Preparations for the Geneva 2 peace conference are facing several problems, which have naturally generated leaks and predictions that the conference will be postponed, whether to January or even beyond. The first essential conundrum involves the question of how to create a working framework for the conference, specifically with regard to establishing a transitional government with full executive powers and the role of Syrian President Bashar Assad and his top allies in such an authority. The chief sides concerned with this task continue to disagree over the precise formula for a role – or lack of role – for Assad in terms of the actions and prerogatives of the transitional government. Russia does not have a conception of how to translate its position that the beginning of this phase does not mean that it will end with Assad's staying on. Meanwhile, the United States does not have a clear plan for the formula that it accepted, namely that the beginning of the transitional phase is not conditioned on Assad's departure. Between the beginning and end of this transitional phase lie a number of obstacles and fears, which are not restricted to the issue of how to represent the opposition in Geneva, or the regional powers that should take part in a settlement in, and over, Syria. In the event that there is no surprise in the meeting between Russian and American officials on Monday over the working framework for Geneva 2, Assad will have made himself the prime impediment to convening the conference, by setting the condition that Gulf states must halt their support for terrorists. The media of Assad and his allies have promoted the idea that the US-Russian agreement on getting rid of Syria's chemical weapons was a victory for the Syrian president, because it requires his remaining in power in return for this concession. But the head of the regime remains unconvinced that Moscow will share this victory with him if it retains its stance that the end of the transitional process requires Assad's departure, if the beginning of the process requires that he remain in power. Assad is concerned with the Russian position because he has given up hope in a change in the American position, which says he must go, and that it is no longer possible to rebuild Syria politically and economically with him around. This is despite the political-media campaign fabricated by his supporters that hints Washington has altered its stance. There are worries about the Russian position because Assad is aware that his remaining in power has become a negotiating card in the hands of Moscow, and is not a card for Washington to hold in the first place. The US does not have many cards in Syria or is not concerned with the Middle East and the region, except from the standpoint of the security of its Israeli ally. If Assad becomes such a card, this means that it is possible to dispose of him in the process of concluding deals and political settlements. There is another aspect of this fundamental obstacle to the possibility of Geneva 2 being a success: the degree to which Iran is ready to accept a transitional authority with full executive power in Syria, as a presumed partner in supporting the establishment of such an authority, since leading powers insist on Tehran's attendance at a Geneva conference. If Assad's presence and continuity in power are a Russian card, its prime partner in possessing this card, Tehran, is not ready to bargain over it. In assuming that Iran is ready to bargain, it is difficult to imagine that it will do so with the same ease as Russia. Iran has made sacrifices to prevent Assad's fall for power, whether through sending money or fighters, or involving Hezbollah in the Syrian quagmire. Tehran has given satisfactory signals to Washington about giving up its nuclear weapons and its readiness to prove that its nuclear program is about the peaceful production of energy. But holding on to Syria represents a "bomb" that is an alternative to nuclear weapons, and it serves as a key link to extending its regional influence. Even though there is currently a separation between the American (and western) negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program and the US-Russian understanding over Syria via the agreement on ridding the country of chemical weapons and striving for a political settlement at Geneva, it is impossible to ignore the fine thread that holds both issues together. If Moscow must take Iran into consideration in dealing with the bargaining chip of Assad's remaining in power as it negotiates with Washington, then Washington must in turn take Israel's calculations into consideration as it and Moscow negotiate with Iran over the nuclear issue. The Jewish state is not reassured by the progress in Iran's relations with the White House of Barack Obama unless this includes guarantees for Israel's security, and this includes the role of Hezbollah in Lebanon and in Syria. Obama cannot ignore Israel's interests the way he ignores the interests of his Gulf allies. Thus, the repercussions of the possible agreement with Iran over its nuclear program must include negotiations between Iran and Israel over guarantees for its security. This represents the link between the nuclear issue and the formulas that will govern Geneva 2. And this raises the question of whether progress on one track requires waiting for progress on the other, and vice versa. In the end, it is difficult to separate negotiations over a political solution in Syria from the Iranian nuclear issue, which involves regional influence, without entering into a grand deal over how to distribute this influence. In the interim, the Great Powers have no problem in expressing sorrow over the humanitarian situation in Syria, and looking on as the cat-and-mouse war goes on.
