Vladimir Putin, the leader of the Kremlin who is strongly returning to it in a few weeks, has made up his mind and is tickling the dreams of the Russians who have become sick and tired of the West's orders and wish that their country would restore its power, although they are definitely not a majority. He has made up his mind with “red lines” in regard to Syria and Iran, not only to avoid losing the last two allies in the region, but also to use them as platforms in the face of the storms of the Arab spring, to prevent these storms from hitting his own country. Putin's no's, which were announced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, unified Syria and Iran by describing them as being the victims of the West's ill intentions. He said no to the sanctions, no to the military option against Tehran and no to military intervention in Damascus' affairs. The string of Russian no's reveals the renewed failure of the American-European efforts seeking the condemnation of the Syrian regime via a Security Council resolution whose birth is still unlikely. However, in the case of the catastrophe of the strike on Iran – against which Kremlin has been warning – all the scenarios are still unfolding outside the Security Council hallways. Indeed, neither Israel will request permission to strike the nuclear facilities, nor will Washington require an international resolution to deter Khamenei's possible closing of the Hormuz Strait. As for the fires of the Sunni-Shi'i strife, what Lavrov did not say about it is that the military option against Iran will spread its flames from Iraq to the states of the region bordering the warm waters. The Russian escalation with the West and the return of the climate of a cold war between Moscow and “partners” whom it accused of reviving the imperialist dreams, might be partly attributed to Putin's electoral program for the presidential polls which will be held in March. In the meantime, Washington's appeasement of the confrontation with Iran while settling to reject the current “levels of violence” in Syria, embody President Barack Obama's caution during an electoral year in which he might lose his change of remaining at the White House. Therefore, Tehran is aware of the fact that the calculations of any American war, or even the Americans' luring into a limited confrontation over the Hormuz Strait – i.e. the oil vein – are different calculations this time around. As for Washington, it realizes that the consequences of the closing of the Strait exceed its calculations, since neither Obama can disregard such a step out of fear of getting involved, nor can Khamenei in this case prevent NATO from responding or avoid the striking of Iran's arsenal and nuclear facilities. Even Nouri al-Maliki's government – which is Tehran's ally – seemed to be in panic over the closing of the oil exports vein. Although it is clear that the calculations are not the same between the United States and all the allies who are expressing disgruntlement over the possible consequences of the banning of Iranian oil, what is certain is that Tehran found the resumption of the negotiations with the West over its nuclear program in Istanbul to be a carrot, used to woo the disgruntled with another opportunity into engaging in a dialogue that most of them know will be useless. This brings us back to square one, unless the Russians' fears over the West's attempts to suffocate Iran's economy, trigger an uprising in it and undermine its regime, are right on the mark. What is certain is that this regime is dreading the date of the parliamentary elections in March, as it perceives these elections as being a new test for the deterrence of the storms of the Arab spring, with the “conspiracy” tune in hand. In the Syrian tragedy, which is cloning itself between martyrs and witnesses, everyone is blockaded in a tunnel whose end does not seem to be imminent. Indeed, the political machine is not working, and the killing machine is not stopping. Moreover, the presence of the Russian fleet did not allow the prevalence of the regime, the spread of the observers did not give any hopes in regard to the possible Arabization of the crisis, and the opposition's troubles did not reveal a likely settlement. As for the militarization of the confrontation that seems to be expanding, it is still proceeding in parallel to the tampering with the sectarian fires. The opposition cannot wager on an exit that would unify the Security Council member states, while the Chinese wisdom – at least – believes there is a security improvement in Syria and is consequently squeezing the hand of the Arab League. But can the regime hope for the mere routine extension of the mission of the Arab League witnesses? It certainly realizes that any international resolution – even if adopted by the Council – to condemn the violence and the oppression, will not mark a critical turn that would weaken it in the face of the facts on the street. But who can guarantee the surprises of the street? Such surprises cannot be tuned based on the American electoral calculations, Obama's ambitions or Putin's dream of reviving the grip of the superpower. The tragedy lies in Syria, where everyone has lost the margin of maneuver and the ability to exit the trench of conspiracy and blood.
