There hardly is any U.S. political analyst or politician who has not tackled the issue of abandoning Afghanistan following the Soviet defeat there, and the withdrawal of the Red Army back to Moscow. One of the most horrendous consequences of that abandonment was the emergence of the Taliban and its success in driving out the “mujahidin" warlords from power. After that, the Taliban ruled Kabul, where they hosted al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Then the tragedy of 11 September ensued in the heart of America, and the rest is well known. But we may add another abandonment that took place in Iraq, with the U.S. withdrawal. It is increasingly clear, especially nowadays, what meaning and significance this abandonment carried, at a time when the Iraqis are on the brink of a dangerous precipice that may well take on the form of an open-ended Sunni-Shia war. This is in addition to the extensive and profound paralysis that affects everything in Iraq, from services and corruption, all the way to the so-called political process, not to mention the growing Iranian role in this country. Yet there is a third abandonment, a preemptive one, so to speak, unfolding today in Syria. To be sure, the sixty thousand casualties or more that have fallen so far, the prospect of a full-scale civil war that is comorbid with the metastasis of terrorist and Salafi groups, as well as the massive fragmentation that might unravel the entire Levant because of the Syrian drama, have all discouraged the United States from pursuing any serious involvement, direct or otherwise, that would finish Assad's murderous and tottering regime at once. Irrespective of the existence of a certain agreement with Russia or not, it remains certain that the calculations relating to Russia and Iran are among the reasons for U.S. hesitation and reluctance. Add to this the Israeli calculations and Tel Aviv's discomfort with the ambiguous future in Syria, and the calculations pertaining to the minorities, something that many in the minority Christian communities are incessantly “warning" the West against. All these calculations can then be added to what is now well known about the dismal economic conditions in the U.S. and the West, and previous painful and costly experiences with interventions. Yet all these factors and others can be seen as part of a wider climate that can be considered akin to a profound historical misunderstanding. The reason is that the U.S.'s tendency to oversimplify renders it unable to assimilate the many and disparate processes witnessed in even one era and one movement of the “third world's" many eras and movements. Thus when everything is reduced to a fixation on “democracy" and “human rights", this distorts the real image of what is going on, and causes one to become particularly susceptible to receive one surprise after another. We saw this happen in Iraq for example, where the freedom that the Iraqis attained in 2003 was portrayed as being democracy incarnate. We also saw this again in Egypt, where the regime of Mohammed Morsi became “neither friend nor foe." On the other hand, much of what comes from our side does not help the cause of comprehension either. This is evident, for instance, with the embarrassment we are caused by an explicit relationship with the West, particularly the United States, and the corresponding embarrassment of having to repudiate our “brethren" and “cousins" like al-Qaeda and its ilk – who act as a burden on the efforts to win over Western support, and an even bigger burden on the future of our peoples. This has a lot to do with the dominance by the familial, religious and sectarian dimensions, over our political processes, and the subsequent civil fragmentation that makes many beginnings liable to become ends instead. One thing we can say for sure is that the interests of both parties, i.e. our peoples and the West, particularly the United States, lie in rapprochement and collaboration – if not to serve today's purposes, then definitely tomorrow's.
