When former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stepped down, many imagined that the Revolution had triumphed, and that Egyptian secular forces would seize the opportunity to lay the foundations for a modern state after getting rid of the legacy of the past. Yet these forces became engrossed in a fabricated struggle against the Military Council during the transitional period. It was therefore only natural for them to be defeated in every race, whether a referendum or elections, against the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist supporters, who had set their goal, maintained their focus and achieved it. And when President Mohamed Morsi was deposed and the Muslim Brotherhood removed from power, secular forces remained as they were, unable to seize an opportunity that might never come again, far from the street and from the people, and continuing to suffer from the same chronic illnesses despite finding themselves under a different government and different circumstances. Had the Egyptian Revolution, since it erupted on January 25, 2011, or since it flared up on June 30 of this year, produced political elites, or popular leaders unaffiliated to the military institution, this whole debate about supporting or rejecting the candidacy of Defense Minister Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in the coming presidential elections would not have taken place. Indeed, the truth is that most of the prominent figures who took the forefront of the stage, attracted the limelight or were attracted to it, only to later be sabotaged by the competition or to sabotage themselves by their own deeds, thus losing their popularity for various reasons, were long talked about but maintained the impression that has become entrenched among the people about them – namely that they, including most of those who ran as candidates in the last presidential elections, have sought to reap the benefits of the Revolution, which gained no benefit from them. The situation thus reached the present extent of political vacuum, making people, or at least most people, tie their hopes and ambitions to a single person, and believe that the absence of such a person from the presidential seat in the coming phase would mean keeping the situation as it is today, i.e. devoid of stability or hope to achieve prosperity. Suffice it to take note of the reactions of those same former candidates to the presidency, when asked about the issue of Al-Sisi's candidacy, to realize the extent of their weakness and their wish for the man not to run as candidate, so that they may themselves maintain hopes of winning the coveted seat! Egypt is busy with the steps along the political roadmap, with the work of the Committee of Fifty drafting the constitution, the preparation of the climate for a referendum in two months over its clauses, and the parliamentary elections after that, and whether they will take place according to the system of individual districts or of proportional lists. It is also busy with the activity, movement, and stances of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as by the displays of opposition to Morsi's removal by its members, which include strikes only they abide by, demonstrations only they take part in, protests only their supporters answer the call to, and moves to obstruct people's daily lives, such as the issue of the metro or that of keeping mobile phones busy – which always fail because people steer clear of them. And between the terrorist attacks in the Sinai, as well as other attacks in the capital and in some provinces targeting army and police forces, and the campaigns to eliminate Brotherhood-affiliated, terrorist and criminal havens, as took place in the villages of Dalga in Minya and Kardasa in Giza, people are not waiting for a time when the Muslim Brotherhood will abandon its obstinacy and the terrorists their terrorism. Indeed, there is a prevalent belief among citizens, and even the poorest among them, that the Brotherhood will continue to the bitter end to protest by all means and in all places available to it, in order to regain the legitimacy it seeks, achieve the foreign intervention it beseeches and restore the popular consensus it has lost. And if those in power are busy with the roadmap and trying to resolve problems that exceed their capabilities and the competence of their ministers and officials, the Muslim Brotherhood is busy breathlessly seeking after new ways to harass people. What is the use of elites, of political parties, and forces, those present in the Committee of Fifty, those constantly appearing on satellite television and frequently participating in meetings, seminars and conferences? What connection do they have to the street and what trust do people have in them? Do they have what it takes to fill the space the Islamists had occupied in society? The situation in fact indicates that Egyptian secular forces have failed miserably to gain people's trust, not just during the transitional period under the rule of the Military Council, or afterwards during Morsi's presidency, but even after the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood has been brought to an end. This is not to mention those who had become shining stars during the January 25 Revolution, who tried to ride the wave of the June 30 Revolution and failed. They changed their course and sought a third revolution, but neither did the Muslim Brotherhood welcome them nor did the rest of the Egyptian people accept them. Secular forces kept complaining that Mubarak's regime was besieging them, and warning against the use of electoral bribes by the Islamists, in sugar, oil, and funds, and while using religion to bypass people's awareness. And then, after Mubarak was gone, after his regime was toppled, after Morsi was deposed and after the Muslim Brotherhood was removed from power and hunted down, secular forces remained scattered and divided, fighting amongst themselves, and brought together only by competition over Mubarak's legacy, and the Brotherhood's as well.
