In light of the Arab revolutions, the Nasserist heritage seems to remain the most controversial, 41 years after Gamal Abdel Nasser's passing. Among all the ideologies that spread during the second half of last century, the Nasserist version of Arab nationalism appears to be the most confusing, at a time when its end cannot be clearly proclaimed. Indeed, the Baath, with its Iraqi and Syrian wings, has exited the circle of influence, not only as a system of governance but also as a political and intellectual framework calling for a civilizational and non-religious revival of a nation whose actual existence as a political entity is being argued by some. The talk about “one Arab nation,” let alone its “immortal message,” has consequently become a farce rather than serious political talk. It is understandable that the Baathist experience, due to its reliance on military coups to reach power and then on violence and oppression to maintain their authority, to its failure in all the experiences in which it engaged from development to the loss of the land before foreign occupation, and even the summoning of occupation as it was done by Saddam Hussein and is currently being done by the Syrian regime, cannot be promoted or respected as an archetype. The outcome of Nasserism is not any brighter. Indeed, the owner of the edifice saw its ruins while still alive during the 1967 defeat, whereas those who said they were following in his footsteps, whether the “custodian of Pan-Arabism” Muammar Gaddafi or the Nasserists of Syria, Lebanon and South Yemen (before the leftist inclination), did not offer any model capable of achieving the minimum level of success. Still, this did not cost Nasserism its attractiveness. It is likely that the recognition of the role of the crowds and the reliance on them to induce political change - as opposed to the Baathist military conspiracy tendency - allowed Nasserism to convey the need of the Arab communities to partake in the political process. Moreover, Nasserism was created by the majority – on the national and religious levels – in the biggest Arab country, and is consequently distant from the need to stress a tense secularism or to conceal narrow tribal and regional inclinations, as it was done by the Baath officers during the stages that followed the foundation. Hence, Nasserism seemed more reconciled with the small urban Muslim bourgeoisie, wishful to climb up the social ladder and participate in the political process in an open popular framework. The Nasserist system was involved in wide-scale oppression and campaigns against all its oppositionists, from the Communists to the Islamists, and humored a local chauvinism which was expressed by the theory of the three spheres, the Arab world, the African world and the Islamic world whose centers intersect and converge in Egypt. However, this did not prevent Gamal Abdul Nasser from enjoying actual popular support until the last day of his life. Moreover, the tragic end of Nasserism following the 1967 war and during the depletion war, earned it sympathy in the ranks of Egyptians and Arabs who have refused and are still refusing the recognition of the concomitance between the end of this theory and the passing of its founder. This does not mean that Nasserism does not carry the seeds of tyranny and exclusion – just like the Baath – but merely indicates that Nasserism is still capable of addressing the sensitivities of factions among the youth and the older segments, maybe due to the fact that it is free of the tensions which accompanied the emergence of the other nationalist parties. But does this mean that Nasserism is still valid as a method of governance in the future? Clearly, it is still maintained as a form of nostalgia for a dream which never materialized, rather than a method of governance or one to reach power. It will remain a requiem for the bitterness of defeat and the lost victory, rather than a way leading the path toward the future. The pictures of Gamal Abdul Nasser in the demonstrations of the Arab Spring do not say more than that.
