The crisis being witnessed in Kuwait nowadays will not be resolved with the formation of a new National Assembly, regardless of the number of participants and boycotters. This is well understood by the ruling elite and the loyalists, although they are not recognizing it in public. In addition, the boycotting by the boycotters, regardless of their size and how big and small it is, will not lead to a solution. Indeed, both parties know that the problem has exceeded the extent to which their positions, measures, steps and actions are respecting the constitution and the laws regulating the work of the authorities and administrations associated with them. Had this been the case, the political game would have reached a way out for the current situation, as happened in many previous occasions. In fact, this is not the first time that the conflict between the executive and legislative powers obstructs the ruling mechanism and causes each to paralyze the work of the other. This was the case in many instances since the adoption of the current constitution in 1963, while the Kuwaitis always found ways to generate solutions, exits and settlements, either through the available doors - and sometimes even interpretations – provided by their democratic systems, or through civil arrangements, compensations and even deals! For a while, on the eve of the Iraqi invasion of the country and after liberation, there seemed to be a drastic flaw affecting the constitutional structure itself, not the way democracy was being practiced. The clash between the executive and legislative powers thus reemerged, and many felt the need to reconsider the structure of the constitutional institutions and establish a second chamber in parliament, as it is the case in many old and new democracies alike. Such a chamber would handle the monitoring of the relationship between the authorities, defuse the clashes between them, contribute to the settlement of the problems so that they remain limited to parliament's dome and regulate the institutions' work. But during the last three decades, this political system faced major challenges which cast their shadows over all the Gulf states, and not just Kuwait. The most prominent event at this level was the Iranian revolution and the war which followed between the Islamic Republic and Iraq, thus hastening the formation of the Cooperation Council to contain the repercussions of both the revolution and the war. We then saw the Iraqi invasion that shook the entities throughout the region, followed by consecutive crises and the escalation of polarization after Kuwait's liberation and the fall of the Baath regime in Baghdad. It consequently seemed that the political system was heading towards an inescapable predicament. Then there was the Arab spring, which might have been the cause of the stubbornness and the insistence on the positions, amid accusations exchanged by both sides of going too far in the bone-crushing battle. These consecutive crises preceded the protest movement which was and is still being witnessed in Arab states. This is why the Kuwaiti scene cannot be associated with the reasons and motives that mobilized the Arab street in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, and are related to poverty, depravation, political and security prejudice and the absence of justice, to name some issues. Indeed, in Kuwait's case, the model is different, as well as in most of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. This is due to the fact that the Gulf countries act as sponsors, and constitute the source of employment and of all the services which are quasi free in all sectors, from healthcare to education and housing. This is why, despite the loud voices and the activities via modern social communication means, which also played a role in instigating the street, there were never calls for the toppling of the ruling family. In addition, all the powers feel, and are aware of the fact that this family is the safety valve, although it will not escape change which was firstly imposed by what affected the known consensual formula in power, by the transformation at the level of the social structure, the general climate in the region, and the conflict over power within the veteran generation of the ruling family members. It is no secret that the consensual contract between the Kuwaiti forces since the first constitution was drawn up in the 1920s and until this day, was based on collaboration between the ruling family and the traders and merchants who always constituted the nerve of the opposition with their organizations and political formations, from the Democratic Forum to the National Alliance. These formations acted as an extension of the nationalistic tide which prevailed after mid-last century and the independence of the national states. Power in Kuwait, as it is the case in most Gulf states, also relied on the tribal-religious institutions to strengthen its position in the face of the other duo, and provide a permanent safety valve and a counterbalance. However, this complementarity was shaken by many factors, including the economic boom generated by the oil wealth, and what followed it in terms of the modernization of the infrastructure and the emergence of new powers that benefited from the human development programs pertaining to education and rehabilitation. It is no secret that today, Kuwait's youth, both urban and tribal, account for more than 60% of society. While it is natural for the youths of the city to distance themselves from traditions and customs which constituted the pillars of the regime, and an inherent part of it and its traditional mechanisms, the tribal youths have also started to have aspirations for larger participation in the political, economic and financial decisions, especially since they have started to represent a demographic majority and wish to translate that on the ground and push the others to recognize this. One could add to that the factor of unemployment among graduates, despite the aid and jobs offered by the government to most of its citizens, not to mention the spread corruption which was recognized by the authorities, without being able to eradicate it. Also among the factors that undermined the traditional duo was the retreat and weakening of nationalism for many known reasons, under the main headline of the inability of the traditional powers and parties to face the challenges and protect the Arab regime against military rule. There were also defeats in the face of the regional superpowers, and the pressures practiced by the West on the Arab and Islamic worlds in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, to face religious extremism. Then came the Arab spring which pushed the Islamic forces to power, and there is no doubt that their riding the wave of the youth action while using a reassuring rhetoric towards the West and a promising one towards societies – more than half of which are living below poverty line – had its echo in Kuwaiti society. Just like the Muslim Brotherhood joined the revolution on the street in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, some religious and Salafi forces quickly rode the opposition bandwagon led by tribal symbols in Kuwait, thus costing the regime its base in ensuring the balance which prevailed in the country throughout the past decades. This made some symbols in the second faction of the traditional duo, i.e. the national movement and the traders, also resort to boycotting as though joining the first. In any case, this team saw its forces and ranks shaken during the last few years, after the rising powers stripped it of the banner of the opposition. This leads us to conclude that the current crisis in Kuwait is distantly related to the models known in the Arab spring, which is why it would be wrong to predict a drastic political change in the regime's structure. It is an acute social divide, and although each side is attributing a constitutional or democratic character to its positions and measures, none of them will be able to exit the tunnel except through an agreement over a new social contract that would revive democracy with its basic principle, i.e. allowing the participation of all the components in the political, economic and financial decisions, away from personal or factional interests and the monopolization of the country's wealth. It might not be useful to go back to the traditional game which generated some weakness in the ranks of the ruling family, bearing in mind that the latter might need to strengthen its unity and put its own house in order at this point in time. This is due to the fact that this game caused further division in the ranks of the citizens, as well as a social conflict in a region governed by tensions between the religious and civil groups, whether liberal or national ones. Moreover, it is residing on the brink of a heated sectarian abyss between the Sunnis and the Shiites and has contributed to the launching of a race over power between generations that are awaiting their turn. Hence the question: Can a new national assembly with full constitutional characteristics govern, regardless of the number of voters, in the absence of the boycotters and the forces for which they stand? Can the establishment of an assembly which is collaborative with the government this time around lead towards the emergence of blocs and alliances that would allow the appearance of a political class allowing the prevalence of the country's interests over its own, release a massive number of projects and laws which were obstructed in the past years, change the mood on the street and respond to many of its aspirations? Or will the issue not exceed the level of buying time to arrange the ranks and ensure the interests, before the vision becomes clear and everyone is convinced there is no point in undermining their democratic experience – which is the oldest in the region – since the repercussions will be echoed throughout the area? This is certainly not wanted by the authority, as the Emir has repeatedly announced he will always resort to the constitution, the law and the judiciary. And this is also not wanted by the opposition which is aware of the game's limits and the serious consequences that could be caused in case these limits are breached, for both their interests and the country itself, and its future and the democratic experience. Yet many of them are taking to the street to achieve gains and interests that have nothing to do with reform and its requirements.
