While there have been no big changes in the stances of parties concerned with the Sahara conflict, the optimism of the international envoy and American diplomat Christopher Ross about achieving progress in expected negotiations is a mere delusion, not much different from a desert mirage. International mediators and UN secretaries general have preceded him in thinking that arriving at a solution is a picnic, and it was a real blow to them to find out that it is not that easy. The source of complication in the Sahara conflict is that it was decided militarily, but not politically. It is not likely that the party victorious in the war should lose in diplomatic rounds. Likewise, the defeated party cannot turn the positions of strength and weakness upside-down, just because it is waging a war with diplomatic weapons. However, what makes the situation more problematic is that the parties to both war and peace lack clear perspectives, as a result of regional facts that introduced multi-purposed dimensions, with some going back to the aftermath of the Cold War. Some of them concern struggles over regional leadership, while the more dangerous element in the essence of the conflict is that it can backfire. Due to this interplay, even the boldest initiatives were unable to solve the conflict. In the 1980s, when the fiercest periods of war took place in the Sahara, Morocco proposed a referendum, which was considered a radical change at the time. Its domestic repercussions led to the imprisonment of the USFP leader, AbdulRahim Bouabid, who called for a constitutional referendum on the Sahara referendum. Then-French President Francois Mitterand stood with influential elements in the US administration and Arab leaders who enjoyed the respect of all sides, considering a referendum a proper way-out, which would boost international legitimacy. Only the UN secretary general, Javier Peres de Cuellar, set down mechanisms for the referendum, realizing the impossibility of implementing it, without an agreement on the eligibility of voters descended from Saharans. It required years before the leading official on the committee for determining (national) identity, Eric Johnson, confirmed that the presence of concerned voters between Tindouf and Mauritania and provinces falling under Morocco's influence would pose a true obstacle; the former Algerian foreign minister, Saleh Dembri, blamed those hurrying in the direction of referendum, as the sole solution. What caused the collapse of the referendum plan wasn't only the absence of an agreement on the final lists of voters, but also the final, undisclosed decision, or the decision of the referendum, which rules the management of the game. Without the accord that prevailed in Algerian-Moroccan relations at the end of the 1980s, the UN wouldn't have been able to arrive at enshrining a cease-fire and sending its MINURSO mission to the region. The idea took hold that it was necessary to establish stronger cooperation and greater understanding between two neighboring countries, to end the impasse. It was natural to see the referendum plan collapse, with the return of relations between Rabat and Algiers to a state of caution and mistrust, with suspicion prevailing. This was especially because the central basis of the plan required the return of Saharans living in Tindouf and Mauritania to their original addresses in the Saharan provinces. Thus, the right of voluntary return would be a precedent for the option of self-determination on elections day. Hence, the referendum plan collapsed because the return of Saharans was delayed until a date that has yet to come. Mediator James Baker was the first one to notice that the referendum was not the only solution. Thus, he had ideas about an alternative solution, described as the third way. When the United Nations could find no way to replicate its earlier resolutions, it drafted the idea of a political solution as an alternative. It appears to be a loose concept open to any interpretations, but its concept means one thing that helps bring about an openness to new proposals. Certainly, there has been a development in the position of the Polisario, as it is putting forward a referendum over options that do not stop at independence for the region or its total unity with Morocco, but also include autonomy. It is not a waste of time for the previous rounds of Manhattan negotiations to see the difference in positions by the concerned sides remain. Those directly involved in the talks, or acting as observers, are aware that they are not meeting in order to provide ideas or convictions. They do this once or more, but not always. The wager of the envoy Ross lies in cementing their belief that a change in positions must take place, at the least as a translation of the will to move toward an honorable solution for all. Perhaps the gaps between desire and ability will be bridged; there is no dispute that the first step begins with enshrining the right of return.
