Iran is working on two interwoven tracks. On one track, it is taking advantage of the mutual exchange of positive signals between itself and Washington in order to spread the notion that it now has extensive clout in the region and complete freedom to deal with its affairs, under the pretext that the Americans are now on the verge of recognizing its influence in the region and its sponsorship of Shiite footholds in some of its countries. On the other, it is taking a series of escalatory steps in our region, meant to inflame existing regional tensions, with the aim of increasingly embarrassing the United States vis-à-vis its allies and of pressuring the latter to go along with what it views as American regression. And while it suffices itself with luring the West with marginal "concessions" of pure form on the issue of its nuclear program, expressing doubts about Western intentions despite speaking of the possibility for talks with the P5+1 group of countries reaching a framework agreement, it seeks to take the utmost advantage of the obscurity dominating the phase of exploring intentions. It does this by trying to impose itself as party to everything that concerns the region's affairs, in particular the negotiations meant to be take place at the Geneva II conference, with the aim of affecting their course and coordinating with Moscow to thwart their main goal of forming a transitional authority in Damascus. Yet the refusal of the Arabs, and especially of Saudi Arabia, to distinguish between the regimes of Khamenei and Assad, and their insistence on considering them both to represent a single entity waging a battle to preserve the sectarian Syrian regime in the face of its people, has led the Americans to break their stride. This might be temporary, but it has clearly appeared in the preliminary talks held in Geneva two days ago, which failed to set a date for the conference – since Damascus still rejects the notion of a transitional phase – or to reach an agreement over Iran's participation. Arab attempts to correct the course taken by the American stance are coupled with repeated demands for Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) and Lebanese Hezbollah forces to withdraw from Syria, and for Tehran to stop encouraging Iraqi Shiite militias to join those defending its ally. In the face of Arab insistence on breaking the hegemony of Russia's vision for a solution in Syria, and placing limits on any role to be played by Iran, the Iranians have resorted to directing blows at the two weakest Arab links: Yemen and Lebanon. Thus the Houthis have unexpectedly ignited the security situation in Northern Yemen and thwarted repeated efforts towards appeasement, while the secessionists, some of whom are sponsored and funded by Tehran, have caused tension in Southern Yemen. This is despite the fact that the national reconciliation conference in Sanaa, sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), had taken several important steps forward on the path to restoring stability. Similarly, the latest speech by the Secretary-General of Hezbollah has clearly revealed his insistence on preventing any step from being taken in Lebanon that might lead to strengthening the role of the state and activating its constitutional institutions. He also declared, speaking for Tehran, that the decision was his to make, whether with regard to forming a government cabinet, electing a president or determining foreign policy, while paying no heed to the threats of collapse knocking at the door of the country's economy and social structure. And the repeated eruption of the security situation in Tripoli does not depart from such a trend. Tehran is trying at the same time to take advantage of the Muslim Brotherhood's predicament after the series of relapses it has suffered, especially in Egypt. For this purpose, it is putting forward proposals to a puzzled Turkey and a secluded Hamas movement, so as to attract them towards itself once again, after the rupture caused by its stance on the Syrian regime, with the aim of forging a new alliance to besiege the moderate Arab line, their common rival. Tehran may well resort to escalation in other areas, among them Bahrain, where national dialogue is being impeded as a result of signals from Iran, while the country's leadership asserts that dialogue represents the only way to resolve any problems. Yet Iran's assault is based much more on its ability to wreak havoc than its ability to take control of the situation in the countries targeted. It also assumes that victory in Syria belongs to Bashar Al-Assad's regime, something which is inconsistent with reality, despite some of the military obstacles encountered by the opposition. Likewise, it assumes that relations between the United States and its Arab allies have reached a dead-end due to the difference in their methods, something which was negated by John Kerry's visit to Riyadh a few days ago, the results of which are beginning to appear.
