If what is happening in Syria is caused by a foreign “conspiracy” backed up by the Arabs and implemented by “armed gangs” that are funded and armed by the pillars of the conspiracy, and if this conspiracy is targeting the “resistance and rejectionism” course established by the Syrian rule through its structure and system of governance throughout four decades, then why did the Syrian authorities proclaim legal and constitutional changes? Especially since some of them – regardless of their implementation method and the intentions behind them – point to the fact that the constitutional structure whose set up was supervised by the late President Hafez al-Assad to fit his rule, are now the object of doubts within the authority. So, are these doubts prompted by the realization of the fact that this power structure can no longer be sustained, or by the result of the pressures exerted by the protests, or that of the Arab consensus over the rejection of the Syrian handling of the protesters' demands? Between the official announcements of the reforms – the last of which was related to the constitutional amendment affecting the president's term and political plurality – and the practices on the ground and on the political level, there is a great gap, even a contradiction causing one to annul the other. Indeed, on the ground, the daily killings are ongoing. In other words, the governmental troops are still adopting the language of power alone in the face of the protesters, the demonstrators and the mourners. This is despite the signing of the cooperation protocol with the Arab observers, which forces the authorities in Damascus to put an end to this policy and ensure a climate of calm that can guarantee the return to politics. But apparently, these authorities do not want to return to politics, the biggest proof for this being its stand vis-à-vis the political facet of the Arab initiative, in its old and new versions. This is happening at a time when this facet is the object of Arab consensus, is welcomed by key powers in the Syrian opposition and is backed up on the international level, especially by Damascus' allies Russia and China that praised this plan more than once. It is believed that as the League is preparing to head to the United Nations to promote this plan, it will become difficult for all the members of the international organization to not seriously deal with it and all that it carries in terms of massive and urgent pressures on the Syrian regime whose support has become limited to Iran and some Lebanese parties, after Iraq also supported the Arab plan. It is likely that the talk of reforms, as featured in the quasi-official Syrian Al-Watan newspaper, aims at besieging the political demands featured in the Arab plan and at limiting the handling of the crisis to the security facet where the authorities feel superior. And what was started by Minister Walid al-Muallem in his press conference yesterday does not exit the context of the authorities' initial tale, without taking into account all that has happened in Syria throughout the last ten months. Once again, this method is revealing shortsightedness and the non-perception of the numerous and intertwined factors of this crisis. At the same time, it exposes the non-realization of the extent of the determination of the regime's opponents – both domestically and abroad – and their ability to topple the equation, including on the security level and on the short run. As for the withdrawal of the Arab confidence from the observers' mission following the miserable reading by its head, Major General Al-Dabi, through the ministerial council's decision and the Gulf states' pullout from it, it only proves that the dodging of the disaster would require the Syrian regime's engagement in the plan regulating the transitional phase as per the Arab initiative. The latter implies that any serious reform should be the outcome of dialogue during this stage - with the consensus of all the Syrian parties – and not after it.
