The Syrian regime is headed toward resembling the state of North Korea, unconcerned with the near-total isolation that is experiencing in its relationship with its neighbors and the countries of the world. This is because it appears confident in its ability to hold out against this isolation. This is irrespective of how many western sanctions are passed, and how much harsher they become, and irrespective of how long the domestic protest movement against the regime continues. The Syrian National Council, which was formed in Istanbul at the beginning of the week, has set the toppling of this regime as its goal. There are objective reasons for the resemblance between the two countries, while each is distinctive in terms of its crisis in relations with the countries of the world. Damascus, like Pyongyang, has a security regime of steel, supported by a hard-line political doctrine, and is protected by the benefits that are enjoyed by a small number of people. Despite the various splits in the Syrian army, it, like the North Korean army, is standing firm, up to now, behind the rulers and is defending them. The two countries also resemble each other in that each has huge structural economic difficulties. They enjoy the support of Russia and China, in a confrontation with the west and a number of other countries, and the support of other important states, such as Iran and Venezuela, even though Tehran's support for Damascus is something that is centrally important for the future of both countries; it is exceptional support, on all levels. But each country is distinctive in its own ways. In North Korea, there is no domestic movement at all, compared to the unprecedented popular intifada that Syria is experiencing. The organizers of this intifada on the street are exhibiting rare bravery as they face the mechanism of oppression. Following the announcement of the formation of the National Council, the opposition now has something to represent it, a body that can be addressed by concerned countries. Thus, the international crisis in relations with Syria is going beyond the external reasons, which already exist, and is heading in the direction of domestic factors. Meanwhile, to the extent that there is an international decision for sanctions against North Korea, the issue is limited to its nuclear program. On the other hand, it has been impossible so far to see western sanctions on Syria, although they can be tough and effective on the Syrian economy, although it is based on agriculture and can enjoy self-sufficiency, unlike North Korea. But Pyongyang has found someone to negotiate with, whether bilaterally (with Washington) or the Group of Six in Asian and non-Asian states, which are following up the nuclear program, and putting forward initiatives. With Damascus, no such framework of negotiation exists; Syria has rejected the mere discussion of the initiative by the Arab League as a regional framework, although the initiative would cover seeing the Syrian president stay in power until presidential elections are held in 2014, a halt in violence against demonstrators, and a speeding-up of reforms. Syria has rejected all of the Turkish initiatives, which prompted Ankara to step up its policies and tone against the Syrian regime. This isolation to which Syria is being subjected, or is subjecting itself, exceeds that of North Korea, if we compare the two cases. Even more, regime officials and supporters go to great lengths to take pride in the ability to be isolated and turn inward, by playing up the foreign factors behind what Syria is experiencing, talking about the conspiracy and the that the regime is confronting "terrorist" groups armed by foreign parties. On the one hand, what is taking place in Syria is an objective reality, which will turn the country into an arena of struggle for influence. Nevertheless, the regime is using this aspect of the crisis in order to play down the objective domestic reasons that are behind the crisis, and whose importance outweighs any external factors. The isolation benefits the regime, in the eyes of regime officials, in achieving the goal it has set for itself, which is crushing the intifada at any price. Therefore, the regime sees a "security solution" as a political solution, and the reforms that have been announced are merely a "prettifying" of the security solution, so that these reforms are not the beginning of political change. It seems the ruling leadership has realized, very late, the extent to which Syrian society has changed. Reports from Damascus indicate that the regime's own appraisal is that those conducting the protests break down as follows: 80 percent are angry, unemployed young people who live under very difficult economic and political conditions, "and they have the right to have demands." Ten percent are Nasserists and pan-Arabists, along with some urban Salafist movements, while another ten percent are the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups. Some regime figures add that there are those who are exploiting the situation, to send weapons into the country, and these are used by some of the groups mentioned above. However, the problem lies in the regime's seeing it as a problem with these groups, irrespective of how big they are, and its deliberately ignoring these three groups. This does not hide the regime's desire to see the intifada become armed; if it does so, the opposition will be playing to the regime's strength.
