The succession of the Justice and Charity leader, Sheikh Abdel Salam Yassin, is not problematic in itself. However, the general future direction of the relationship between the Justice and Charity movement, the Authority and some political figures might pose some problems. Although the organization was active in the field of religious preaching and guidance, its positions and practices were closer to those of a political party rather than to a religious organization. The group even adopted a radical stance in the opposition based on religious jurisprudence, rather than the criticism of governmental policies. The effect of the group's leader was clear through his movement from the banks of the Sufi spiritualism to the establishment of a political opposition, which coincided with the growing Islamic tide in the region, especially in light of the Algerian experience that stirred the dormant waters, at a time when the Moroccans liked to say that they would not be affected by this trend. However, it turned out that the globalization of this phenomenon would not exempt any spot. Thus, the succession of the late Abdel Salam Yassin will not only be concerned with his intellectual heritage and his methods that brought together the image of the family and the organization. The succession will rather make use of a void that might turn into a bigger presence. Yassin was the group's binding force, its theory-maker, and symbol. Thus, his passing will leave a gap, since the man had a major effect. He was characterized with a great deal of firmness and discipline and he created a direction that was different from the one that the rest of the political partners followed. This allowed him and his group to gain a massive presence despite the legal ban, which included detention and house arrests. This was then topped with an openness initiative that revoked all restraints without however breaking all the barriers. Just like a Damocles sword that maintained the ban against the group, the parties' formation law increased the estrangement between the Authority and the movement. The prevention of the establishment of religious, racial, or tribal parties limited the movement of the Justice and Charity movement, which acted as a religious organization, but also as a group that uses a political logic to confront its adversaries. Its' firm position against the amended 2011 constitution could not only be due to its insistence on boycotting, but also to its literal compliance with the religious teachings. Regardless of the reason, this position caused the movement to oppose the reigning trends. The power balance tests between the movement and the Authority were apparently based on religious matters, rather than political ones. Had the differences been political, the movement would have fused in the democratic legitimacy, similarly to the Justice and Development, as well as other Islamic parties. The group was probably exchanging messages with the regime outside the realm of the negotiations with well-known rules, ceiling and various trends. However, at the heart of the conflict, the movement asked its young activists to break their connection with the February 20 protest movement. This was an indication to that the group had slightly backed away or had at least used this method to stand out. Away from the hidden or open conflict, the Justice and Charity movement opposed violence, not only as a sign of spirituality and rise above the worldly sensitivities, but also as a sign or drawing closer to a realistic logic that allowed the movement to communicate with other parties. Indeed, the group distanced itself from suspicions of radicalism. At the same time, it maintained an equal distance from all its potential adversaries. The movement acted as an electoral reservoir that was always on a stand-by mode. The positive thing about the movement is that it never brandished weapons or launched dangerous adventures. However, its retroversion prevented it from benefitting from some political developments that could have allowed it to try some other legitimate political practices. The movement abstained from taking larger steps and the authorities also failed to meet it half way. Caution and the lack of trust are still prevailing. The abortion of any agreement features prevented both parties from opening up to each other. In the realm of the war of positions, the comrades of Sheikh Yassin could become more radical or less prone to start a new chapter, especially after the loss of the leader who established the movement's methodological foundations. It is important to always include the Justice and Charity in any given formula. The movement will definitely be affected by the passing of its leader, although it seemed more prone to accept his passing away since it had restructured its leadership a few weeks before his death. At the end of the day, the rebuilding of the group is not the only challenge. The bigger challenge consists of defining the features of the major directions, which will reflect the strength, power, and effect of the movement. The movement's retroversion must not turn into“seclusion." Indeed, there have been political developments that highlighted the need to consolidate the ranks of the opposition. If the movement succeeds in joining the wave of democratic participation similarly to the experience of the Islamic movements within and outside Morocco, then it would have abided by Sheikh Yassin's unwritten will. Indeed, he was the one who had called to re-establish a strong front for the democratic parties. As to the how and when, this is left for time and its effects on slowly fixing all matters.
