By announcing his commitment to the preservation of the democratic heritage, the furtherance of the institutions' work, and the respect of the rule of law, Lebanese Army Commander General Jean Kahwaji confirmed that the army was standing behind the political authority and defending it. In the "order of the day" issued on the 68th anniversary of the establishment of the Lebanese army, Kahwaji stressed that "the army is the institution of November 22 (the day of independence from the French Mandate) and we reiterate today that we are holding on to the Lebanese constitution and its preamble which stems from the Document of National Accord." This talk is very accurate, considering that never in its history did the Lebanese army exit the elected legitimate authority. All attempts at this level – the most famous of which is the coup carried out by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party at the end of 1961 – were from outside the military institution and did not emerge from the army barracks and positions. But the deeper dimension of Kahwaji's statements is that the Lebanese army firstly reflects the image of a democratic regime, which is based on the consensual formula that surfaced after independence and was enhanced by the Taef Accord. In other words, the army is responsible for the defense of the regime that is based on concord between the various groups, since the authority in Lebanon stems from this concord. Hence, democracy is the fruit of coexistence between the groups, their authority and their laws, which are tailored to fit their needs. As for the foreign sponsorship of Lebanese concord, it is a decisive factor in ensuring stability. The army's role at this level is to protect the final formula that resulted from these factors. But the problem arises whenever internal or regional balance is shaken. This is when the army starts seeking a balance that has disappeared from the entire country. And unlike the remaining state institutions – for which it is relatively easy to resume their activities far away from the political climate – the army, as a pure expression of national sovereignty and the one assigned to use violence to defend it, is deeply puzzled. Following the retreat of the major dissent carried out by Muslim officers and soldiers between 1975 and 1976 under the headline of Lebanon's Arab Army, which was conducted with clear Palestinian sponsorship, the army went back to being part of the advanced Christian positions in the Lebanese state until 1983. This is when it fully engaged in the Mount Lebanon war alongside the Lebanese Forces to prevent the fall of the Eastern region's entrances, thus pushing the brigades with a Muslim majority to side with their sects especially following the February 6, 1984 uprising. Upon the end of the war and the establishment of the "Syrian peace," the Lebanese state's relationship with the army manifested itself with a new military doctrine, ending the previous intentional ambiguity and stating that Israel is Lebanon's enemy and Syria its friend. During the crisis provoked by the extension of the term of President Emile Lahoud and the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri – which is still ongoing – the army adopted a theoretical approach by announcing its commitment to the general headlines of national unity. But the practical application was completely different and more in line with the political and field balances. And when the demonstrations erupted in rejection of the stay of the Syrian troops in Lebanon, the army abstained from dispersing the demonstrators from the squares, and was even said to have facilitated their arrival to them. But on the other hand, it abstained for example from responding to Hezbollah's attack against Beirut on May 7, 2008. Since the revolution broke out in Syria, the search for the desired balance has become much more difficult. In addition, the army was subjected to difficult tests and was unable to confirm its neutrality in some of them. Its performance rather reflected the balances of the Lebanese and regional powers, being the victim of the absence of national concord and its limited capabilities and likely contributing, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to the deepening of domestic imbalance.
