Iran has rarely acknowledged that it is facing difficult confrontations, or that it has weak points, or that its plans in the region are experiencing a setback because of the growing number of rivals who are being hurt by these plans. Iran has always believed that it holds significant negotiating cards that it should be proud of, making it strong enough to go on the attack in recent years. However, the other day the Supreme Ruler of Iran said, while commenting that street protests have caused the collapse in the Riyal, that sanctions on his country are "barbaric, and a war against the nation." This allows one to believe that Tehran has moved from a state of attack, via its achievements on the regional and nuclear front, to a state of defense. Around ten months ago, western countries expected that the ramifications of the last round of American and European sanctions on Iran would begin to appear this autumn. The first signs of this have emerged, with the recent collapse in the Iranian currency, as it registered a drop in recent months of about 72 percent. The western press has begun to talk about the "sinking" Iranian riyal, and the impending collapse of the economy. While this conclusion appears hasty, Iranian officials continue their policy of making light of the difficulties, as if they are still on the attack, and not the defensive, to which they have clearly moved because of several factors. Most importantly, the Syrian crisis has erupted and reached a point of no return, as evidenced by recent political and military developments. Ever since western sanctions were imposed on Iran because of its nuclear program around six years ago, Tehran has repeated that these sanctions are for the benefit of the Iranian people, because they would force it to rely on itself. Military and tech industries would be developed and near self-sufficiency in food and daily items would be achieved. However, the numbers say that over recent years, the impact of these sanctions has built up and the last batch has affected Iran's revenues; the targeted oil exports, which are relied on to cover 80 percent of the budget. These sanctions have become painful, prompting the Supreme Leader this time to acknowledge that the sanctions might cause problems, with the expectation of the collapse of the economy of western countries. This ignores the huge gap in terms of the mechanisms that Europe has at its disposal to deal with its crises, such as the cooperative relations among various countries. Meanwhile, Iran lacks these mechanisms and most importantly, its relations are limited to a small number of surrounding states which could help it overcome any economic crisis. The sanctions on Tehran might have been less painful were it not for the regime's costly political-financial policy, which has begun to erode its strategic capabilities domestically and in the region, whether this involves its nuclear program or the Syrian crisis. The Iranian leadership has been forced to move toward a defensive policy to prevent the collapse of its valuable card, namely the Syrian regime. This is taking place directly, through a direct presence on the ground in Syria, beginning with the commander of the Quds Force, General Qassem Soleimani, and also by dragging Hezbollah into battles here and there, inside Syria. This is putting the party under the microscope and causing unrest among the Shiites, its base, because they are being pushed into a conflict that will have repercussions for the future and threaten all of the achievements they have seen thus far. The Arab Spring has begun to return the issue of Arab political roles back to the forefront, after their decline due to Iran's progress, to fill the vacuum. Moreover, the developments in the Syria crisis have moved Iranian-Turkish relations from regional cooperation in confronting crises, which allowed Ankara to play a mediating role with the west on the Iranian nuclear issue, to one of contradiction and competition in terms of interests and objectives. Tehran has moved to a position of defending the huge arsenal of rockets and military industries, which it established in cooperation with the regime of President Bashar Assad. Iran built this so that it would become a base for its aggressive policy in the eastern Mediterranean. This huge military, financial and security investment justifies its fierce efforts to see the Syrian regime survive. Tehran has been obliged to give up Afghanistan and reduce its involvement there and in some Central Asian countries, in order to save money, which it is spending on its eastern front, and specifically in Syria. This came after it saved money spent on supporting Hamas, which has exited the sphere of Iranian influence after supporting the uprising of the Syrian people. Iran is accused of intervening in Yemen, after President Abedrabo Hadi announced successively the discovery of six Iranian espionage cells. Some believe that Iraq's move toward signing a huge weapons deal with Russia means that Moscow has returned to Mesopotamia, to fill the vacuum left behind by the Americans, and even divide influence with Iran, which had already moved in to fill this gap. Tehran has come to require a re-ordering of its regional negotiating cards to suit the state of defensiveness, and not attack, that it finds itself in, before they eventually all collapse.
