Whether or not Damascus agrees to sign the observers' document within the next few hours, and whether or not the Iraqi initiative succeeds and the Russian project achieves a breakthrough, the road ahead of change in Syria remains long. Indeed, all the concerned sides are aware of the dimension of the crisis they are facing and the internal balance of powers has not yet tilted in favor of any party, just like the balance of powers between the regional and international actors. Moreover, the negotiations path seems lengthy, after the Arab League extended its deadlines to President Bashar al-Assad's regime, at a time when Turkey's positions are shifting, along with those of embarrassed Russia and confused Iran. During the last few days, the three axes seeking the resolution of the crisis were clearly active in what seemed to be a last attempt to exercise influence over Damascus and protect the interests. This activity coincided with meaningful events at the level of the region's political map, the most prominent of which probably being the American troops' pullout from Iraq, the spring which has started to knock on Moscow's doors, the challenges it will carry for the Putin-Medvedev duo and Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization after two decades of strenuous negotiations. This might be a payment in advance, or even a non-free gift in the context of the exchange of accusations between Moscow on one hand, and Washington and Paris on the other, against the backdrop of the events unfolding in Syria. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki definitely carried messages from Tehran to Washington, as these exchanged messages between the two sides have not stopped since the days of President George Bush Jr. back when President Jalal Talabani carried similar ones. The recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report marked some sort of rapprochement with Tehran, but the circumstances had not yet ripened on the American, Iranian and Arab levels in particular. At the time, the Arab regime – especially the Gulf states at the head of which is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – was not ready for a deal between America and Iran, as such a deal would have undermined the status and role of the GCC in drawing up the region's policies. Until this day, the Council is still expressing reservations over the revival of the tripartite American-Iranian-Arab agreement formula which prevailed during the days of the Shah, and granted a favorable role to the Islamic Republic in the region. Hence the ongoing Gulf stand toward the two governments of Al-Maliki in Baghdad, whether the current or the previous one. It is worth mentioning at this level that there is a new component in the equation that should be taken into account, i.e. Turkey, which has become part of any arrangements affecting the entire Middle East, as well as its security and political system. President Barack Obama's blessing of the current Iraqi action toward Damascus was quite clear, as though he were sending a message to Tehran which is also strategically concerned about the future of the situation in Syria to avoid losing this strategic bridge into Lebanon and the border of Palestine. It also looked as though America did not mind assigning Iran – via Baghdad, following the initiative presented by the Arab League and Turkey – to seek an acceptable exit from the crisis, especially if this assignment serves the Arab initiative which the international community wants to turn into one similar to the Gulf initiative that set the roadmap for the end of the Yemeni crisis. In other words, it is drawing up a settlement temporarily taking into account the head of the regime, his party and his entourage, and distributing the positions between the conflicting sides in preparation for reforms with the contribution of all the latter sides. There is no doubt that the Syrian social structure is different from the Yemeni one and from the other structures throughout the lands of the Arab Spring. Indeed, the demographic map in Syria is very close to the Lebanese and Iraqi one, which is why the situation might end up with a new Taif Accord that allocates the shares on the various sects and ethnicities. Consequently, we will be in the presence of a third state governed by quotas that do not instate coexistence as much as they instate some sort of management for the crises that are prone to turn into open wars every now and then! At this level, there is no need to recall that the Iraqi initiative is certainly supported by Iran if it aims at launching dialogue between the regime of Bashar al-Assad and its oppositionists, even if based on the Arab initiative. And while the results will prevent Iran from losing this country and Lebanon along with it, and more importantly guarantee its safe presence in Baghdad following the departure of the Americans, it knows that the most dangerous thing it will face will not be the management of the crises which will emerge in Iraq following this departure but the future of the situation in Syria, whether the regime falls, anarchy continues or wide-scale civil war erupts. Hence, the meeting between Iranian Minister of Security and Intelligence Heidar Moslehi and Heir to the Throne Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Prince Nayef Bin Abdul-Aziz might not be a mere protocol meeting. It probably marks the beginning of Tehran's realization of the critical situation it is facing, whether at the level of its position toward the Syrian crisis, the repercussions and aftermath of Washington's exposure of an Iranian plan to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the Iranian capital or the ongoing confrontation over its nuclear file. Indeed, it is totally aware of the fact that it cannot ensure an Islamic solidarity with its stand, unless it earns such solidarity from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia firstly. It also realizes it cannot jump over Riyadh's influence in Iraq among other places. This Iraqi-Iranian action to grasp the key for the solution in Syria might have been one of the reasons behind the shift which affected Russia's position. The latter does not only feel that spring is knocking on its door, but also that the regime in Damascus cannot stand fast until the end in the face of all these pressures. And regardless of the Russian resolution draft at the Security Council, it will definitely increase Syria's isolation, although some powers considered it to be void of any content because it did not call for the imposition of sanctions. This resolution draft reflects Moscow's fear of seeing President Al-Assad's losing his grip without him being able to achieve victory over the people's will, and the opening of the road by the Arab initiative – which is earning wide Islamic and international support – before a regional-international solution. This is due to the fact that such a solution would jeopardize its vital interests as it was seen at the level of the Libyan crisis, in parallel to the enhancement of America's and Europe's interests, and Turkey's and some Arabs' interests before them. The next few days will determine whether Russia's new position is one last attempt to exercise its influence in this country, or a mere effort to take the solution key from the others, or an attempt to eliminate the embarrassment it is facing from the part of human rights organizations. In this race - or the heated conflict over Syria - Turkey is still the one that enjoys the most influence and is the most capable of reaching a solution, while there is no doubt that any direct military action to which it might resort could end the crisis quickly. However, this adventure might be obstructed by Iranian and Arab calculations, which might not even spare the safe passages which Ankara is willing to instate provided they earn an Arab cover. Amid this conflict over Syria, some are drawing up painful possibilities for the end of the Syrian crisis, the worst and most dangerous of which being the country's critical division, as imposed by a balance of powers that is quasi identical. Such a division would threaten other countries in the region. As for the least dangerous but most painful possibility, it is seeing Syria sliding toward a long civil war that will not spare anything, as it is being heralded by what is happening in some cities in the center and the northwest. Such a war would also affect the neighboring states, which will allow the prevalence of turmoil, acts of violence, tensions, as well as political, economic and social crises throughout the region, from Iraq to Lebanon going through Jordan. However, if Bashar al-Assad's regime is able to overcome all the pressures based on the cohesion of his military and security institutions and his apparatuses, Syria might turn into a second North Korea. Such a situation would also cause great harm to Lebanon before any other neighboring state, considering that it will become the only available door in light of the siege imposed on Damascus – regardless of Iraq or even Jordan's positions – will be under international scrutiny at the level of each and every detail, and might be included in the blockade.
