The campaign waged by major leaders of the Republican Party against the foreign policy pursued by Democratic President Barack Obama, may be marred by excessive one-upmanship. But ignoring it or treating it with condescendence, motivated by the achievements in Libya, would cost Obama dearly, especially if he fails to take decisive action in Syria or provides Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon with a way out, and for the regime in Damascus. True, Europe is the United States' current partner in the new alliance alarming Iran today, as it includes active Arab countries like those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), alongside Turkey, the NATO member-state. Nevertheless, there is a great deal of disparity between the American and European stances, because their interests diverge, and also because the dynamics of Europe's relationship with the countries of the region differ from those of their American counterpart. If Barack Obama is not to fall into a pitfall here or a trap there, he must pay the utmost attention to the American-European relationship with Iran, and immediately start figuring out what's required in terms of dealing with Lebanon at the present stage, until the regime in Damascus collapses, through regime-change, radical defeat or a coup d'état. Second, Obama must try to fully comprehend the nature and location of Iran's inevitable revenge for the defeat it would have suffered as a result of the downfall of its ally in Damascus, which was otherwise central to the ambitions of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Clearly, Lebanon was, until recently, barely on US administration's radar. Today however, in the wake of the popular uprising in Syria, it has once again come under its microscope. The reason for this is not just the relationship with the tripartite alliance among Bashar Al-Assad's regime in Damascus, the regime of the mullahs in Tehran and Hezbollah's regime in Lebanon. Nor is it Israel, which represents a major element of American policy, locally, regionally and internationally. But rather, the reason is the geopolitics that makes Lebanon, with the kind of government it has today, an artificial lung for both Iran and the regime in Damascus to breathe through. The Obama Administration has finally acknowledged that, regardless of the sanctions it imposes, whether bilaterally or multilaterally through the United Nations, against major figures of the regime in Damascus and in Tehran, these will remain of little use as long as the Syrian and Iranian regimes can still find air to breathe thanks to Lebanon. The US Administration has therefore recognized that Lebanon was the decisive element for completing the task – the task of shutting off the life support system feeding Damascus and Tehran. This in fact will require sanctions that are not restricted to Syria and Iran, but which also include the leaders of the government in Lebanon. Furthermore, the sanctions that are being examined far from the spotlight are not restricted to the banking sector, and to clamping down on money laundering, drug trafficking and their links to terrorism. Nor do they only affect individuals involved in partnerships and corporations inside and outside Lebanon, in particular with the major figures of the regime in Syria. The sanctions the Americans and the Europeans are considering at present, seek to strike a blow against Damascus and Tehran's artificial lung, starting with Lebanon's airport, which is under Hezbollah's control. Barack Obama does not want to repeat the Libyan scenario in Syria, with airstrikes carried out by NATO, and even fears an indirect role for the latter in ground operations. The last thing Obama wants is “American boots” on the ground, especially during an electoral cycle. Therefore, shutting off the Lebanese lifeline to the Syrian and Iranian regimes is very tempting, especially as it would achieve two other things in the process, namely stepping up the siege on Hezbollah and providing Lebanon with an opportunity to breathe normally. If Lebanon's airport is indeed a launching pad for unlawful operations at various levels, then blockading it with cumulative sanctions would shackle the tripartite alliance among the regimes in Damascus and Tehran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. There are many means of achieving this, be they exclusively American or joint American-European sanctions, and they do not require international resolutions. They are effective means that would shackle irregular free trade through the airport and other places, which would pull the rug from under the feet of the tripartite alliance without the need for military operations. It is a process of stepping up the siege on Iran and Syria through Lebanon, something that the US Administration could come to an agreement over with the European governments, or could implement unilaterally if any signs of delay or disagreement were to appear with some European leaderships, in view of the differences in their relations with both Iran and Hezbollah. The alliance that exists today between the United States and Europe over Libya does not negate the reality of the disparity in both the nature and dynamic of the European relationship with Iran and Hezbollah, compared to the relationship the United States has with the two, and subsequently with Syria. Furthermore, Hezbollah is not listed as a terrorist organization in Europe as it is in the United States. The Europeans also hold covert relations with Iran. And until recently, France had sought to break isolation of the regime in Damascus – at the behest of President Nicolas Sarkozy. This is regardless of the reasons for which such isolation had been imposed in the first place, with a primary role played by his predecessor Jacques Chirac in this, because of the Syrian meddling in Lebanon, and its involvement in political assassinations there. The United States is thus in need of a policy for the period that follows the current enthusiasm in the American-European partnership, especially as the Europeans do not view things from the American perspective, and vice versa, on Iran and its proxies in Syria or Lebanon. Meanwhile, the GCC countries, the party to a marriage of convenience with NATO, perceive the Iranian factor following the collapse of the Syrian regime from a completely different perspective. In truth, the GCC countries anticipate that Iran will engage in retaliatory operations through Hezbollah and other militias affiliated with Tehran, not against Israel, but against the Arab Gulf countries. Here, the statement recently made by Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi calling on Bashar Al-Assad to meet the “legitimate” demands of the Syrian people, could have almost been an initiative by an academic who once strived to be a reformer, but who was never ‘hands on', so to speak. Those words were thus of a single person who wields no influence, and they have had no repercussions or impact, neither among the leaders of the regime in Iran nor through its Lebanese mouthpieces. Assad's Syria today has no allies but Iran and Hezbollah, after Europe and the United States succeeded in isolating it both regionally and internationally. This was achieved by exhausting the Syrian regime with sanctions and an intensifying siege, by allying with the GCC countries, and finally – even if quite belatedly – by the stance taken by the League of Arab States and its offer to send a delegation to visit Damascus - an offer that was rejected by the Syrian regime. Even Russia's alliance with the Assad regime is an ephemeral one – regardless of the cost of such a transitory alliance in terms of innocent Syrian lives. Russia's interests with the West are much greater than its interests with the regime in Damascus. As such, Russia's leadership will do what it has done in the past, when it has found this to be in its interest – i.e. it will retreat and backtrack. This will happen sooner or later, and under one pretext or another. But Iran will not do the same. The regime of the Islamic Republic is well aware that if it should lose Syria, then this will cause it a tremendous setback that it will be compelled to compensate. While Iran fears the new alliance, which included the GCC countries, Turkey and Syria along with Europe and the United States, it will not stand idly by and do nothing. Thus, the GCC countries expect the regime in Iran, following the collapse of its ally in Damascus, to become a “wounded tiger” geared up for revenge. Yet such revenge, according to the estimates of those countries, will not take place in Lebanon and at the border with Israel, by using the Hezbollah card there. While would still involve Hezbollah, this card and that of the Iraqi militias will be played elsewhere within the GCC zone, through sabotage and terror in order to undermine stability. In other words, Hezbollah, according to those who are of this opinion, will turn into a destabilizing and subversive factor at the regional level, not at the Lebanese level – because the position held by Israel at the Lebanese border would hold back both Hezbollah and Iran together. The Gulf countries will try to distance themselves from ideological and partisan politics, as they believe that Hezbollah, after the fall of the regime in Syria, will be docile in Lebanon but rowdy in the Gulf region, to the benefit of Iran. Here too, the shadow of the differences between American and European stances appears. What the Gulf countries are working on is sending a clear message to the US Administration, signifying that if American and European ranks do not unite in confronting Iran in earnest, then the cards of subversion and destruction will affect this resource-rich region, and with it both American and European interests. For all these reasons, the issues of U.S. foreign policy must not become a mere squabble between the Republicans and the Democrats, at such a crucial stage for the Middle East. Instead, this deserves the utmost seriousness.
