When a boxer exaggerates in showing off his muscles, this gives the impression that he is concerned, afraid of the next round, or unsure about how firm the ground he is standing on is. So perhaps it is for this reason that he is excessively warning against the big showdown, hinting that this would open the gates of hell and set the whole region on a fire that will spare no one. The Iranians' recent behavior resembles the conduct of such a boxer. War exercises are thus announced, complete with generals and binoculars, images of missiles being fired and reassurances regarding their accuracy in hitting their targets, as well as talk about a new generation of weaponry. And when there are no such exercises and images of missiles, fiery statements act in their stead. Iran is behaving as though it constantly needs a high degree of tension, perhaps because this protects it from disputes and divisions that would no doubt surface when the odds for a confrontation with the outside decrease. The climate of tension justifies the arsenal and the need to develop it, and the claim that the nation is in a state of war and must speak with one voice. This means, in other words, silencing dissidents and opponents, and prohibiting any call for accountability with respect to the prices incurred by risky policies. Iran acts as though it is threatened by calm, as this would otherwise compel it to tackle internal issues, and answer questions about the economy, development, freedoms and the purpose of policies that revolve around a sustained belligerence. In truth, the absence of tension with the outside world would give ordinary Iranians the chance to ponder their situation, ask questions and perhaps even deplore and condemn. Indeed, what can the Iranian official say if a citizen is to ask him why Turkey has succeeded in gaining an acceptable or needed regional role, and the ability to engage all parties without burdening its economy with the price of duels in the region or beyond? And why has a Turkish Islamist party succeeded in adopting the democratic game to regional and international acclaim, so much so that it is now considered a role model? What if the Iranian citizens ask the President why the slogans of the Iranian revolution or the portraits of Imam Khomeini were not raised in the squares of the Arab Spring? Or why the Iranian experience was not a model, whether because its Shiite identity creates boundaries that cannot be crossed or whether the discourse it has adopted in addressing the people of the region and the world is to blame? There are many questions. What if the Iranians ask why the revolution, after three decades, has not been able to consolidate an active, influential and palpable role? This is especially valid given that all the countries of the region recognize Iran's right to such a role, which cannot possibly be built on policies of infiltration, incursion and coercion. It is also the Iranians' right to ask whether Iran's attempt to become a political and religious reference point for Arab Shiites has propelled it into a conflict with majorities in the region, and undermined the ties between Shiite Arabs and other communities in their countries. It is their right to remember that while Vietnam had defeated America, it is today attempting to attract American investors and tourists, and that the Soviet Union imploded exactly because of its involvement in an arms race that was more than it could bear, as a result of conflicts beyond its own borders. To the observer, it appears that Iran has suffered a setback and incurred only further tension from the Arab Spring year. This is not only because it was forced to stand against the wave of Arab uprisings when it reached Syria, but also because it had benefited from the presence of rigid, questionable and unpopular regimes, especially in Egypt. For with the absence of Egypt, Iran had taken hold of the Palestinian card, and Jerusalem Day had become Iranian par excellence. One can even say that Iran is in danger of losing allies on whom it never held back. For instance, Khaled Meshaal can now sleep in peace in Cairo, and Islamil Haniyeh can now fly to Tunisia and embrace Rashid Ghannouchi. People with bad faith may say that Iran's insistence on undermining balances in Iraq and Lebanon has greatly damaged Syria's Arab and international relations, and put an end to the Syrian-Qatari-Turkish axis. The Iranian boxer was defeated in the year of the Arab Spring. The American withdrawal from Iraq may lure him to further rounds and fights. But the threat to close the Strait of Hormuz does not solve the problem. Rather, it makes it doubly difficult to carry on with the battle for a role and for the bomb. Whether the Iranian boxer is looking for a confrontation or a major crisis to improve his hand in negotiations, he must first notice the weaknesses inherent in his discourse, standing and arsenal.
