In parallel to the Syrian movement of political opposition abroad to form a unified structure, the armed opposition on the ground is advancing by gradually eating away at the regime's positions and military pivot points in numerous areas. It has become clear that the method of insane and deadly shelling and of itinerant massacres of civilians employed by the regime in every direction expresses its frustration at losing control of additional areas in the country, and perhaps at its inability to achieve any progress on the ground. International and regional pressures are increasing on the opposition to prepare itself for the transitional phase after the fall of the regime. Meanwhile, the area of control the regime has on the field is becoming increasingly reduced inside the country, indicating that the phase of lost time is nearing its end. International disagreements over the nature of the solution for Syria and its political future may well be among the reasons that have prolonged the period of lost time. Moreover, the US Administration, which, as circumstances would have it, stands at the threshold of presidential elections, has not shown determination in any direction, making European countries tone down their enthusiasm for a quick solution. The result of all this is that Syrians were left to face the regime's deadly war machine with a minimum of armament, sufficient for the clashes of urban warfare but incapable of confronting long-range heavy artillery. This in turn has prolonged the period of lost time, in view of the near-impossibility of achieving decisive military victory on the ground. During this period, the political opposition, in all of its shades and colors, was caught up in conflicts that were most often of a personal nature, thus reflecting the previous phase of Syrian rule in which the regime focused all of its instruments of repression to prevent the emergence of a secular opposition movement and to uproot its most prominent figures by exiling, jailing or killing them. And when the popular protest movement erupted, the political parties, formal bodies and prominent figures of the opposition breathlessly chased after it, without managing, by virtue of having been exhausted over four decades, to provide a model of leadership for the Syria of tomorrow. Thus the protest movement remained a spontaneous one, trying to adapt in every region to the factors needed to survive at the local level, without finding a unifying program and leadership. With the defection of members of the military who refused to open fire on their protesting civilian countrymen, “militarization" began to expand on the ground, with the vacuum of military confrontation being filled by the groups most attached to combat and most experienced in it. And with this filling of the vacuum came itinerant radicals, unconcerned with the agenda of the Syrian political opposition... reaching up to what we are witnessing today in terms of practices and slogans that arouse caution and questions over where they might lead. At a time when the opposition is preparing to hold its “unification" meeting in Doha and to select a joint leadership, there are challenges that face it which the future of the country rests upon meeting. We all know that the US elections will be over in a few days, and the issue of Syria will be the most prominent one facing the next administration. The current administration has begun to show signs of the manner of dealing with this issue that will be adopted, whether from current Democratic President Barack Obama (who is most likely to remain in office) or from his Republican competitor Mitt Romney. Those signs stress the necessity of having a broadly representative formal body which would include the entire spectrum of the Syrian opposition at home and abroad, and would be able to manage the country when the regime collapses. It should also be able to confront the radical and takfiri movements spread across Syria today. These signs have also found an echo with Westerners, who have repeated them in their statements and advised the opposition to take them into consideration. Opposition conferences have moved around, following political affiliations, between Istanbul, Cairo, Doha and most recently Amman, as well as between many Western capitals. And all of these conferences sought to make of themselves the political frame of reference of the Syrian opposition, including the military opposition, without having any kind of military presence on the ground. These conferences may have been occasions to incite against the regime and stress the necessity of toppling it, and perhaps also to obtain some aid, financial or in kind, of which some has been spent on relief for refugees at home and abroad. Yet at the same time, they were occasions to deepen the rift between opposition factions, as well as to exchange criticism, accusations and sometimes insults. They in any case have not effectively contributed to the real battle on the ground, and have not been able to shorten the lifespan of the regime. Political lost time has begun to run out, and developments on the ground are creating new realities and a new balance of power. The Doha conference, which is supposed to unify forces at home and abroad, presents an opportunity, perhaps the last, for the opposition to restore the bright side of the unified protest movement and its demands of a secular democratic state for all, as well as to regain the political credibility it has lost as a result of its fragmentation and division.
