It is not enough for Algeria and Morocco that they confront each other in numerous arenas, sowing discord between their bonds of brotherhood and amity, stretching from regional disputes to the erection of sealed border fences. Indeed, there has been added to this an even greater apprehension, embodied in dusting off border issues inherited from the colonial era. And despite the fact that they have ratified a treaty of delineation and good neighborliness to put a permanent end to a burdensome legacy, one that had led them to a military confrontation known as the Sand War in 1963, the fact that the legislative institution in Morocco never approved the contents of the treaty has left the door ajar. Yet this does not mean that Moroccan demands have emerged in an issue that was settled by the treaty, inasmuch as it has reflected a great deal of weariness regarding what relations between Morocco and Algeria have come to, marking time without the stances of the two countries witnessing significant changes that would drive towards détente and towards rebuilding the Arab Maghreb Union, which both countries and their partners in North Africa describe as a strategic choice. The fact of the matter is that the notion of a union had emerged originally in order to melt away all border disputes, on the basis that regional coalitions sweep away boundaries and establish a more open space of cooperation, coordination and mutually exchanged interests. Historically, the commitment by Morocco and Algeria equally to reinstate the delineation treaty of 1989 has provided an encouraging basis, allowing for the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union, especially as an understanding between its two central poles, Rabat and Algiers, would remove for their remaining partners the most difficult obstacle. Conversely, poor relations between the two would have a negative influence on the course taken by the Maghreb in its entirety. The truth is that such a commitment has come at the right time to dispel doubts about the periods of caution and distrust that have characterized relations between the two neighbors. Yet such an understanding did not last long. Indeed, it had been established on the basis of the fact that each of the Maghreb countries had its own definition of the Western Sahara. Meanwhile, the issue of the Maghreb Union was suspended, faced with continued discrepancy in stances on the best possible solution for a regional conflict that has taken up a great deal of time and effort. The call by the leader of Morocco's Istiqlal Party, Hamid Chabat, for reopening the issue of the eastern part of the Western Sahara under Algerian control does not mean that Morocco is making territorial claims. Indeed, the dispute was settled at the time, when the text of the treaty had stated that any territorial claims should be exchanged for a comprehensive cooperative package deal to benefit from the region's natural resources and establish an integrated border economy. Yet this is like referring to the background of a conflict that never came to an end. And what influences the course of the settlement sponsored by the United Nations the most is the lack of agreement between Morocco and Algeria, whether in terms of resuming negotiations or driving forward the principle of a political solution that cannot go through without a comprehensive agreement. Had such an agreement, which is obscured today, not been reached when the United Nation began dealing with the regional conflict, in particular through the implementation of the ceasefire, no progress could have been made on this front. And had an agreement not taken shape over establishing a buffer zone east of the security wall that would prevent the airspace of the two countries from being violated, the ceasefire agreement, which has spared the whole region the dangers of deterioration and unrest, would not have held. But why does the same situation not apply to the more important aspect of implementing a political solution? Indeed, this would require consensus that would restore warmth to relations between the countries of the Maghreb as a whole. And the talk by Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon about reaching a regional solution quickly does not fall outside the scope of the need for a major understanding to be reached that would be tantamount to historical solutions that only emerge after all other means in a conflict have been exhausted. The same sensitivities that worry Algerians regarding the issue of the borders inherited from the colonial era attract the attention of their Moroccan neighbors to the legitimacy of historical rights. And despite the fact that such a tendency is considered to have arisen as a result of the discrepancy between regimes during times of ideological tension, the two countries opening up to the changes of our age and the logic of coalitions have not come accompanied by openness that would lead to the collapse of the wall of distrust. In fact, it is paradoxical for the Berlin Wall to have fallen at a time when the leaders of Maghreb countries were inspired to establish their so far unlucky union, while these excessive sensitivities did not fall with it. Regardless of shared responsibility for the discourse of mutually exchanged reproach between Algiers and Rabat, their lack of trust resides in the fact that they both for many long decades did not try to walk together down the same path. This is one of the negative aspects of geographical coexistence when it is built on caution and on the philosophy of conflict. Mathematically speaking, concord between the two, for a number of years that can be counted on one's fingers, has led to the achievement of several historical projects, whether at the level of building the Arab Maghreb pipeline which transports Algeria's natural gas to Spain through Morocco's territory, or earlier at the level of ratifying additional joint collaboration treaties for the exploitation and export of natural resources. Yet nothing remained of this latter project because political disputes nipped it in the bud. In fact, had it not been for the presence of a third party, namely Spain, in the gas pipeline agreement, this project would have perhaps not seen the light of day either. The two countries talk to each other with a great deal of emotion. And when the Polisario Front threatens to take up arms again, a Moroccan political party leader responds by calling for reopening the issue of the eastern border. Nevertheless, at the state level, both countries cling to restraint. But what use is there for such restraint if it fails to produce concord that would dispel all doubts?
