We did not have to go through the painful Saida events to be reminded that when the state negotiates the sovereignty over its land with others, it actually paves the way for armed outlaws to take advantage, compete for power, and battle the legitimate forces that are supposed to be in charge, alone, of shielding the country and protecting people's lives. No one is questioning the right of the Lebanese army to self-defense following the offensive against it in Saida that led to the martyrdom and wounding of a large number of officers and troops. Moreover, no one can argue with the state's right to seize control of a "security square" on the Lebanese lands. This is one of the state's most basic duties. However, there is a flawed dealing with different situations whereby the state is forcibly dealing with one group of citizens while being quite lenient with other groups under different kinds of excuses and pretexts. This defect is harming the military institution and the entire country just as much as the Saida offensive against the army is. In the early stages of the civil war back in 1975, the army was wrongfully depicted as supporting one group against the other, which led to the collapse of the military institution followed by the collapse of Lebanon and its institutions. All the elements that led to that collapse are present today under different nomenclatures. Back then, the Palestinians had turned into an armed force with powers exceeding those of the state. They also had the political and military immunity to do whatever they wanted from the "Fatah Land" base under the pretext of the "Resistance", of which nothing was left except a few Katyusha shells fired from time to time from Al-Arkoub simply to remind the Lebanese of the Resistance. Because of the deep sectarian schism, the army was unable to confront that irregular situation. Indeed, a political resolution prevented the army from halting the expansion of the Palestinians on the expense of the state's authority and power. This situation eventually resulted in some Lebanese sides arming themselves under the pretext of restoring the state's authority and sovereignty. These sides worked under the title of the "Lebanese Forces," a term that was supposed to be exclusively used by legitimate forces. The current events are similar to the situation back then only with different names and locations. The state has relinquished its responsibilities in favor of the "Resistance" in a large number of areas. Just like Fatah Land, we now have a Hezbollah Land in the South, Beirut's southern suburbs, some areas in the Bekaa and in a number of Christian areas under different excuses and names. This is reminiscent of the political and military expansion practiced by the Palestinian Resistance under the names and slogans of the "national and progressive parties" that were quite trendy at the time. All what remained from the Palestinian "Resistance" is its name as it diverted its attention to the Lebanese domestic arena and turned into a burden on the state and the institutions. Similarly, "Hezbollah's Resistance" turned into a burden now that its operations in the South have been paralyzed following the truce with Israel, thus turning Hezbollah's weapons into a power affecting the internal sectarian balances and taking part in the Syrian civil war in support for the regime. The misleading slogan, "The Army, People and Resistance" was invented to place Hezbollah in an equal position with the army in terms of moral force and the right to act. This led to hindering the army's role and preventing it from carrying out its duties in the areas under Hezbollah's control. We hope that the Saida confrontations have sounded the alarm bell: the situation in the country cannot be fixed if security was to be imposed through different means in different areas. Responding to any offensive against the army must be equally harsh regardless of whether such an offensive occurs in Ahmad al-Assir's "area" in Abra on in Hezbollah's "area" in the southern town of Sajad.
