The United States has just entered its extended presidential and congressional election season with the Republican battle over their party's nomination well underway and President Barack Obama having formally launched his reelection campaign. This regular feature of the American political system has important implications for US foreign policy and vital lessons for the Arab world. As always, the election context has a direct influence on both the conduct of, and the debate over, US foreign policy. For example, while the Obama administration clearly regards progress on peace between Israel and Palestinians as essential and not optional for US interests, no major peace initiative can be expected during the campaign season. These built-in restrictions are an integral part of the cautious American approach to pushing Obama's outline of renewed talks based on the 1967 borders with mutually agreed-upon land swaps and a focus on borders and security first. They also help explain why so little progress has been made in translating them into clearly defined negotiating terms of reference rather than generalized principles. The election season has also helped produce a hardening of attitudes in Congress towards the Palestinians, with administration officials having to defend continued aid to the Palestinian Authority against vehement criticism. And it prompted grandstanding by Republican lawmakers who threatened to defund the mission in Libya. It is unthinkable that Republicans would have threatened to defund a military effort by a Republican president, and they would have questioned the patriotism of anyone who tried to do so. Electioneering unquestionably distorts foreign policy, as it brings politics into conflict with policy, which is always a problem, even more than usual. But it helps clarify the mechanics through which US foreign policy is determined and the US national interest is defined. Many Arabs, and even Arab-Americans, tend to think of US policies as predetermined or subject to the machinations of small and shadowy groups of powerful players. To the contrary, as election seasons demonstrate most dramatically, the levers through which Americans define their interests and develop a policy consensus are, in fact, largely open, transparent and played out in public. The two main sources of leverage in American politics, including on foreign policy, are votes and money. These, more than any other factors, determine exactly who gets elected, and on what platforms. Media coverage, publicity and policy advocacy, especially when connected to broad national or influential elite sentiments, are also an important factor. These levers are available to all Americans, and there are no laws or mechanisms restricting who can apply them if they have the means and the will. History demonstrates that a sustained application of such resources eventually has a powerful impact on shaping how the country defines its national interests and what its policies will be. Arabs and Arab-Americans seem remarkably resistant to either understanding how the system works or, at least, deciding to participate in it enthusiastically. We have generally opted out of the process altogether, leaving an open playing field for others on many of our most cherished issues. Arab-Americans have failed to create strong, effective national institutions. Every single national Arab or Muslim American organization is smaller or in some way less effective than it was on September 10, 2011, which is a shocking indictment of the lack of interest of the community in defending itself or promoting its concerns. I'm not aware of a single registered lobbyist working for an Arab-American organization with Congress on Capitol Hill. The consequences of such woeful inaction are evident across the board. While direct political participation is reserved for American citizens only, Arab societies and governments have also demonstrated a bewildering disinclination to understand the importance of encouraging and supporting the development of Arab-American organizations. What Arab societies need in the United States are not clients but friends; allies, not employees. There has to be room for significant disagreement as well as agreement. But influential Arabs have shown a consistent preference for working with non-Arab-American organizations and companies that do not understand or really care about broader Arab concerns, and wasted huge amounts of money on this dead end. Both the Arabs and the Arab-Americans have the means, talent and resources to have a significant impact on the American policy conversation through the established political system, which is open to them in different capacities as citizens or noncitizens. The negative consequences of their persistent non-engagement or wrongheaded engagement is always evident, but becomes even more clear as elections approach. If we want Americans to sympathize with our positions, for example by adopting a more evenhanded policy towards Palestine, we must give them a reason to do so. Serious, sustained and meaningful engagement with the American political system, and creating and supporting relevant institutions, is the only way to accomplish this. Not doing so guarantees continued failure. *Hussein Ibish is a senior research fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine and blogs at www.Ibishblog.com.
