The convening of the High Joint Commission between Morocco and Mauritania next month would not have been a noteworthy event, had it occurred within the context of an ordinary schedule. Yet after seven years have passed since the last session was held, i.e. since the regime of President Maaouya Ould Taya was toppled, this gathering raises questions about the reasons behind the schedule of sessions having been hindered in this way – most prominent being the fact that Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz has not visited Morocco, as had consistently been the custom with former Presidents, just as Morocco's Monarch, King Mohammed VI, who is known to take great care of his country's African relations, has not been placing Nouakchott on his schedule of visits. Some of the reasons for this regard the fact that Morocco has dissociated itself for internal struggles that have grown more heated between the Presidential Palace and the opposition over the past few years. It may thus have preferred to monitor the struggle's developments, as it does other events and repercussions in any African country in its geographical neighborhood. On the other hand, Mauritanian President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz cannot ignore the support provided by Rabat, particularly in the wake of the military coup, when Morocco voiced the hope that he would follow the method of democratic elections in order to obtain legitimacy, in a manner that would lead towards peaceful alternation of power, and that he would give up his military uniform and medals. Nothing has been issued by Nouakchott or by Rabat that would reflect the existence of a crisis, yet to the same extent, neither of the two countries has been able to assert that their relations were devoid of any apprehensions, as evidenced by the fact that the lukewarm nature of these relations must be rooted in some form of reproach – whether in terms of the receding momentum of dialogue that had been characterized by its comprehensiveness, or at the regional level. And it was noteworthy that, while tensions erupted in the Sahel, which is considered a vital space for the two neighbors' African dimension, their relations did not experience dialogue or coordination to the extent expected in view of the occurrence of such events, with the exception of actions of a humanitarian nature concerned with providing shelter and assistance to refugees. Nevertheless, stances that would arouse sensitivities have been kept in check under rules of coexistence, of which the background is understood by both sides, with neither of them wishing to inflame its difficulties. Indeed, neither has Morocco asked Nouakchott to suspend its recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), with the ambiguity it entails, especially while other African capitals have taken the step of suspending such recognition, although they are not tied to Morocco by treaties and agreements at the level of the Arab Maghreb Union; nor did Mauritania depart from its commitment to neutrality, vocally supporting the efforts exerted by the United Nations to find a consensual political solution that would be acceptable to all sides. Submitting to the de facto situation has helped preserve the bridges of dialogue stretched between the two countries, and it is clear that party leaders such as those of Mauritania's Union for the Republic (UPR – Union pour la République) and Morocco's Independence (Istiqlal) Party have had the providence of finding a political formula that would ensure restoring some warmth to relations eroded by tepidity. The most important aspect of this initiative is that it brings back to mind consensual frames of reference through which Moroccan political parties had engaged in playing roles that brought together different points of view. It had in fact set a precedent for shaping the features of plans to unite the Arab Maghreb decades ago – and specifically the day Tangiers hosted a conference of political parties active in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria – even if it took over three decades to ratify the treaty of the Maghreb Union, which has been marking time within a narrow space, devoid of any movement or any role to play. In past experiences, the Arab Maghreb Union had been similar to a meeting tent, for when disagreements would grow embittered. And what would be difficult to accomplish at the level of bilateral relations would eventually end up in the arena of the Maghreb Union, whose leaders would meet twice a year. Added to its burden today is the fact that it has been impossible to even hold a Maghreb Summit for about two decades, despite statements that constantly reassure of the existence of a political framework that has been abandoned by its own partners before anyone else. Neither have bilateral relations achieved a breakthrough that would bring us closer to a more comprehensive vision of the Maghreb, nor has the Maghreb Union cleared away the accumulated rubble of disagreements that are in the process of becoming the rule, not the exception. The result of this situation is that, at this point, any movement, no matter how limited, suffices to revive hopes that new relations of trust could be built. In fact, attempts to establish focal points upon which two or more countries would meet have in turn become excluded, seeing as they widen the gap between different parties. Thus all have fallen into the slumber of reclusion and seclusion. In this sense, the dialogue between the two political parties, Mauritania's Union for the Republic and Morocco's Istiqlal Party, takes on special importance, seeing as it is taking place between two parties that are part of the government majority in their respective countries. It could thus pave the way for parallel initiatives among opposition factions, which would allow the political elites in the two neighboring countries to contribute to bringing points of view closer together. And if the ongoing crises between North African countries were to develop to the point of being considered an issue of public opinion that seeks to escape the grip of deep-seated disagreements, this would indicate the start of a new phase, one that would lead to merging plans to unify the Maghreb in its bilateral and multilateral dimensions at the core of the concerns of the street. And there will have been no meaning to what is known as the Arab Spring, which sprang forth from North Africa, if it does not achieve political consensus between the countries of the Arab Maghreb – especially as no single party to it could alone confront the difficulties presented by the challenges at hand, in terms of changing the regime of relations that had been prevalent. It has been admitted that that the cost of not having an Arab Maghreb Union has been an exorbitant one. Yet the cost of not having an understanding between those who are party to it only adds further burdens. More importantly, political party elites have entered the fray, even if timidly, and it would be even more useful if they were to tour together all the capitals of the Maghreb. Indeed, this could entice decision-makers to follow in their footsteps, even if after some time.
