The Iranians and the Americans are engaged in a process of pressuring the ruling authorities in Lebanon, which emerged after the collapse 17 months ago of the Saudi-Syrian (S-S) agreement. These pressures are expected to continue, and grow, as the crisis in Syria continues, and escalates. However, the pressures are “under the ceiling” of the interest of both Iran and the US, in safeguarding a minimum level of stability in Lebanon until further notice. This is because both states are busy with more important matters in the regional arena, particularly the bloody violence in Syria, and the negotiations between leading powers and Iran over the latter's nuclear program. Washington requires a guarantee that Iran will not exercise total control over Lebanon's official decision-making. Meanwhile, the Iranians need to affirm that they continue to hold the Lebanon card, after the achievement of bringing down the government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri under the slogan of “safeguarding a strong resistance [to Israel] is more important than Lebanon's national unity” (the term was used by the Iranians in January 2011). As it carries out its policy of withdrawal from Iraq, Washington has managed to limit its losses in Lebanon by pressuring the government of Prime Minister Najib Miqati. It set down the conditions, with other western countries, of funding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, extending its mandate, and not handing over power to the allies of Iran and Syria in a number of state institutions. Also, the US exercised pressure to see Lebanon adhere to sanctions on Iran and Syria, give Syrian refugees save haven in Lebanon, and adopt a policy of “disassociation” from the crisis in Syria, instead of standing fully with the regime in Damascus. Meanwhile, Tehran has been able, with its Lebanese allies, to preserve political and sectarian cover for the Miqati Cabinet, while keeping one of the country's leading political camps out of the ruling majority. The Iranians have allowed the Miqati government to remain in power, in such a way that allows these allies to boost their influence in Lebanon's official political, bureaucratic and security institutions. This has extended to state ministries and other bodies, where these allies face no obstacles in offering services with strategic objectives, or boosting the influence of Hezbollah on the ground. This has been aided by a total absence by Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, after the S-S initiative collapsed. What is new on this front, with the visits this week by the US Assistant Secretary State, Jeffrey Feltman, and the Iranian Vice President, Mohammad Reza Rahimi, to Lebanon? The coinciding visits are part of the pressure that was previously being exerted, but the two sides are now moving in a fluid situation, even if it has yet to be decisive in either direction, on the regional front. This requires each side, in Lebanon, to pay attention to its role and position. Certainly, the developments in the Syrian crisis are likely to be prolonged, which has entered the calculations of both Tehran and Washington. If Washington hoped that the sanctions that it, the European Union, Japan, Canada and Australia have put into place on Iran and Syria would benefit its policy on the two regimes, it is natural that Damascus, and along with it Tehran, would use Lebanon as a way to get around these sanctions, since they have strong allies holding the reins of power. Western countries have monitored these actions, which have taken place in way such that the private and the public are mixed. In the last two months, Washington has pressured the political authorities in Lebanon to adhere to sanctions; for this purpose, it has dispatched the deputy secretary of state for financial intelligence and terrorism, David Cohen, to Beirut, and has insisted, along with the EU, on the protection of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The allies of Tehran and Damascus, meanwhile, have pressured the Lebanese authorities to stop heeding the wishes of the west (with Miqati, for example) with regard to the Syrian crisis. They have informed those concerned, by issuing a certain type of threats. This pressure covers the campaign against President Michel Suleiman and Miqati, and to a certain extent, Walid Jumblatt, the head of the parliamentary National Struggle bloc. This is even though there has been a bit of "exaggeration" when it comes to the dispute over raising the ceiling of state expenditures, making appointments to posts in the bureaucracy, drafting a parliamentary election law, and revamping the electricity sector, and under "local" pretexts. It is said that this pressure has been effective with some, but not others. Also in terms of the regional arena, Lebanon serves as a forum for Lebanon, as it behaves flexibly with the negotiations over its nuclear program and exchanges positive signals with western countries, to send messages to those concerned. These messages state that this flexibility is matched by Iran's retaining all of its regional cards, if America's goal is to weaken it, for objectives that have to do with the negotiations. Here, Iran's strong presence in Beirut is not separate from the country's hard-line stance on countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council on the issue of the three occupied islands, and its retaining its grip on the ruling authorities in Iraq - and this extends to Rahimi's proposal, made ten days ago, that will lead to total unity between the two countries. The message that Iran wants to send via Lebanon is that it will not permit itself to be weakened, if the Syrian card it holds has been weakened or blocked due to the war of attrition that has beset its ally in Syria, even though the regime is still in power.
