The rulers did not fear the people before. The people were under control. People and political parties, when these existed, were prisoners, not to mention trade unions and the media. The rulers only feared the military and the appetite for power among those ascending its ranks. Saddam Hussein subjected the army to a permanent purge, and to the authority of his security services and party, and then subjected the latter to his personal will. Hafez al-Assad army engineered the army in a way that made it impossible to return to the era of coups and the balances of power that stood before. He oversaw promotions and eradicated unruly ambitions before they grew out of control. He subjected the army and the party to the security services, and then made the latter compete among one another to serve the master of decisions at the palace and in the country. Early on, Muammar Gaddafi feared the army that brought him to power. He dwarfed it, reined it in, and turned it into disparate battalions, the command of which he distributed among his sons. In Egypt, the rule was that the master of the palace came from the army. Meanwhile, the Egyptian armed forces saw many transformations because of the vicissitudes in the country. The army came to possess a network of extensive economic interests and a budget that no one outside the army could discuss; the army retained the image of the guardian. Indeed, the army guarded the regime, and would be summoned to suppress the ‘terrorists,' or in case ‘riots' came to threaten the higher interests of the country and its national security. The Arab Spring, however, changed the rules of the game. Social media allowed a handful of young Egyptians to shake symbols and shatter halos. Social media enabled them to ignite a spark that threatened to become a large blaze. The army was no longer able to ‘nip sedition in the bud,' ‘thwart the plot before it gets out of control,' and strike down ‘collaborators' and fabricate cases against them. The Arab Spring troubled rulers greatly and left their armies puzzled. It tested the relationship between the army and the regime, the state itself, the constitution, and the people and their aspirations. What can the army do when the public squares are flooded with protesters chanting "the people want to overthrow the regime," and carrying placards saying "leave"? The Tunisian army decided not to shed blood among the Tunisian people, so the president fled. Gaddafi's battalions splintered on account of the defections and airstrikes, which denied the dictator the thrill of seeing Benghazi destroyed and deserted. The leader was killed, and with him his long-lasting reign. Last May, Ahmed Shafik gave Al-Hayat an account of a meeting he had attended in his earlier capacity as prime minister. He said that former President Mubarak turned to former defense minister Hussein Tantawi and asked him, "Where are your tough men, Hussein?" Tantawi replied that the army could not fire at the people, but Mubarak said," I did not say fire, and I would not accept that. I am just telling you, where are your tough men, because tanks are useless. Where are the men who can stand against the protesters?" This exchange sums up the anxiety of the ruler and the confusion of the army. The military council managed the transition in Egypt with much confusion. The ballot boxes then brought a Muslim Brotherhood president named Mohamed Morsi, who also spent his first year in the palace in much confusion and made mistake after mistake. The new president's conduct perplexed the army. Then millions of people descended to the public squares to topple the Brotherhood's ruler. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the defense minister, chose to side with those he deemed to be the majority, and thus, Egypt saw a quasi-revolution and a quasi-coup. Morsi was toppled, and Egypt embarked on a new transitional phase, but one must wait before the final results of the match are announced. The Syrian regime was caught off guard by the winds of the Arab Spring. It was quick to draw the lessons of other experiences: the public squares packed with peaceful demonstrators were more dangerous than armed dissidents. Any neutrality by the army would nominate it to become the alternative to the rulers; therefore, there could be no squares and no alternatives. The Syrian army quickly became implicated in fighting against "dissidents, marauders, and radical Islamic militants," and rivers of blood flowed. The army entered the game of victory or suicide. It prevented the fall of the regime, but it was forced to accept open military assistance from Hezbollah. The confrontation there became part of the Sunni-Shiite struggle over Syria and the region. The Syrian army was not mired by confusion for long, but it was mired by what is even more difficult. Some believe that the army can rescue the regime at exorbitant cost, but it cannot save the territorial integrity of Syria. The Lebanese army was confused to begin with. The institutions of the state are non-functional, and utter vacuum is preparing to take control of all levers of the state. The army requires a political decision and cover, but they are both absent. The past few months have proven that the borders have fallen, but also that coexistence has fallen. Recent events have provided al-Qaeda a climate that allows it to infiltrate Lebanon. Lebanon cannot be protected with a quasi-state and with cracking and subverted institutions. The Arab Spring has exposed our countries, states, parties, societies, and our archaic ideas and antiquated lexicons. It exposed the fragility of our institutions, borders, and the confusion of our peoples and armies.
