It appears that the Bloody Decade of Algeria may be in the process of being replicated in Egypt. It does not seem that tens of thousands of casualties, economic collapse, and the surrender to permanent feelings of fear will prevent the repetition of the same kind of chain of events that led to the disbandment of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). While there is a large difference between the Algerian and Egyptian experiences, for instance the fact that the FIS never took power, and while moderate Islamist groups are no longer a source of concern for Western partners today, the concepts of moderation and extremism have not yet been defined in the context of power. Those who were classed as moderates are now closer to being extremists. The West has not issued value-based judgments; rather, retaining power at any cost is the criterion that is determining realities and attitudes these days. Meanwhile, it is paradoxical that the same factions that backed the Islamists' rule in Egypt are the ones whose fears only increased when the country took a turn towards blind extremism, with the logic of weapons overshadowing other approaches centering on dialogue, persuasion, and coexistence. It is very difficult to put a large wedge between the two concepts; though moderation as a value and conviction cannot turn into extremism, the latter might find justifications for itself upon an ideological and critical assessment of moderation and integration as a policy. Even when assuming that the suspension of political life that existed until the impeachment of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was the primary reason behind the current confrontation, retaking power democratically cannot take place through a confrontation that uses the street as a weapon. In the Algerian experience, the starting point was the vacuum left behind by a political, economic, and social system, under the dominance of the single party. The emergence of the FIS took place on the back of the transition to a pluralist formula and a free market economy, which cleared the way for the advent of new elites from outside the Liberation Front and its associates. It was understood that a change of this magnitude would no doubt impact the structures of the regime and society, given the influence of long decades of French colonialism and the attempts to distort the country's identity. However, Islamists in Algeria were not oppressed or persecuted before, because they did not exist as a political party, but as ideological organizations and movements active in preaching and advocacy. By contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had many bitter political experiences, characterized by much restriction and marginalization. Though it is well known that factions from the FIS adopted violence and sought shelter in the Aures Mountains and woodlands from the army's brutal crackdown, things are different, or were supposed to be different, for Egypt's Islamists, who have amassed considerable political experience and currency throughout their episodes. Ultimately, the Algerians were exhausted by the repercussions of the bloody conflict, and started looking for harmony with those who accepted it. The Algerians, in turn, had wagered on change though the ballot boxes, but were disenfranchised when the ballot boxes brought the worst possible outcome, namely, absence of security, stability, and the sense of belonging to the homeland rather than to parties or groups. The Egyptian street is not an exception in rejecting violence. Those who protested at Tahrir Square wanted a peaceful change, and no one can question the democratic dimension of their demand, while the supporters of the impeached president wanted the continuation of the status quo without any democratic underpinnings. Indeed, their commitment to legitimacy did not foster any democratic initiatives, including, at the very least, a deferred return to the polls, as this is better than no return at all. The Islamist rule in Egypt did not face a foreign enemy or foreign challenges, but only internal anger. When it comes to both regimes that hunkered down to defend themselves and their elites, and those who are today defending a regime that they lost, because they did not know how to preserve it, the conclusions are very similar. But why all this pride over a regime that did not last for more than a year, as if there hadn't been many accumulated irregularities that exacerbated the outrage? Is it enough to say that legitimacy was deposed by a coup to erase all past mistakes? Was it necessary for the confrontation to reach the point of no return? Harmony in Algeria required strong will, after the conflict left many victims without graves or tombstones. Here, it is feared most that Egypt may be drawn to the same bitter fate as Algeria. As the events have demonstrated the dangers of using religion for political goals, new ideas must be adopted to prohibit the formation of parties on religious, ethnic, or sectarian grounds. Indeed, this is safer than subjecting the identity of Arab societies to further sectarian conflicts; to be sure, the wounds of previous sectarian conflicts have yet to heal.
