Activists and writers are trying to refute and criticize the discourse of the Jihadist Takfiri groups, by using means drawn from the same system of ideas and doctrines on which the Takfiris are basing their opinions, visions, and sentences. The activists are thus trying to show these Takfiris' deficiencies and ignorance when it comes to the principles and sciences of religion, jurisprudence, and the Islamic Sharia'a in general, as well as the spread of selectiveness and the absence of a strict methodology governing the issuance of fatwas and the establishment of the origins of jurisprudence, in order to shed light on the false practices of the Takfiris, along with their actions that are harming the interests of the Nation. This approach was recently put forward in the context of the search for tools to deter the threat which has started to be posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) on the Syrian revolution and the future of the country and its civil society, not to mention the clear services this faction is offering – whether intentionally or unintentionally – to Bashar al-Assad's regime. But in our opinion, this is a useless effort. Indeed, criticizing the ideology of the Takfiris belonging to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant among other organizations, is much like the attempts to expose the contradictions of rejectionism and the emptiness and decadence of its discourse. This is due to the fact that criticism, exposure and revelations are inefficient tools when accompanied by the complete disregarding of a complex structure of interests, identities and belongings. In addition, criticism is either based on a balance of determined political powers or is non-existent, as it turns into sentimental reflections that have no role in determining the course of change. As for its necessity as a cultural work, it is a completely different issue. For example, is it not puzzling that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant managed to control wide Syrian areas whose liberation cost thousands of martyrs and wounded and massive destruction? Does this not require a look into the social and political environment providing this parasitical organization with elements of strength, immunity and the ability to face all the formations of the Free Army and exploit their contradictions and disputes as it has happened and is still happening in Rakka and Aazaz? Despite the countless journalistic material talking about the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, it is very rare for the reader to encounter a report capable of helping him understand the social base supporting, protecting and facilitating the expansion of the organization. And blaming the intelligence formations of the regime, the alliance between the remaining thugs and the immigrants and the role of foreign intelligence services, is not enough to explain the strength of this phenomenon and the reason why it is not being stopped before it spreads. As for the talk about responding to and refuting the organization's discourse, by relying on logic and debates and by shedding light on the right speech and the right opinion, it is much similar to what the Arabs tried to do at the level of their conflict with Israel. Indeed, throughout decades, it was believed that the West and the world will change their biased opinion in favor of Israel, if the undeniable justness of the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian rights is shown. But those advocating this opinion refused to recognize that the size of international interests in supporting Israel, its stability and security, exceeds by far the size of the world's sympathy with the Palestinian tragedy. And today, the Palestinian cause has reached its known predicament. Therefore, the issue is neither cognitive nor ideological. It is not about the extent of the commitment or divergence away from the Sharia'a, and is not necessarily limited to the replacement of a false awareness with the right one. It is primarily linked to the transformations introduced by the current revolutions in Arab societies, at the level of their realities, developmental levels, social structures, and financial interests. Today, the setbacks witnessed in the Arab spring countries are a mere facet of the rebellion of local forces, and the interference of other regional forces along courses that did not rise up to the level of their revolutionary claims. Hence, the current stage might appear to be extremely ambiguous, while waiting for reorganization in societies standing on the thresholds of change.
