Hezbollah shares responsibility for the bombing in Bir Al-Abed with those who planned and carried it out. Indeed, when the party decided to reduce all of Syria to the Assad regime, to consider its people in revolt to be mere "takfiri groups", and to assume unjustly and unjustifiably that any new regime in Damascus would certainly be against "the Resistance", it was making an enemy of not just the Syrian Revolution, but also of the overwhelming majority of Lebanese and Arabs, who support it and hope that it will change this blood-spattered regime and put an end to its evil forever. And when Hezbollah complied with Tehran's orders – being no stranger to them and not having in the first place the ability to refuse them – by sending its men to fight in defense of its only ally in the region, it publicly opened up a front it had long claimed to make sure to keep closed: the front of Shiite-Sunni strife – with what this means in terms of implicating its own helpless "nurturing environment" in a cycle of action and reaction of the kind that occurred two days ago, in which innocents pay the price for its stances in their safety and their lives, as did before them Syrian civilians who happened to be in the areas where the party was carrying out its operations. Hezbollah of course knew that going to war in Syria would later mean bringing the Syrian war to its home soil. It also knew that the killing in which it implicated itself in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus, under pretexts that convince no one but itself, would not remain confined to the geographical limits it had chosen, inviting the Lebanese who objected to its intervention to confront it there, and would surely move to reach "its own areas". Yet this is the conscious and irrevocable decision Hezbollah has taken, choosing to fight its battle to the end and to cling to its suicidal wager on complete victory or complete defeat, without a care for the consequences this would have even on its own sect itself. This is why the calls of Lebanese politicians, directed at Hezbollah after the bombing, to reconsider its stances and its decision to get implicated in a war beyond the border will only end up as empty talk that will neither be heard nor have any influence on the party's fateful ties to the Assad regime. Indeed, it had in the past been among those who fiercely defended the notion of removing the borders between Lebanon and Syria, has previously acted and is currently acting in such a way as to in effect do away with these borders, opening them up to thousands of its fighters. There is also talk of a "Plan B" that would connect a hypothetical "Alawite State" on the Syrian coast to the Southern Suburb of Beirut (Dahieh). Hezbollah chose to bring down the Mikati government and with it the slogan of "dissociation", which it had been violating in secret, after having become forced to breach it openly. This is why it will not allow a new government to be formed, as it might raise the same slogan again and seek to apply it, if it were to be represented in it, just as it will not allow a government to be formed without its participation. This means that the vacuum in Lebanon will be maintained, and will spread to the country's constitutional institutions one after the other, as long as it serves a further purpose connected to the fate of the Lebanese state itself and to its sovereignty over its territory in general, and its borders in particular. As for security there, it is connected not to how fortified its "perimeters of defiance" are, having already proved possible to breach, but rather to reduced foreign regional interference, especially from Iran, in the affairs of the Arabs and in their revolutions, and to Hezbollah reaching the tangible conclusion that it has entered a war it will not win on the long run, even if it does achieve temporary and inconsequential "victories".
