Developments in quick succession in the Sinai and the spread of violence there, despite a security campaign and military measures being taken, in addition to radical Islamist organizations being uncovered in the heart of Cairo, as well as fears of an outbreak of “Islamist wars", despite an Islamist President being the head of state in Egypt, drive one to wonder: what form of government do radical Islamists, whether Takfiri Islamists in the Sinai or members of the group dubbed the “Nasr City terrorist cell" who were arrested by Egyptian authorities in Cairo recently, want? It is quite evident that both always make use of violence as a means to express their stances or achieve their goals. Indeed, they have the conviction that the regime ruling Egypt today does not represent them or express their views, and are thus aiming to change it. It is also quite evident that there is no difference for Takfiri groups between the regime that ruled Egypt before the Revolution and the one that rules it today. Indeed, they in the first place consider all those who are not affiliated with them to be apostates of Islam. The answer to the question can therefore be summed up by saying that Takfiri Islamists want a different regime and a different ruler, other than Doctor Mohamed Morsi. As for the Jihadist members of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated “Nasr City terrorist cell", even though they are not Takfiri Islamists, they consider Morsi to be ruling in a manner different from what was revealed by God in the Holy Quran, and therefore wish to change him and to establish an Islamist system of government by their own standards, not those of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet the more important question is: do radical Islamist organizations, whether Takfiri or Jihadist, flourish better under oppressive regimes such as that of Mubarak or under democratic Islamist regimes such as that of Morsi? So far there seems to be no difference. Indeed, repression and widening the scope of suspicion, arrest and torture creates motivation among some of those who have lost hope in the possibility of change, and thus adopt ideas based on change through violence. It can also make some peaceful Islamists react and turn into Takfiri or Jihadist Islamists. The history of radical movements in Egypt and in other countries is rife with examples of this – starting from the Qutbists who appeared in Abdel Nasser's prisons in the wake of the execution of Sayyid Qutb, followed by the members of the Takfir wal-Hijra movement headed by Shukri Mustafa in the late 1960s, as well as all the Takfiri groups that appeared under Mubarak, such as Al-Najun Min Al-Nar (Salvation from Hell) for example, in addition to all other Jihadist groups whose activity and operations expanded in response to the policy of uprooting adopted by the Interior Ministry under Mubarak. On the other hand, the climate of freedom imposed by the January Revolution, the emergence of Islamists as an influential force in the street, the constant appearance in the media of faces whose location would have been impossible to disclose under Mubarak, and the desire of those in power to offer them solace and compensation – including of course those who had already relinquished their Jihadist ideas, such as the members of Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya and some of the members of the Islamic Jihad, before the Revolution – none of this has met with the convictions of the remaining Takfiri and Jihadist Islamists. They have thus maintained their ideas and activity, despite the presence of an Islamist President and an Islamist government, and in fact exploited this climate to expand their radical activity. This is on the part of Takfiri and Jihadist Islamists. What then of the “Islamists" in power? The truth is that the state of political polarization that has afflicted Egypt ever since Mubarak stepped down has contributed in a large part to the spread of this phenomenon. Indeed, each faction seemed to be accusing the others of “apostasy" in politics, and it was only natural for this to clear the path for Takfiri Islamists. Moreover, the preoccupation of traditional Islamist forces, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiyya and the Salafists, with politics and political work, as well as with reaching and remaining in power, has made them overlook the principles of education and social work. In fact, education and social work have become means at the service of politics, attracting additional members or supporters, and therefore voters. Thus, political polarization and political takfir (accusing others of apostasy) have increased the phenomenon of religious takfir and Islamic Jihad, and ordinary citizen must now face not only the battles and the conflicts of the elite, as well as for example the debate over the new constitution, but also the bombs of Takfiri Islamists... and the weapons of Jihadists!
