After the failure of the first round, the difficult negotiations will be resumed next week between the five major powers plus Germany (P5+1) and a "moderate" Iran, to reach a balanced agreement, perhaps within months if intentions are sincere, that would allow for putting a stop to uranium enrichment and placing the Iranian nuclear program under complete international supervision, in exchange for gradually lifting sanctions. That is if the Americans do not commit another blunder by pressuring their allies, and especially France, to accept a formula that would give Tehran much more than it would take from it, in their rush to achieve rapprochement that would open the door to parallel agreements, among them safe withdrawal from Afghanistan, after they had leapt over those allies and neglected them during their negotiations with the Russians of the agreement to dismantle Syria's chemical arsenal. And despite the effectiveness of France's "breaks" to America's hurried policy in the previous round, both Washington and Tehran have a strong desire to reach a "Grand Settlement" that would exceed the nuclear issue to other areas of overlapping influence. In reality, such a desire clashes with domestic difficulties both of them face. This is especially true in the United States, where numerous members of Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, have been voicing their opposition to a hurried deal with Iran that would not ensure putting a stop to its nuclear program, and calling for strengthening sanctions in order to force Tehran to submit to the will of the international community. The White House has resorted to frightening Americans against "another war" the sanctions could drag them into, but this has has not succeeded to soften the stance taken by those who oppose it. Meanwhile in Iran, the new government is finding it difficult to back down on uranium enrichment, an issue which Supreme Leader of the Republic Ali Khamenei has designated as a red line that cannot be crossed, raised as a slogan tantamount to the country's independence and sovereignty, to which successive governments were bound. Indeed, relinquishing the "right" to enrich uranium might leave the impression that Tehran could back down on other essential issues as well, among them in particular the issue of Syria, thereby increasing pressures on it in every issue, while it would prefer to negotiate over them all at once, in such a way as to compensate in one what it might lose in another. This is an option the Americans seem inclined to opt for because it is convenient for them as well, while the Europeans stress the principle of keeping the different issues separate. And although these obstacles faced by the Americans and the Iranians reduce the margin of negotiations and embarrass both sides, they might also drive them, along with other reasons, to achieve what the Americans consider to represent a "historical breakthrough" that could save them both, despite the fact that it would mean violating the conditions and red lines they had always stressed, and letting down the allies they continue to reassure. Obama's popularity has dropped to its lowest point, with 54 percent of Americans now considering the President, whose administration and healthcare program are meeting with difficulties, to be "dishonest and untrustworthy". The Iranians, for their part, are making sure to deny that the tough sanctions might be behind their decision to resume negotiations with the West, without providing any other clear reasons apart from speaking of "an opportunity that must be seized". Meanwhile, reports assert that their economic and financial capabilities have reached "rock bottom", and now not only pose a threat to their influence abroad, but also threaten with broad domestic social unrest, which the new government claims to only be due to the mistaken policies that had been adopted during Ahmadinejad's two successive terms in office. Perhaps the reports now being published about Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's "real estate and financial empire" make it clear that the economic influence with which Khamenei has compensated for his reduced religious authority, when compared to that of his predecessor Khomeini, could be threatened as well.
