As is customary with every noteworthy event, prominent figures of the Egyptian elite have been busy over the past two days interpreting the behavior of former President Hosni Mubarak during the first session of his retrial. They thus zealously searched for the secret of his “cheerfulness", of the smiles he gave out to cameras and to attendees left and right, and of his waving to those present in the courtroom and those watching him on television screens. Indeed, he appeared, despite the signs of ageing that could not be masked by his dark hair dye, elated and unconcerned with his jailors, with those judging him... or those ruling his country. In the heat of their preoccupation with the event and its interpretation, they waited for a reaction from President Mohammad Morsi to the smile and the waving. Some expected the President to exert pressure for Mubarak to be returned to the prison hospital, and taken out of the military hospital into which he was admitted a few weeks ago. And while members of the Brotherhood concluded that Mubarak was waving at his supporters, at the remnants of his regime, at the members of the National “Destruction" Front, and at those who oppose Morsi and are causing the country's paralysis, the revolutionaries reached a different conclusion – that the former President was waving at Morsi and smiling at the Muslim Brotherhood, thanking them and applauding their failure at managing the affairs of the state, and their strengthening the impression that his rule had been better for the Egyptian people. The truth is that Egyptians have been busy since the start of the revolution interpreting the speeches, statements, reports, measures, behaviors, policies, moves, hints, suggestions, paradoxes and contradictions that have been appearing all around them, without anyone looking into prospects for the future or answering the question: how will the people's situation and the state of their country be after some time? The result is that they are always surprised by what they had not accounted for. They thus quickly start looking for someone to hold responsible for the catastrophe at the heart of which they have found themselves. After that, they grow busy once again interpreting the phenomena of the present; one another's behavior; the policies of the government, the President, his party or the group he is affiliated to; or the deeds of the sympathizers and remnants of the former regime or Mubarak's associates and sons. They can also delve deep in explaining this or that incident. And the final conclusion is always that things remain as they are, or let us say deteriorate further at every level. Thus begins another round of lament over the state they have found themselves in ever since the revolution bore its first fruit with Mubarak stepping down, before withering away and shedding its leaves, or let us say its goals, and seeing its branches, or let us say its factions, collapse. When young men and women began cleaning Tahrir Square on the morning after Mubarak stepped down, they had been driven by hope, as had other Egyptians of course, that “the Egypt of the revolution" would turn into an advanced country, even if the matter required some suffering, effort and time. Yet not one of the Egyptians who took part in the revolution, supported it or followed its developments approvingly, had imagined that the country could reach the state it is in today, in terms of division, decay, unrest, poverty and backwardness. And they never imagined that the graph that rose at times and fell often under Mubarak could turn into an ever-falling slope after the revolution. Of course, phenomena such as these appear repeatedly in most countries of the world, but the difference is that, when people in advanced countries become preoccupied with an event, a behavior, an incident or even an earthquake or a major natural disaster, their state institutions continue to work for the future, and their elites think, innovate and put forward views to avoid the mistakes of the past, and to achieve a better future. In Egypt, on the other hand, as a case model and as a patient who hopes for treatment and seeks to heal, the institutions in power and the opposition are nearly paralyzed. And if they do work, they commit so many mistakes that the illness increases and healing becomes of the utmost difficulty. As for the elites, from across the social and political spectrum, they have turned into alien beings that appear to people often at night and sometimes during the day, chewing over the same talk and increasing preoccupation with the smallest and most futile matters. The result is thus not just the absence of hope in achieving the goals of the Revolution, but also the fear of losing the entire country, with all of its history, its present and its future. Two decades ago, two “elite" American researchers, Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama (of Japanese origin), put forward the theory of the clash of civilizations. Regardless of its qualities and of its flaws, of its soundness or its unsoundness, of its failure or its success, this theory reshaped the world order. A whole decade later, American researcher of Indian origin Fareed Zakaria wrote, wondering, “Why Do They Hate Us?" and searched for the reasons behind the events of September 11. Yet Zakaria, author of the famous book “The Future of Freedom", was not just digging for the motives behind the September 11 attack, after having reached the conclusion that what had happened had been a reaction rather than an action. He pointed to the hatred of Arab and Muslim peoples for America as a result of American policies in support of dictatorial regimes, but also warned about the approach the United States should adopt in dealing with those countries in the future... The situation in Egypt is different. Here, those in power speak of a Renaissance, the opposition is waiting for another revolution, while the elite is busy interpreting Mubarak's smile and his waving.
