The “Friends of Syria” conference held in Tunis has come in response to the failure to issue a Security Council resolution that would adopt the plan for Assad to step down and for changing the regime, as a result of the dual Russian-Chinese veto. In this sense, it represents the alternative to the Security Council, and provides support to the UN General Assembly resolution which condemned the regime and adopted the Arab League initiative. In other words, it represents escalation of political and military pressure through decisions of which the political aspect is written while the military aspect is secret, having been agreed upon and begun to be implemented before the conference. Arming the opposition is not a new demand. It has been raised by protesters and the leaders of the Syrian National Council (SNC) have been calling for it for months. Such a call has been answered by some parties – or at least by weapon dealers with political connections to parties opposed to the regime. In fact, the issue of weapons no longer matters, now that they have started flowing heavily into the Syrian interior. What matters is covering it with a political decision. The United States was perhaps behind such a decision not having been taken, because it was unable, along with its allies, to unite the opposition and give it an identity that would ensure that what happened in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi does not happen in Syria. The US Army's Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, challenged “anyone to identify (…) the opposition movement in Syria”. He also said that “there [were] indications that Al-Qaeda is involved and that they're interested in supporting the opposition” and that “there [were] a number of players [taking part in the events], all of whom are trying to reinforce their particular side of this issue”. The US being puzzled does not mean that Washington does not know the constituents and the orientations of the Syrian National Council. Indeed, US officials, headed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have entered into lengthy talks with the SNC, in addition to individual talks with a few prominent figures and with the Muslim Brotherhood – not to say that US intelligence knows the full history of every person in this opposition. It also did not need to hear Ayman Al-Zawahiri's speech to know that the Al-Qaeda organization was present in Syria. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper confirmed the contents of Bin Laden's successor's message by to his brethren. Clapper said before the Senate's Armed Services Committee that the bombing that took place in Damascus and Aleppo “had all the earmarks of an al-Qaeda-like attack (…) and so we believe Al-Qaeda in Iraq is extending its reach into Syria”. He also pointed to “the presence of extremists who have infiltrated the opposition groups”. The presence of Al-Qaeda in Syria will not prevent Washington from continuing to work to topple the regime, and it seeks to unify the opposition so that it may “mature” and reach a level that would allow it to assume power in an important country like Syria. It is within such a framework (bringing the opposition to maturity) that one can place the resolutions that were put forward at the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Tunis conference – and those that will be put forward at other conferences in the future. The issue is not limited to this line of action alone. Indeed, the US Administration has a plan, or a roadmap, summed up by researcher at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) – an institute founded by AIPAC of which the studies are often adopted by the US Administration – Jeffrey White. White advised the Administration to adopt “indirect intervention”, which would include supporting “armed resistance, sabotage, political warfare, and civil resistance”. He states that “the Syrian people are already employing such methods, but not in a coordinated, organized, or well-supported way” and that “the United States and other countries are capable of giving the opposition the help it needs”. He also asks Washington to “[build] effective combat forces (…) [and] provide weapons and training for resistance fighters”, in addition to “building [a] more effective civil (unarmed) resistance (…) [that] could have much greater scope and effect”. In his report, White returns to the United States' past experiences in supporting and arming rebels, closely following their movement and development so that they may not stray from the set political plan, and so that they may remain loyal to those who embrace them. If this, i.e. indirect military support, were to take place, perhaps through a third party loyal to both sides that denies being concerned and fearful about “extremists” taking control of the movement and of the situation after the fall of the regime, then Washington would become the main actor in forming the new regime. White's plan is a traditional one, known to all those who follow American politics, and his recipe for gang warfare is well known of beginners in this “science”. It started to be implemented in practice in Syria months ago, but it is a very useful recipe for one who wishes to become informed of the direction taken by the US regarding Syria, the opposition and developments in the near future.
