Although it is legitimate to undermine the ceasefire agreement draft between Israel and Hamas, the bus explosion in Tel Aviv likely shifted the attention towards Iran and the Palestinian factions revolving in its space, in order to prolong the Israeli Operation Pillar of Cloud and remove the truce monopolization card from Hamas's hand and the Egyptian guarantor. As for the Israelis' talk about “strong international recognition" earned by Hamas via the truce agreement, whose announcement was delayed, it is much similar to the West's and the Americans' recognition of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood following the Arab spring and the inevitability to deal with them through their governments. In the meantime, other complications linked to the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian divisions are transforming Egypt - under the Muslim Brotherhood - into the primary sponsor of Hamas's rehabilitation and prevention from launching rockets on Israel starting from the Gaza Strip, or in other words, the prevention of Iran from using some factions in shows of power to which it resorts whenever it needs to address messages to Washington and Tel Aviv. This time around, the message featured in the rocket attacks on Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, does not stop at the level of shifting the attention away from the battle over the fate of the Syrian regime. Indeed, following the launching of the Ayoub drone by Hezbollah, it falls in the context of a “deterrence" display in the face of any war project which the Israeli right wing might be considering to destroy the Iranian nuclear facilities. Consequently, the messages' logic pushes towards Hamas's prevention from controlling the ability of the other Palestinian factions to launch missiles whenever Tehran wants them to, for reasons related to its nuclear program and the sustainment of its presence on the Mediterranean Sea while awaiting the outcome of the war in Syria. What was attributed to Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak in regard to understandings guaranteed by Egypt and placing Hamas before a serious test – the imposition of its control over the other organizations - will cost the movement the prevention of any act targeting Israel's security. But it also tests its ability to constitute an alternative interlocutor for Mahmoud Abbas' authority if the latter does not recant the request to earn an observer member state status for Palestine at the United Nations. Hence, Iran's and Egypt's interests are clashing in the Gaza Strip, knowing that Hamas outside the Syrian-Iranian umbrella is not the same Hamas which waged the 2008 war. Cairo wishes to restore its regional role under the banner of the Muslim Brotherhood, and cooperate with the Americans' request for it to interfere and ensure calm in Gaza after President Barack Obama insisted on this in his phone calls with President Mohamed Morsi, who is disgusted by the masquerade of the Israeli aggression against Gaza. Morsi's slip of the tongue during his talk about the massacre in Gaza being a “masquerade," cannot be compared to American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's rush to the region to inform the Israelis that Washington's commitment to their security was “rock-solid," and deliver to Morsi a message regarding the “rehabilitation of the Gaza MB." Indeed, the alternative would be regional turmoil and the inability to restrain Netanyahu. Still, despite the doubts cast by the bus explosion whose repercussions extended to the understandings project, one does not need a lot of effort to detect that the lifting of the blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip is a main obstacle. True, Hamas needs that step to announce the achievement of a victory, but what is certain is that on the eve of the Israeli elections, Netanyahu will not offer such a major concession. Hence, throughout the 90-day truce – during which Hamas's ability to prevent the launching of rockets will be tested – he will be able to postpone the opening of the crossings' file until after the elections. As for the movement, it will be able to announce that it was able to get an Israeli consent to stop the raids and the assassinations. Clearly, the Israeli killing of the Palestinians in Gaza temporarily shifted the attention away from the killing of the Syrians in Syria, despite the major discrepancy at the level of the daily count of the martyrs. On the sidelines, Iran is scolding the Arabs for their reluctance to arm Gaza, while America is scolding Erdogan for his harsh condemnation of Israel. In reality, Netanyahu's government that wants five years of calm with the Gaza Strip, will draw the lessons from the missile deterrence process and the Arab spring test, while swallowing the lands of the Strip and undermining the decision of the Palestinian authority. In the meantime, it will leave the fate of the Iranian nuclear file in Washington's hands, albeit for a while. At the level of its shape, Washington's rejection of Russia's draft statement before the Security Council in regard to Operation Pillar of Cloud, recalls the Russian veto at the level of the Syrian file. Still, there are numerous differences between the two, namely the fact that Syria is witnessing a war to end the regime, while Gaza is witnessing a round of rehabilitation for the Hamas's MB regime in the new Egyptian era. Between Damascus and the Strip, the status of the spring is transforming, and causing the trimming of the Iranian fingers. So will the Islamic Jihad movement succumb to Hamas and will Abbas be reassured by what lies beyond the long-term truce between Israel and Gaza? The clouds of a lengthy crisis are emerging between Cairo and Ramallah.
