A process of political change is underway in Egypt, and a new political formula should emerge in the coming months. As the world awaits these developments, monitoring the exemplary dynamism of the Egyptian people indicates that these dramatic events will lead to a regional reshuffling, changing the political map of Arab countries that have experienced popular uprisings. The Arab uprisings, which erupted at the end of 2010, were not expected to settle into a clear formula as soon as change came to the countries' political authorities. The transition from authoritarian regimes was fraught with problems and difficulties. It came after decades of seeing the popular will seized and political life tamed in all of those countries, which were concerned with rising up against backwardness, marginalization, repression, humiliation, the plunder of resources, and the hobbling of national institutions, if the despots had left any such institutions. The various elements of the societies that formed the fuel for these uprisings were sure to undergo a difficult period of birth pangs that could last for another decade, based on the lessons of history. Revolutions do not succeed in achieving their objectives and producing alternatives in the blink of an eye. This is especially true in countries where despots have left behind backward political structures, subject to the will of a single individual, or a small group that acts like a mafia. This backwardness will certainly extend to the opposition and rebels as well; they have fallen short in managing the process of change and moving in the direction of modernity in the distribution of resources and achieving participation, followed by development. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has not been alone in proving its failure to transition to a new regime; the same goes for similar movements in Tunisia, North Africa, and Libya, which have been no better, even though all of these countries have witnessed a domestic dynamism. Even Syria's Muslim Brotherhood, which is still in the opposition and struggling against the regime, has fallen into the game of monopolizing power and internecine struggle, which is one of the many reasons that has delayed change in Syria. In Yemen, meanwhile, the game is run according to different rules. In Egypt, there are different mechanisms at play, as it might be the only country with a state and institutions, regulating various social forces. Irrespective of how quickly they respond to popular movements, these long-standing institutions are able to absorb new developments in the popular mood. However, what is the meaning of the change that we are witnessing today? This change, it should be noted, is due to the alliance and cooperation among the military, the judiciary, religious authorities, cultural institutions, and political parties in responding to the million-man protest against the Brotherhood's failure to respond to any of Egypt's political, economic and social problems, after the opportunity it received to make such an attempt. There are many questions being posed about the coming days in Egypt: Will the popular movement be immune to the possibilities of violence, and will popular and youth groups be able to attract millions of people to public squares and send its voice of protest to rural areas, where the Brotherhood wields influence? Meanwhile, the new phase of change in Egypt will reshuffle the cards on the regional front, for a simple reason. When the new political formula becomes stable, Cairo will recover its weight in drafting the policies of the Arab world. When Egypt was weak domestically, drowned in its own problems, its external role experienced weakness and retreat, compared to the roles of regional powers, particularly Turkey, Iran and Israel. This recovery of Egypt's role might take some time, as the country will be busy with arranging domestic scene so as to guarantee the participation of the Brotherhood in the new political process. Also, the amazing popular movement must prove that it can generate a clear leadership that transcends the fragmentation that was responsible for its failure in parliamentary and presidential elections less than a year ago. However, the impact of change will certainly be reflected in all Arab Spring countries, because it has been shown that the rise of Islamists in these countries is not inevitable, as countries in both the west and the east, along with frightened minorities, and Arab peoples, sought to convince themselves. Most likely, Syrian President Bashar Assad will not be overjoyed for long about the "defeat of political Islam," as he put it while commenting about events in Egypt. Is it reasonable that the Syrian president will behave like the political partner of those who brought down the authorities in Egypt? Assad has restricted control over Syria's military and intelligence bodies to himself and his family. He is also the one who frightened religious institutions and minorities; he turned the cities against the countryside, and used all types of foreign support for his regime in a war of annihilation against his people; he destroyed Syria's infrastructure to retain power. There have been more than 100,000 people killed in Syria, while the number of people killed in Egypt in confrontations over the last five days can be counted on the fingers of two hands. Two and a half years ago, only several hundred people were killed in the 25 January revolution that toppled President Hosni Mubarak. In Egypt, people allowed political Islam to undertake an experiment; then, when it failed, political Islam was held to account by demonstrators. In Syria, public squares have been bombed and massacres have been committed, in the name of standing against political Islam.
