The rules of engagement with Iran have changed, after US President Barack Obama condemned the regime of the Islamic Republic for its repression of demonstrators and protesters objecting the manipulation of the presidential elections, as well as for the violence of its militias against civilians, both young men and young women. Thus the leaders of the US Administration have returned to the policy-drawing board to reformulate everything they had in mind when they thought of granting legitimacy to the regime in Tehran and recognizing its perenniality by providing guarantees that they would not interfere in its internal affairs. Indeed today, after panic has possessed Iran's leadership, its internal affairs have become international affairs, and it is no longer possible to overlook the challenges that face this leadership from the reformists and from clerics, who are part of the system of the Islamic Republic, as well as from those who oppose the rule of mullahs, the notion of the Vilayat-e-Faqih and the concept of the monopoly of religious-military rule of the state and the country. Yet it is not the United States alone, nor just the West, that are in the process of reframing policies towards Tehran. In fact, the Islamic Republic, headed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his partner President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is preparing different scenarios for the phase that comes after carrying out the plan of Ahmadinejad's inauguration as President, in the face of the Iranian people, next August. The possibilities that these scenarios involve range from fabricating crises in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine in order to divert attention away from the uprising within Iran and justify additional restrictions in order to suppress the ability to protest, to focusing exclusively on internal developments to contain and corner the opposition, which would consume all of the regime's forces and render it unable to implement its desired escalation strategy. Thus when leaderships in the Arab region observe the events taking place in Iran – whether these are loud or inhabit the silence of the unknown – they must think of their options at this transitional phase, which is of the utmost importance for the future of the region, whatever happens. Within such a framework, Arab and US policies certainly overlap, such as in policies regarding Syria or Iraq. Overlapping in the minds of the leaderships of organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas are realistic ideas, related to the wager on national identity instead of burning in the flames of what is taking place in Iran. Such wisdom may not be the final option, but it is an option worth encouraging, especially as Benjamin Netanyahu's Israel is skilled at attracting the enmity even of friends, and seems headed towards a very important confrontation for the future of US relations with the Middle East. First, at the level of Iraq: more than any time before, this phase requires an Arab role – primarily a Saudi one – within Iraq to sow the seeds of readiness in case of imported unrest or military operations against US troops. Indeed, obstructing the withdrawal of US troops from the cities may apparently not seem like a useful goal for Tehran. Yet if the media becomes occupied with any military escalation in Iraq that might weaken and endanger the US-Iraqi security agreement, this will reduce pressures on the ruling leaders in the Islamic Republic and help turn the attention away from what they are doing at the domestic level. Thus it is in the interest of the Arabs to be ready to support and help Iraq to continue moving forward towards stability, so that it may not become the alternative arena for power struggles within Iran. Neighboring countries especially should make certain to help Iraq through different means, so that it does not fall victim to the events in Iran. As for those countries that have clung to the notion of avoiding direct contribution in Iraq, they must reconsider, so as not to be taken by surprise by a sudden change in Iraq. Most prominent among these is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Saudi Arabia plays several roles, at the regional level and also within the framework of international partnerships, in many issues, extending from the Arab region to the Caucasus, through Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iraq is a milestone of the utmost importance, one which requires readiness but also positive contribution with an influence that aims, on one hand, at safeguarding Iraq and defending against legitimization, and on the other at restoring it as a country that falls within the Arab bosom. Syria has a role in protecting Iraq from exploitation, one which it has played in the past by its agreement with the United States to stop the infiltration of fighters through its borders to Iraq to wage operations against Iraqis or against US troops there. This agreement is ongoing, and this is why certain figures in the US Administration visit Damascus, as it is expected that the Commander of US Central Command General David Petraeus will visit, after the visit there of the President's Envoy for the peace process in the Middle East Senator George Mitchell. And because Damascus has promised and kept it promises of not interfering in the Lebanese parliamentary elections, it has obtained one of its chief demands from Washington – the return of the US Ambassador to the Syrian capital. Syria has not decided to separate – nor has it separated – itself from the Islamic Republic in Iran, as many have wished, dreamt and drafted policies in which they have based their hopes on such a separation. Damascus, in fact, will not have to choose. Fate has decided for it to choose the United States amidst its Iranian ally's internal battle in Iran and external battle in the world. Nevertheless, Damascus is also skilled at decrypting politics most of the time. It has observed the foundations of power shaking in Iran and has perhaps concluded that it would be a lengthy – and uncertain – battle. This took place after it had taken the decision to wager on the United States and President Barack Obama in any case. Now Damascus will most probably implement an agreement over the Syrian-Lebanese border similar to the one it reached with the United States over the Syrian-Iraqi border. This matter is of the utmost importance for President Obama, who does not wish to abuse Lebanon, but rather to remove any pretexts from Israel, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might use to turn Lebanon into a battlefield, in order to draw attention away from his blatant obstinacy in clinging to the settlements. Removing pretexts calls for Syria to seal its borders with Lebanon to any military cargo or trucks from Iran or elsewhere, intended for Hezbollah or for Palestinian factions working in Lebanon. And because the situation in Iran is fragile both internally and at the international level, the Syrian leadership might consider that any gamble it might undertake would come at a cost it could do without. Indeed, it neither wants another Gaza at its immediate borders with Lebanon if Israel were to undertake a similar military adventure, nor is it willing to miscalculate in a phase of Iranian or Israeli “implication”, to become the link to disasters it will not survive. Indeed, Damascus, as it seems, has decided that its interest now requires working diligently to convince the Barack Obama Administration that it is a link and a channel of communication, and this will require it to take measures that might not please some of its friends and allies, among them Hezbollah and Hamas. Doubtless Hezbollah's leadership is carefully examining the events and developments of the past two months at the level of the Lebanese parliamentary elections, the Iranian presidential elections and the developments of the events that followed in Iran, as well as the relationship between the US and Syria. It may also be itself in the process of determining its options. The fact of the matter is that the best option especially now is for it to take its natural place and standing on the Lebanese political scene. This way it would ensure its rights as a Lebanese political party, belonging to an independent, sovereign state with one strong army defending against aggressors. This way it could frustrate the schemes that Netanyahu and his team might have in mind, in terms of turning Lebanon into a battlefield for a wretched military maneuver that would tear it apart and do away with the means of international pressure and international punishment on Israel. This way it would avoid falling victim to the sidelines of events. Hamas too should carefully examine its options to realize that its fate is now hanging at the mercy of the wind that is blowing over the regime in Tehran. The Hamas leadership must realize that the opposition within Iran – whether it be from reformists or from those who hold a grudge against the regime – has grown tired of the Palestinian cause, as a result of Ahmadinejad's outbidding with Hamas's support. Thus Hamas must awaken from the dreams of the past, which had taken as a basis an unreachable, strong and fearsome Iran with an overwhelming influence. Indeed, the “gum” has burst, after it blew a bubble that amazed some leaderships and misled others. Indeed, the Iran if the near past is gone, even if the regime returns to power with all the resolve it can muster to restore its status and the impression that it is above limits and accountability. Better for Hamas to think strategically of the interest of the Palestinians, which would require it to stop wagering on Ahmadinejad returning to exploit the Palestinian cause, and take advantage of the opportunity to build on a window provided by Damascus, if it insists on rejecting the open door that faces it at the Palestinian level, through which it can reach the US Administration. Indeed there is today international consensus over cornering the Israeli government and imposing the two-state solution upon it, or else, there is the option of cutting US and European aid to it, and of ceasing to protect it from resolutions at the Security Council that condemn and perhaps punish it. And if this matter will take a while, building the institutions of the establishment of a Palestinian state – so that the “state” may be ready in two years – is a lucid, practical and wise strategy put forth by Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayad. It is a suggestion that falls within the interest of the Palestinians, and it is impossible for anyone who places Palestine first to oppose it, because it speaks of building the capabilities and the institutions of the state. Iran too is able to leap out of the cage of seeking after greatness, through a repressive regime with ambitions of regional hegemony and of exporting religious-police rule of the state, to a state of conveying the impression of the democracy of an ancient and noble people. Any regime that requires for the Basij and militias to impose law and order in the country is one that is on its way to disappearing in our day and age. The women of Iran have triumphed over the old and young men of the regime, because they have flown with wings of freedom against oppression and tyranny. The youth of Iran has amazed the world by launching its “internet revolution” and has fallen – young women and young men – dead before the cameras of mobile phones. Neda, that young girl whom people will not forget, has placed the Islamic Republic in Iran on the map of history, with a live image smeared with her blood. In the near past, the world feared Iran and was afraid to challenge it. The Islamic Republic was a painting with dark colors entitled cohesion and tremendous abilities. Today, the foundations of the regime in Tehran have been shaken. Reformists, such as “defeated” candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi, and former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani, are originally an integral part of the system. Yet today they stand against the plans of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad which aim at provoking the enmity of the United States, against plans of hegemony over the Middle East by provoking the enmity of Arabs and Sunnis in general, and against plans of wreaking havoc in Arab countries and employing militias. Perhaps they were less “against” in the past, but they have now crossed the threshold from which there is no return to what has passed and gone. They have defied the Supreme Leader, but he has behaved with political bias and thus his halo and authority have fallen. After events developed to the worse, the area of opposition – within the reformist movement – grew to include objecting to the absolute authority of the Vali-e-Faqih, Ayatollah Khamenei. Then after the circle of opposition widened and included sectors opposed to the regime, the reformists were forced to adapt and are today looking into the next phase of the confrontation. Will it be in the framework of strictly religious authorities, which would lead to abandoning those who call for secularism, as had previously taken place in 1979? Or will it be decided that Iran's interest requires a new mixed transitional regime that would turn it from a system of religious rule to a one that would separate religion and state? These are questions the Iranian people will answer in the coming weeks and months. As for now, it is clear that something new has happened in Iran, and that something new has happened to US policy towards Iran and perhaps to Iranian policy towards the interior, the region and the world. It is also clear that Barack Obama has been forced to return to the drawing-board to reconsider.
