The Iraqis are steadily proceeding toward the point of no return, while all the calls have failed to get them to engage in dialogue to resolve their internal crises, and at least become immunized against the infection coming from across their western border. United Nations Envoy to Baghdad Martin Kobler summarized what was happening by saying: "Iraq is heading towards the unknown," while all the tribes have formed their own army because the governmental troops, which some of them described a few days ago as being the "Safavid army," have become in their opinion occupation forces. And on Friday, speakers called for raising the "banner of Jihad" to get these forces out of the Sunni provinces! For its part, the Shiite authority warned from the Shrine of Imam Husain in Karbala against dragging the country towards the abyss, at a time when Kurdish Peshmerga troops were deployed in the disputed city of Kirkuk to fill "security vacuum" and "protect the citizens," as stated by the Peshmerga Ministry Secretary General Jabbar Yawar. This was considered by the Central Government as being a dangerous development. In light of the difficult circumstances prevailing over Iraq, it is hard to call for a comprehensive settlement or a drastic solution to the political crisis which has been ongoing for around two years. Had such a solution been possible, or had the conflicting sides been willing to offer mutual concessions, they would not have reached that stage. Therefore, the current urgency is to stop security deterioration instead of continuing to exchange accusations and mudslinging. Indeed, all the sides are responsible and not just the government and its administration, although the latter undoubtedly gets the biggest share of responsibility since it is the one in charge. Hence, all the sides are responsible because they raised the ceiling of their demands, went up on their trees and started waiting for someone to help them climb down. The absence of dialogue throughout that stage widened the gap, seeing how the protesters earned consensus over the legitimacy of their 14 demands, while Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his ministers are not lying when they say they do not hold the key to the solution at the level of some of these demands, some of which are in violation of the constitution and others related to laws requiring parliamentary decisions. But the opponents of the State of Law Coalition are also not lying when expressing their inability to reach an understanding with the prime minister, as the latter has done nothing but try to partition the solutions instead of cooperating with the calls made by the political powers and the advice offered by clerics to head towards a dialogue that would ensure a comprehensive settlement to the crisis, one which has started to deepen since the case of Vice President Tarek al-Hachemi broke out at the end of 2001. Prior to the Hawija incidents and what followed them in Kirkuk, Mosul and Suleiman Beg among others, the conflict was limited to its political form between the government and a key component of Iraqi society. Today, it is feared that the conflict will become one between the latter component, i.e. the Sunni provinces, and the Shiites in general, knowing that Nouri al-Maliki's problem is not with these provinces solely. At this level, there is no need to recall his problem with the Kurdistan province from which he is receiving a delegation today, and the old and renewed problem he has with his partners in the Shiite alliance, especially the Sadr Movement and even Ammar al-Hakim's movement. It is no secret that the criticism addressed by Muktada al-Sadr and other Shiite forces to him and their announcement of their solidarity with the protesters alleviated the acute sectarian tensions, knowing that they were met halfway by most of the religious and political leaders in the opposition front. Therefore, it might be up to all the parties, especially the people on the squares who refused to call for a Sunni province and militarize their action, not to turn their weapons towards their partners in the country to prevent the conflict with the government from spreading in a society where most of the people are supporting these oppositionists. This is due to the fact that what was recently witnessed in Baghdad and some other cities in terms of attacks on Sunni and Shiite sites is threatening with the reemergence of the ghost of a destructive sectarian war. Ever since the eruption of the political crisis, Nouri al-Maliki managed to get his opponents to build a wide opposition alliance from Kurdistan to Najaf, going through the Irakiya Bloc and the Sunni provinces. This has facilitated and is still facilitating his accusation by this alliance of wishing to maintain power and establish his permanent presence in it at whichever cost, even if by risking the renewal of sectarian war. Had the crisis not escalated and reached the brink of civil war, had the Iraqi scene not been living to the beat of the developments in Syria and the open confrontation in the region between Iran and its opponents, and had there not been objections against the way the military and security institutions were built, then the slogan related to the protection of these institutions' status would have earned a consensus which is no longer available today. In light of the current sectarian alignment, the implication of the army and the police is not without risks, as it could cause them to burn in the furnace of this alignment and become divided, or at best enhance the calls for the establishment of other armies, such as the clans' army! Al-Maliki, and some of the members of his government, did not heed the call of Supreme Shiite Authority Al-Sistani who hoped to see the withdrawal of the army from the areas witnessing protests, the deployment of the local police solely and cooperation with the legitimate demands of the demonstrators and protesters. And no one knows whether or not it is too late to get the army and federal police out of the tension areas, in order to protect these institutions against sectarian division and stop the slide towards wider confrontations. Was there no other way to handle the tensions between the protest arenas and the elements of the armed forces? What made Al-Maliki place the army in the face of the protesters, at a time when he was saying in an American paper that the majority of the Iraqis wanted to express their demands via democratic means, although "some sectarian elements call for violence," stressing that "with provincial elections this month and general elections next year, Iraqis can resolve their disagreements with ballots, not bullets?" Was it because the local council elections did not secure the same accomplishments for his party as the ones held in 2009? Was it because the level of participation was low? Al-Maliki was hoping that this process would enhance his authority in the provinces and pave the way before results in next year's parliamentary elections, allowing him to stay at the head of the government. If this is not the case, then why did he raise the challenge, even if elements did carry weapons among the protesters and demonstrators? Does he not remember that the Al-Anbar uprising and the ousting by its Awakening troops of the Al-Qaeda elements in it enhanced the political process, ensured additional support for the central government and restored security and stability throughout the country? The mistake committed by the American occupation following the occupation of Iraq was its disbanding of the army and all the security institutions. So could the government repeat that same experience, even if unintentionally? Would it not have been better for it to dispatch the local police or at least reach an understanding with the leaders of the protesters who had rejected the calls to carry weapons and even to establish autonomous regions like Kurdistan? Today, the two sides are facing a dangerous predicament. The Sunni areas that are forming their own army are actually becoming an independent province and enhancing the worries of those who are fearful over Iraq's unity, while the escalating conflict is drawing the lines of this division on the ground, even if it remains unannounced by both sides. At this level, there is no point in blaming forces acting on the domestic arena or the near and distant foreign scene. The Iraqis, and especially the State of Law Coalition, should have respected the principle of power transition. Al-Maliki's political opponents are right to hold him responsible for the current situation, while before them, the ordinary citizens never stopped complaining about the lack of the minimum level of services ten years after the departure of the Baath regime. On the other hand, Kurdistan had set an example in the provision of services, development, projects and investments. At this point, we will not tackle the security situation which Al-Maliki's state could not improve, thus wasting numerous opportunities to capitalize on what was achieved since the clans' Awakening Councils ousted the fighters of Al-Qaeda and its sisters, leading to the Sunnis' participation in the political process. Therefore, was it not a lethal mistake to push the Sunnis once again outside the political process and the state institutions? But at the same time, is there anything more dangerous than seeing powers and components describe the military institution as being a Safavid army or an occupation army, even if they have reservations over the government's building of the army? Nouri al-Maliki was right when he said two days ago that "sectarianism is evil and the winds of sectarianism do not need a visa to move from one country to another... Its return to Iraq is due to the fact that it broke out in another area of the region." But did he forget that the political crisis which he badly managed deepened the Sunnis' feeling of being treated unjustly? Did he forget his announced positions against the Syrian opposition? The leader of the State of Law Coalition knows that the Sunnis of Iraq share with their brothers, the Sunnis in Syria and in Lebanon, this feeling of injustice and the control of the Iranian grip from Baghdad to Beirut, going through Damascus. In other words, he knows that the entire region is standing on the edge of a volcano, amid a heated conflict between Tehran and its opponents inside and outside the region. His opponents accuse him of having fueled the tensions in accordance with the policy adopted by Iran, which many believe is ready to push the entire region and especially Syria's neighbors towards absolute chaos, even division, in order to preserve the regime in Damascus and its arc which extends from the Afghan border to the Mediterranean. But the question at this level is the following: Is it not in the Islamic Republic's interest to see stability in Iraq and Lebanon in order for it to reposition itself in Syria, i.e. the focal point of the rejectionism or the resistance axis? Or do its opponents believe that the time has come for the battle to retake Iraq from its grip? Regardless of the answer, the Iraqi crisis, just like the crisis in Lebanon, is no longer limited to the local actors. They both have become part of the flaming scene in Syria, one whose developments on the ground are heralding the escalation of the confrontation with Iran and the drafting of new maps for the region that is on the brink of the abyss, from Iraq to Syria and other locations.
