It is no longer possible to get around the demands and conditions of Lebanese political sides with regard to a solution for the Lebanese crisis, which has been about a government vacuum and fears about a vacuum in the presidency during next May's election, when President Michel Suleiman's term ends, and the possibility that already-delayed parliamentary elections will not be held in the fall. Even the proposals put forward by "centrists" are no longer viable for discussion by any of the parties to the stalemate, which is growing deeper. At times the proposals are considered to be in the interest of one of the sides and thus biased; at other times, they are seen as desperate attempts whose successful implementation cannot be guaranteed by their authors. This is because the decision over the crisis is much bigger than these proposals, the local Lebanese scene, and any good intentions. Contrary to the content of these public statements and stances, which mask people's need to see their daily affairs and economic matters seen to because of an economic crisis that is being aggravated by the political crisis and that justifies calls on the other side to solve the crisis, the two publics – of the March 8 and March 14 coalitions – have not become fed up with their political leaders or their clinging to demands and conditions vis-à-vis an exit from the national political crisis. The sectarian and religious polarization has become a reason for the supporters of both camps to accuse the other of causing general paralysis and deterioration, which could afflict Lebanese institutions concerned with people's daily affairs and interests and treating their daily concerns. There is no truth to all of these justifications made by leaders of any group, namely that the Lebanese have begun to hate their leaders. The reality is that these people maintain their blind loyalty to these leaders and go as far as to blame the leaders of the other camp for the deteriorating economic and security situation, even if their leaders are the cause of this. The daily incitement and constant mobilization underway, even on the simplest of issues, have been carried out to preserve the sectarian and religious polarization, which reaches a new peak every time. Each time Lebanon witnesses a huge event, some public opinion leaders become hopeful of dismantling the "state of alert" for supporters of the two camps. Disappointment then quickly sets in for such people. Many are betting that when the regional moment comes, the political settlement can be drawn up and the leaders will force their supporters to accept it, as in every time in the past. However, it is worrying to see that local leaders and groups have been forced to raise the ceiling of their demands, which hampers these leaders even more; it then becomes difficult for them to back away from such demands. The most prominent example here is Hezbollah. Since it has been forced to send thousands of its fighters to Syria to defend the regime, it must engage in the highest level of hard-line stances in Lebanon, in parallel with the launching of a phase of western-Iranian negotiations, so that the Iranian negotiations can retain all of their cards before it is time to strike deals, make concessions, and achieve benefits. But the game of raising the ceiling does away with the process of retaining cards and fiercely holding them, and leads to keeping Lebanon subject to the results of big regional deals. This means using Lebanon as an arena for supply and support for the Syrian regime in its confrontation with the opposition. This in turn leads to even further domestic polarization and increases sectarian sensitivities, and does not help even in translating presumed victories in Syria into acknowledgement from rivals in Lebanon about the demands made by Hezbollah and its allies. It leads instead to making it easier to bring the chaos of Syria to inside Lebanon, and renders the other side fixed in its positions, unwilling to alter them. Thus, the accusation by March 8 groups that their rivals are wagering on developments outside the country is to their advantage in Lebanon. It is like putting yourself in the trap of this accusation, to see it rebound against you if it strikes your rivals. The situation in Lebanon has become impossible to solve if solutions are left to domestic political forces. Countries that are concerned with Lebanon, whether regional or great powers, should search for a Geneva 1 and Geneva 2 to solve the crisis, to get the country out of a situation that is threatening its economy and social fabric. These are liable to explode if the struggle continues in this fashion. Perhaps these countries, before urging participation in a Geneva 2 conference for Syria, should bring about a solution for Lebanon, such as forming a government. The other day, the American ambassador to Lebanon, David Hale, said "It is a special thing when Russia, America, China, the Europeans, the UN and other international bodies agree on something. Today, they agree on some basic principles and goals in support of Lebanon. Our common agenda for Lebanon stands apart from any developments elsewhere in the Middle East." What is the point of him saying this if he does not mean isolating the crisis over Lebanon's political vacuum from the negotiating underway over Syria and the region? This is the responsibility of both Moscow and Washington.
