Egypt is still erratically trying to find its way, between an elected parliament that is more of a constituent assembly supposed to lay the foundations for a new system, and a power structure the instruments of which continue to function despite the fall of major symbolic figures of the former regime. Indeed, neither does the parliament hold any executive powers, or even the power to hold the executive branch to account, nor is the executive branch, as represented by the government cabinet and the Military Council, which remains the source of government powers, able to move forward on the roadmap that has been set. Far from the traditional methods of courtesy in Egypt, and from the tactical considerations of political forces, especially the Islamist forces that dominate the parliament and seek to bring about an executive branch tailored to their interests, the struggle for power remains heated, and in fact bloody – which means that a stable and recognized new system has not yet arisen. It may only be natural for the political tug-of-war to continue at this unclear stage, yet what Egypt is witnessing in terms of violence can no longer be justified by the presence of “remnants” (of the former regime). Such violence is the product of forces that are still present on the scene and are prepared to commit acts of violence in order to preserve a certain situation or certain gains, or in order to obtain them. In this sense, there is a connection between what Cairo has been witnessing, in terms of demonstrations, protests and clashes with the police, and the massacre that took place in Port Said on a football field. Any technical explanation for the fall of 74 dead and hundreds of wounded to a clash between the supporters of two football teams would mean concealing the political roots of the problem in Egypt today. Indeed, had it not been for the tremendous tension that dominates relations among Egyptians, and the greatly floundering manner in which this unclear stage is being managed, civilians would never have resorted to this kind of violence, akin to phenomena of civil strife. Indeed, the violence of Port Said continued in Cairo, and in other places in Egypt, in the form of confrontations and clashes, which led to additional victims falling. And before Port Said, the youth movement was confronted with political violence from outside of any state-affiliated framework, when supporters of the Islamists formed a barrier around the parliament building to prevent demonstrators from reaching it. Such a phenomenon certifies that there are those in Egypt who consider that their victory in parliamentary elections gives them the right to monopolize security, and to consider a state institution to have become their own share, a share that should be preserved – even if this were to require adopting militia-like methods reminiscent of those of the baltagia (hired thugs) employed by the former regime. It is only evident for members of the Military Council to show resistance to changing the status of the army as a decision-making power. And it is also evident for political struggle to persist in a phase that is witnessing a process of opening up, even if partially, to freedom of political expression. Yet violence between citizens themselves carries in its folds a conclusion of the utmost importance for the future of the political process in Egypt – namely that the fall of the symbolic figures of the former regime did not lay the foundations for a phase that would establish the equal citizenship that was raised as a slogan by the Revolution, and that there is still a long way to go before reaching popular recognition of differences and the rights of others. It thus remains difficult to find ways to organize the struggle peacefully, in a manner that would allow for getting across the transitional period to the phase of the state of law, equality and democracy. It seems that the great imbalance of power within parliament, the institution which is supposed to lay the foundations for such a phase, and the appearance of tendencies towards monopoly and hegemony within the majority, have brought about profound feelings of frustration, which are also being fed by the Military Council's narrow-minded management. Indeed, the Council, despite the roadmap it has laid out for the political process, has shown little sign of keeping up with the transformation up to its withdrawal from politics, especially as its members had occupied the same positions under the previous regime.
