There are two American readings of the events in Iran. The first is based on the experience of the last six years. It takes into consideration Washington's need for Tehran in order to exit the Iraqi quagmire and a focus on pursuing the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, as they are America's direct enemies. This reading holds that the Islamic Republic can be neutralized through dialogue and an exchange of interests in the Arab Gulf and the Middle East, and a settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue. Thus, President Barack Obama has appeared reluctant to take a stance in support of the reformers in Iran, satisfied with the hard-line European stance, expressed by France, Germany and Britain. This leaves the door open to dialogue with the regime's leading figures, even though President Ahmadinejad has adhered to his desperate rhetoric. The second reading of the situation is based on ideology; it sees no benefit from dialogue with Iran, especially after the recent elections proved the strength of the conservatives and their readiness to defend their positions and proposals by stamping out any opposition by force, even if the opposition is from within the regime and its leaders are the children of the Islamic Revolution. This reading holds that politicians should not await what will happen in the struggle within the ruling institution and religious hawzas, especially since the Iranian street has proved its vitality and determination to see change. The reading goes further; it calls on the White House to support the opposition and hasten the fall of the regime, which it believes to be inevitable, even if this means giving the green light to an enthusiastic Israel to strike Iran's nuclear reactors. This reading believes that the general atmosphere has become conducive to taking this hard-line position: the Iranian street is ready to move against the regime. Europe is no longer hesitant. Sectarian division in the Arab world has matured to the point that it will support any military action against Tehran. Moreover, getting the hard-liners out of power in Tehran will end Syrian opposition, and therefore that of Hizbullah and Hamas, to the Middle East peace process, and Obama will be able to accomplish what all previous US administrations failed to do. This point of view has been best expressed by US Vice President Joe Biden, who affirmed that “it's a sovereign nation – what's in their interest and what they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else….whether we agree (to a military strike) or not. They're entitled to do” what they want. The other reading, built on the experience of the Iraq war and accompanying lies and deception, was expressed by the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, who said: “I have been, for some time, concerned about any strike on Iran. I worry about it being very destabilizing, not just in and of itself but unintended consequences of a strike like that would be destabilizing.” Have we returned, with the Obama administration, to the hawkishness of the vice president, like the situation with Dick Cheney during the George Bush administration? Does Biden represent the ideological, demagogic mindset in the White House? It is a legitimate question but one that we cannot answer now, for many reasons, most importantly the fact that Obama is considerably more knowledgeable than Bush, his predecessor. The two American readings spring from an old tradition that remains in effect – focusing on US (and Israeli) policy toward Iran and ignoring Iranian policy toward the US, or considering it a mere reaction, as the Iranian-American academic Mohsen M. Milani wrote in the most recent issue of Foreign Affairs. Milani expressed his surprise at this phenomenon, especially since Washington has confirmed that nothing resembles the challenge posed by Tehran. Milani adds, “What does exist is sensationalistic coverage about Iran's nuclear ambitions and about mad mullahs driven by apocalyptic delusions and a martyr complex.” These writings conclude that its leaders cannot be deterred and must be removed by force. He concludes by saying the mullahs are not mad, but fashion their policies with precision, trying to preserve their regime. They have set up relations that extend from the Middle East to the Caucasus, passing through the Arab Gulf. Thus, we should look at what they are planning, and read it based on its complexities and the complexities of the Iranian situation. We are facing a new phase in Iran, after the presidential elections and its fall-out; more than ever, especially in the Arab world, we need to read the situation without the traditional US view of things, and without the readings of Biden and Netanyahu.
