What has been dubbed the Islamic Awakening was met by a social awakening. The Islamic Awakening relied on interpreting religious scripture so as to agree with its political aspirations. It accepted elections and the recognized branches of government – the executive, legislative and judiciary – while voiding them of their modern significance, crippling their work, and exploiting them for the benefit of the single party (the Muslim Brotherhood), as it waits for the right moment to announce the establishment of the caliphate. Perhaps the experiences of Egypt and Tunisia provide the best examples of such a trend. In Tunisia, the Ennahda Movement tried reluctantly to coexist with modern state institutions, clashing with the other parties that had been its partners in the revolution against Ben Ali's dictatorship. Thus it backs down at times and clings to its ideology at others – striking a balance between its political interpretation of religion and the direction taken by the street; as well as between the direction taken by the international community, especially the United States, and the requirements of remaining in power (Tunisia had been counted among the hawks in confronting the Syrian regime, but its enthusiasm has waned so much as to nearly disappear over the past few months). In Egypt, on the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood considered that its victory in the elections gives it full mandate to change all state institutions. It thus began to subject them to the authority of its Supreme Guide, who would draft domestic and foreign policy and entrust President Mohamed Morsi with its implementation. In other words, the Supreme Guide, the Shura Council, and "the Seat of the Caliphate" formed the true power, turning the President into a "Wali" (governor) who rules in their name, helped in this by the cabinet, the judiciary, and the parliament. Together, these institutions would thus help them apply the theory of "consolidation", i.e. control over all centers of the state, political parties, civil society, the media, the country's armed forces, and its security institution (a number of officers and members of the police force began demanding to be permitted to grow their beards in accordance with Sharia law). In order to apply such a theory, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted a foreign policy of truce-seeking to the extent of submitting to the conditions of the international community (read: the United States). It thus preserved the Camp David Accords with Israel, demolished the tunnels that reached into the Gaza Strip, convinced the Hamas Movement to put a stop to armed resistance, and took it upon itself to turn the latter into a "peaceful" political movement. It stood with a great deal of enthusiasm against the Syrian regime and backed down on reaching an understanding with Iran, considering this to represent its affiliation to the direction taken by the international community in the Middle East, in hopes of achieving "consolidation" and a monopoly on power in Egypt. In other words, the Muslim Brotherhood followed the policies of the former regime in order to cover for its domestic practices. Yet, just as this foreign policy did not protect Mubarak's rule in the face of the masses (and for the first time, the world has come to know what this word means), such "craftiness" could not protect the Brotherhood. The policy of "consolidation" made the regime of the Muslim Brotherhood in a hurry to take control of all state institutions, making enemies of the other political parties, as well as of the two most deeply entrenched and well established institutions in Egypt: the army and Al-Azhar. For the sake of comparison, it took Recep Tayyip Erdogan ten years to take control of the judiciary and the military institution in Turkey, while Morsi began from his first week in office the process of cleansing the judiciary and the Ministry of the Interior, and of changing the laws. He also tried to seize control of Al-Azhar. Meanwhile, the awakening of the masses had its sights set on the "doctrine of deception" adopted by the Brotherhood. Leftist, Nationalist, and Liberal political parties, civil society, and the media made their move, and they all took part in the revolution against dictatorship and oligarchic rule. They demanded freedom and dignity, as well as the restoration of Egypt's role in the Arab World, after decades of coma and of turning its back on everything that was happening in the Levant and in Africa, Egypt's two vital strategic spaces. The people rose up, sought the support of the military and religious institutions, and gained what they had wanted. The Commander-in-Chief of the army stood, with the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar and the Pope of the Coptic Church by his side, driven by fear of Morsi's fatwas and calls to jihad, of the repercussions of this on the domestic scene, and of Cairo becoming implicated in the war in Syria, and deposed him. The army carried out a preemptive strike before the Muslim Brotherhood was able to take control of it. It regained control over the situation, with the "legitimate" cover of the masses and of the religious institution. All eyes are turned towards Egypt, as it now stands between the fast-declining awakening of the past and the awakening of the present, which has not yet found its way, and is forced to rely on the military – and that is where resides the danger that cannot be avoided.