Doubtless Israel's political and military leadership (the alliance between Netanyahu and Barak) realizes that directing a strike against nuclear facilities in Iran would be nearly impossible without the approval and the active participation of the United States – just as it is well aware that such a strike, if it were to take place, would not be certain to put a stop to the nuclear program, and would be followed by an response from Iran. US officials, on the other hand, ever since Obama reached the White House, have been reiterating stances that reject military action against Tehran, considering that there is still sufficient time for diplomatic action, and that one must allow the sanctions to take their course in besieging the regime of the Ayatollahs and convincing it to renounce its policies, whether nuclear or connected to the situation in the region. Even Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey has stated, with clarity uncommon to relations between the two countries, that he wants no involvement in this potential Israeli adventure. Where will then be translated all of this Israeli verbal escalation, sounding the drums of war and embarrassing Israel's US ally? The answer resides in what is taking place in Syria. Indeed, the Israelis have from the beginning defended the Assad regime and prevented American and European stances from evolving towards direct intervention to help overthrow him. Today, however, they have become convinced that time is running out for this regime and that its collapse is only a matter of time, in light of the progress achieved by the opposition on the field, and of the regime being forced to call up army reserves. The collapse of the Syrian regime would represent a dual loss for both Israel and Iran. Indeed, Tehran would lose the main country, or in fact the only country, allied with it in the region, and Tel Aviv would lose the regime that guarantees its security, whether on the Golan front or on the front of South Lebanon. This is why they are both seeking to compensate for this loss, within the framework of each of them preparing for the post-Assad phase. However, direct confrontation between the two of them is currently restricted to Lebanon alone, after Gaza has nearly left the picture in the wake of Hamas withdrawing from Damascus and disassociating itself from Iran. Thus the “tug-of-war" over Lebanon has in effect begun between the two countries. Indeed, Israel threatens that it will target all of Lebanon if it is subjected to any attack from Hezbollah, without specifying any kind of geographical framework. It has in the past, and specifically in 1982, invaded Lebanon following an assassination attempt against its ambassador in London. As for Iran, concerned about its sole surviving ally, its officials have been making repeated visits to Beirut, the latest having been by Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, who asserted that Lebanon's security was part of his country's own, while Hezbollah raised its voice, threatening the Hebrew State with severe human casualties if it were to attack Iran or Hezbollah itself. Yet muscle-flexing and mutually exchanged threats fall under the framework of indirect negotiations between Tel Aviv and Tehran over Lebanon – negotiations over drafting a new equation without the element of Syria, which could lead to extending the current truce between Hezbollah and Israel, even if without cementing it within a legal framework that would exceed the notion of “cessation of hostilities" stated in UNSC Resolution 1701 to a permanent ceasefire, or could clear the path for another round of fighting, which this time will be quite destructive.
