It would not be an incredible finding to say that getting the basic necessities to sustain the minimum level of livelihood in the Gaza Strip is inherently linked to Egypt, as long as no one can force the Israeli government to lift the siege imposed on the Gaza population. This reality was transformed by Hamas's leaders - who are ruling the Strip - into a source of problems of all types with Cairo, thus pushing some spokesmen for the movement to shift the state of hostility towards Egypt and focus their instigation against the Egyptian transitional authority. Hamas's command in the Strip mixed geographic facts, interests, and ideological belonging, without any regard for the price paid by the Gaza population. This is considered a major political mistake that is still being committed by Hamas's leaders in the Strip, even though they are aware of the fact that its repercussions on the population and the ability to secure its basic needs will be extremely negative. The denial of the serious accusations made by the Egyptian authorities against Hamas of interfering in Egyptian affairs through its political bias in favor of the Muslim Brotherhood group and its military wing, by training Islamists to carry out explosions and sometimes even participating in military operations against the governmental troops in Sinai, is not enough to dissipate this mix-up. Indeed, in light of the official character of these accusations, the Islamic movement ought to provide the Egyptian authorities with all the information and investigations they ask for, to eliminate any doubts. But Hamas did not do that and has not even shown willingness to discuss it. This means that the movement's command in the Strip, or at least part of it, is collaborating with the armed extremists who are trying to retaliate against the Egyptian authorities in Sinai, or that this command is unaware of the special important given by the Egyptian authorities to stability and security in Sinai. In both cases, the movement is committing a grave mistake at the level of the relations with Cairo. This mistake becomes lethal when Hamas considers it can repeat the experience of the hostility it adopted as a policy towards former President Hosni Mubarak's regime, relying on the depth of a strategy secured by the Syrian regime, Iran, and Hezbollah, as well as on some Gulf support. Today, this chain has been greatly weakened after the collapse of an important link in it due to the Syrian developments, the retreat of Iran and Hezbollah in regard to Syrian affairs, and the emergence of reluctance in the Gulf towards the Muslim Brotherhood group and its Arab branches. And at a time when the Arab changes should have pushed the Palestinians to achieve rapprochement towards the completion of the reconciliation agreement, Hamas rushed to tense up the situation with the authority in the West Bank through unilateral measures to tighten its grip over the Strip and the obstruction of the agreed on procedural steps. Cairo considers that its interests are being damaged and its influence undermined the more the Palestinian reconciliation grows distant, accusing Hamas of standing behind this situation without the latter undertaking any steps to dissipate this political accusation. But before that, Hamas was accused of transforming the Gaza Strip into a rear base for the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, but also of acting as a model for it in Egypt through the Islamists' seizing of positions and villages, their defense by use of weapons and the implementation of what they consider to be Islamic rulings. This was seen after elements in the movement played a role in attacking Egyptian prisons and releasing Islamists who are now fighting the Egyptian armed forces in Sinai among other regions. Regardless of the ideological ties between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood group, taking sides at the level of the Egyptian domestic situation is no longer a mere political position. It is part of a bloody confrontation in Egypt, which is exactly what Hamas is doing now.
