Similar to the external dimension of the Lebanese crisis, where the open confrontation with the outside characterizes the conduct of the opposition, there is also an external dimension to the Iranian crisis, where the same confrontation specifies the course of the political process. Those who were hoping for the presidential elections in Iran to end with the defeat of the conservative trend represented by president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad just because the voters wished so, were deluded. The same thing happened in Lebanon, where the votes of electors – which could not be rigged like in Iran – could not express themselves through political action, and hence in the formation of the new government. The response came indirectly yesterday from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who said it is no longer allowed for the representatives of the opposing camp (which is “accused” of being a reform camp) to win. Khamenei warned against any attempt to turn Iran into “a fake Islamic Republic with a sectarian nature but an Islamic face”, reminding of what happened during the tenure of President Mohammad Khatami between 1997 and 2005. In such a context, how would the moderate candidates have won, or even how would they have been allowed to win, amidst an intensified confrontation between Iran and the West on its nuclear dossier – the same one that has been pending for more than seven years? How would it have been possible to organize flawless elections, when the confrontation with the West prevails over the interest of the Iranian regime with its democratic image – especially in light of the impression spread by the pillars of this regime that any defeat of the conservatives would be categorized under Western gains at the expense of the rights of the “Iranian nation”? Khamenei has set the ceiling of compromises with the necessity of being determined to defend the rights of Iran in the nuclear field, since waiving those rights would imply “the collapse of the regime”. In his words: “We will take the road to collapse if we showed our weakness to the oppressors and backed off instead of resisting them”. Before that, Ahmadinejad had considered that the door of negotiations with the West on the nuclear issue had been “shut”, but he suggested to President Barack Obama to meet “any time, any place” and discuss global issues. This same offer was mentioned in the suggestions made by Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki to the representatives of western countries in Tehran. It is an offer for dialogue and negotiation in order to provide the right setting for a permanent peace. It is also a discussion that would involve the various issues regarding security, politics, the economy, and culture! This is an offer of the same caliber as the one previously heard by westerners in a message addressed by Iran in August 2008, which did not include any specific response to the demands of stopping uranium enrichment. What the West heard this time was summarized by the spokeswoman of Javier Solana, when she said that Iran had not responded in its latest suggestions to the questions regarding its nuclear program. In the face of the West's efforts to keep away the “cup” of confrontation that has become more imminent with Iran, it seems there are Iranian efforts being made towards such a conflict at any price. In the current Iranian setting, a confrontation of this sort would strengthen the regime and push its internal opponents to silence and shame. Once again, the domestic and foreign scene are linked. Khamenei's threat to retaliate severely against anyone who would “brandish a sword” in the face of the regime is aimed at Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi as much as it is aimed at Obama, Merkel, and Sarkozy. The nuclear card is the weapon that allows the Iranian regime to cover its internal issues, and this is fine if the expected price of this stance is some additional sanctions. Tehran's wager here remains, as it was previously, on the Russians and the Chinese, and on a non-negligible number of western companies that see nothing wrong in rallying around the regime of sanctions if this serves their interest. In this context, what remains of Barack Obama's “extended hand” to Iran? In any case, is there anyone in Tehran who actually cares about this hand?
