Perhaps the chemical attack in Ghouta has re-galvanized the idea of intervention that could follow the Kosovo model, or the Libya model. This is what a growing number of Western politicians and observers are alluding to, each in his or her way. In truth, regardless of any or all reservations here or there regarding intervention, it remains today the only way to limit the region's accelerating decay, and not Syria's alone. In light of the inability of either side in the conflict to settle the battle in its favor, and in light of the broad overlap among the Syrian revolution, the Syrian civil war, and the regional crisis, the only ace in the sleeve left is foreign intervention. To be sure, there is nothing worse than the status quo, and what it could result in, whether in Syria itself, or in Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and even Turkey. The assumption that the Obama administration has finally overcome its impotence, reluctance, and cowardice, must be matched with the Syrians and Arabs overcoming impotence and reluctance over several fateful issues. Indeed, there are experiences that must not be repeated just to be loyal to our ideological ‘benevolent ancestors,' so that we can avoid a repeat of the disaster following Nasser's clash with Western influence in the region, after the United States rescued the Egyptian president in 1956 and paved the way for his pan-Arab leadership; and so that we may also avoid a repeat of what happened in Iraq, where the United States toppled a dictator after which the country was offered as a gift to the U.S.'s number one foe, Iran. Naturally, we are perhaps asking for too much, as the above has to do with many political and cultural complications. But an intervention that would prepare for the overthrow of the regime of Bashar al-Assad would allow, if only in principle, renewed hope that a historic reconciliation between the Arab Levant and the West in general could be initiated. It goes without saying that Syria, at least since the mid-1950s, was the party that set the agenda of that ongoing conflict and fueled it, while drawing the function of other parties involved in the conflict with the West in neighboring countries. As long as this approach, which used Palestine and its 'liberation' as a pretext, is linked to strengthening the grip of tyranny in Damascus and its regional hegemony, one may assume the opposite would happen if tyranny falls. This viewpoint helps combat the rampant decay from another angle. Indeed, if the Iranian takeover of Iraq has revived sectarian bonds, because it in and of itself empowers one sect against another, then striking at the Iranian influence in Syria could help reinforce national bonds. Though this task seems conditional upon also taking down the jihadi and takfiri groups, and reassuring the Alawi minority and other minorities, the resulting stronger relationship with the West would be a relative guarantee for the success of this mission. It may be possible, with some symbolism, to say that the United States supported the Syrian nation-state when it put pressure towards pulling out Syrian troops from Lebanon in the aftermath of the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005. Indeed, that was a blow to the imperialist project operating at the expense of the Syrians and the Lebanese, while it was impossible for it, by definition, to coexist with the concept of the nation-state. Now, in the event of intervention, this will act as further support for the project of the Syrian nation-state, where the symbolism would lie in the withdrawal of Hezbollah's fighters from Syria.
