It is no longer possible to describe Kofi Annan as the Envoy of the League of Arab States to Syria. Rather, one could say that he has become only the Envoy of the United Nations, the role of which has been obstructed as a result of the stances taken by Russia and China. Indeed, the Arab League initiative, which states that Bashar Al-Assad should hand over his powers to the Vice President in order to begin negotiating with the opposition, is very different from the six-point plan presented by Annan, which Damascus verbally declared to agree to. Clearly the Arabs made a mistake by agreeing to a joint envoy with the United Nations, because they have by this introduced the Russian veto into the core of their efforts to resolve a problem that primarily concerns them, and given the UN Envoy excessive freedom to negotiate in their name, despite the differences in terms of interests, analysis and conclusions reached. They should have, after Moscow obstructed the Security Council, left a margin between them and the UN, which would have allowed them to voice reservations over any approach that did not meet with their vision for a solution and to intervene to modify it. The Russians were feeling embarrassed by Arab consensus over the necessity for Assad to leave, and now the Arabs are embarrassed to be forced to back a settlement that eludes their consensus. Furthermore, the Arab Summit held today in Baghdad finds itself forced to support the plan of the UN Envoy, who also speaks in its name, which means lowering the ceiling of its discourse and holding the regime and the opposition equally responsible for the violence, as stated by the plan – something the Arab League had rejected from the beginning. Annan's approach is based on the fact that the Syrian regime does not represent a threat to the world order, and that Assad's departure is not a necessary condition for stopping the violence, while the Arabs know that the regime of the Assad family, since its establishment over forty years ago, has represented and continues to represent an effective threat to the Arab order, as a result of the breach it has caused in it to the benefit of two foreign parties – Iran and Israel. They thus consider changing the Syrian regime to be essential to protect the Arab order from being targeted by Iran, which is relentless and which finds strong support in Damascus and in its influence, which stretches to Lebanon. But what will save face for the Arabs, even if it will not resolve Syria's problem, is the nature of the Syrian regime itself – i.e. its inability to commit to what it perceives to be a threat, even a minor one, to its survival. And as it will later become clear to all parties, Damascus will skillfully manipulate the six-point plan and its priorities, and will lay down conditions in the details that will cripple the plan's implementation, just as it managed previously to void the mission of the Arab observers of its content and to turn it to its advantage until the Arab League had to abandon it. Moreover, it is striking that Annan would suggest for the Syrian army to stop firing, withdraw its heavy artillery and return to its barrack, and then demand a daily truce of two hours, as if admitting that implementing the first point was out of the question. On the part of the Syrian opposition, which Annan invites to engage in dialogue with the regime, it is unlikely for there to be anyone who would be bold enough to sit down at one table with Assad's representatives to negotiate for less than his departure. And what was the Syrian President's visit to the destroyed Baba Amr neighborhood two days ago but a clear message about the kind of negotiations he wishes to engage in? And until the Syrian opposition on the ground manages to turn things around and impose change, there will always be Arab and international mediators moving between capitals and trying what has been tried before.
