The international community is gearing up for a political battle that will take place in September at the United Nations, over the issue of the promised Palestinian statehood, while anticipating possible surprises in August, coming from either Syria, Libya or Yemen, where the revolutions are yet to be settled, either in favor of the people demanding change, or in favor of the regimes clinging to power. Nonetheless, the Security Council will most probably remain shackled with the start of India's presidency of the UNSC that will last throughout August. This is while bearing in mind that the atmosphere at the UNSC these days is reminiscent of the Cold War period, with the major countries of the Third World positioning themselves behind one of the two camps, with a slight inclination towards the Russian and Chinese position, mostly to protest the ‘monopoly' of decision making powers at the UNSC by the United States, Britain and France- in these countries' view of course. Yet by doing so, these countries are aligning themselves with the so-called ‘defiant axis', which practices obstructionism as a means to prevent the UNSC from tackling important issues and developments, such as the ones transpiring today in Syria. This axis comprises, in addition to Russia and China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. It also often hides behind the stances adopted by Lebanon, a country that is already powerless over the Syrian issue, to justify its failure to shoulder its responsibilities and to go too far in its defiance, in a manner that will eventually prove harmful for it and for its relations with the future Arab world. On the other hand, the tripartite Western axis, comprising Washington, London and Paris, and frequently supported by Germany and Portugal, behaves on the basis of mutual agreement, but not necessarily identical views, with regard to Middle Eastern affairs. While there indeed is absolute uniformity in this axis's views over the Libyan issue, the same does not apply with regard to Syria. However, this has recently started to change, as the American stance has evolved abruptly, and converged if not exceeded the European stance. With regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the difference between the American and European positions, while being explicit, will not turn into a dispute. Furthermore, there is not much enthusiasm on the part of Russia, China or the ISAB (India, South Africa and Brazil) to counter the American inflexibility at the UNSC with regard to Palestine, at a time when these same countries are fervent in opposing the discussion of the Syrian issue at the UNSC. This is indeed odd, especially as India prides itself in its democracy, while South Africa had gained its independence with the support of the peoples of the world, through the UNSC and the UN itself. Why then? And what is happening to the relations among the UNSC members in the context of the events in Libya, Syria and Palestine? On the issue of Libya, the stances of all UNSC members have started to converge progressively, in the wake of the fierce battle led by Russia against what it considers to be excesses perpetrated by NATO, in the course of the latter body's interpretation of resolution 1973 and its military operations in Libya. In truth, it was this resolution that reinforced the noncooperation of Russia, China and the ISAB with regard to allowing the UNSC to adopt any stance on the Syrian regime, even a toned down position that would criticize the crackdown against the protesters – or at least this is how the ‘defiant axis' wants to explain and justify its stances, while threatening to counter the ‘monopoly' of resolution 1973 and the West's going too far in interpreting its prerogatives. Noteworthy here is the fact that Russia now seems less stringent than South Africa and India with respect to the Libyan issue. For instance, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is now speaking in terms of a ‘post-Gaddafi' Libya, while the President of South Africa Jacob Zuma has opted to visit Tripoli several times, but did not bother to visit Benghazi- the headquarters of the National Transitional Council opposed to Gaddafi. Zuma has thereby made it clear that he is on the side of Gaddafi's regime, and not that of the revolution for change in Libya. As for India, its officials are sharply criticizing the rebels, the efforts underway at the UNSC to grant the ICC the authority to issue arrest warrants against Muammar Gaddafi and his son, as well as the operations carried out by NATO against pro-Gaddafi troops in aid of the rebels. What has taken place this week regarding the Libyan issue indicates that the bet on Gaddafi's good intentions is a losing one, even if the purpose of the mediation or the initiative is for him to save face and step down, while remaining in Libya immune from prosecution. Instead, Gaddafi is clinging to the African initiative, because its main gist is reform, not change. This means reforming the regime while maintaining Gaddafi at its helm. Gaddafi has also chosen to interpret the French initiative to allow him to stay in Libya after he steps down, as being consent to his remaining in power. He also understood Abdul Ilah al-Khatib's talk of a transitional authority, to be a vehicle for him to remain in power, while Khatib meant for his ideas to instead be a vehicle for Gaddafi to step down in a dignified manner. Gaddafi also found the international support for Khatib's efforts to be an opportunity for him to buy more time. Meanwhile, the fact that the UK has expelled Libyan diplomats and raised the level of its recognition of the NTC, from that of a party to dialogue to that of a governmental authority, is an important development that will give a boost to Khatib's future efforts. There is no longer any need for the transitional authority or transitional government mentioned among Khatib's ideas, now that pivotal countries have begun to consider the NTC to be in effect the official alternative government. Subsequently, what the mediating Envoy should do now is to think of a comprehensive initiative that would function according to a certain mechanism – and not mere ideas that gradually lead to a concession here, or even to a distortion of ideas there. A compromise is out of the question, something that renders the task of the “mediator” nearly impossible. The reason for this is that Benghazi maintains that Gaddafi stepping down is its primary precondition, while Tripoli says that refusing to step down is its own main precondition. Khatib therefore has only the choice of either saying to the rebels “No” to regime change and “Yes” to regime reform, or firmly and resolutely telling Gaddafi that stepping down is the fundamental precondition to any talk of a safe exit. However, Khatib will most probably not be able to say this unless the Security Council reaches unanimity over the language in which to inform of this. There is thus a need for Khatib to rehash his ideas into an initiative that does not seem like an open-ended peace “process”, and one that does not allow for making difficult demands on the part of either Gaddafi or the rebels. For this he needs the Security Council members to be serious about urgently resolving the Libyan issue, at a time when the head of Libya's intelligence, Abdullah Senussi, is threatening to enter into an alliance with al-Qaeda for the purpose of revenge, and at a time when Muammar Gaddafi is increasingly entrenched in his siege mentality and hunkered down. While it is true that India has interests in Libya, especially in the oil sector, India is betting the wrong way by pitting itself against the NTC and those rebelling against Gaddafi's oppression. It is harming itself by becoming an enemy of the future Arab world, whether in Libya or in Syria. The common denominator among the three ISAB countries is that each one of them is seeking a permanent seat at the Security Council. South Africa has nearly become a permanent member (without the right of veto) by holding the African seat every two years, while bearing in mind that Africa has three seats at the council, while the Arabs hold an African seat at times, and an Asian seat at others. Brazil sees itself as a leader and a pioneer in South America. Yet, just like India, it also seeks to play the “Third World” card, to say to the countries of the Third World: I am your representative and I am your voice. Both of them view the issue of Libya at the Security Council as central to the decision-making process within the UNSC. They both have massive interests in the United States. Yet they seem to separate these from their political stances. They are both upset at the fact that Japan enjoys complete American support for its permanent membership at the Security Council, while believing it not to oppose India's membership and to be forthcoming to it. The permanent seat at the Security Council represents a national interest, and one that is among the fundamental positions firmly held by India, the country which sees itself as a “political giant”, not just as a major economic player. Similarly, such a permanent seat is central to the ambitions of both Brazil and South Africa. The three countries in the ISAB axis thus adopt their stances at the Security Council on the basis of their own political interests, whether in the framework of the axis of defiance regarding the Syrian issue, the Libyan issue, or even their evasiveness on the Palestinian issue. Nevertheless, neither ISAB nor Russia and China are alone in placing their own interests above values and above justice. The United States, too, has always placed its own interests first, sometimes overstepping international laws, and has excessively supported Israeli impunity, at the expense of the Palestinians subjected to bitter occupation. Today, the Barack Obama Administration finds itself in the same position that previous administrations had found themselves in, being forced to backpedal on their promises to the Palestinians that is, in order to gain Israel's approval and also for considerations pertaining to the elections. Dennis Ross, the architect of U.S. policy on the Middle East at the National Security Council, has become known by the nickname “Mister Process”, i.e. the man who suffices himself with a mere peace “process” rather than achieving peace per se. Barack Obama has put him in charge of this issue, as had before him Presidents Bush Senior and Junior, and between the two, Bill Clinton. Ross tells the Europeans that they are wrong to warn of the consequences of the United States blocking the recognition of the Palestinian state at the United Nations. The Europeans will not, on their own, be able to help the Palestinians – neither within the Quartet on the Middle East, nor at the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Obama Administration is banking on the preoccupation of the Arab peoples with achieving change in their respective countries, and does not fear any reactions, as long as the Palestinian street does not erupt in the direction of Israel . In fact, Dennis Ross first came into the limelight when he sought to contain the First Palestinian Intifada, and he successfully did so, as he himself admits and boasts. But the Arab Spring spreading to Palestine will represent the greatest challenge for him, even though he currently assumes that this is impossible. This is why he does not fear reactions to the American stance in opposition to the fulfillment of the pledge to establish the state of Palestine, and the efforts in this direction at the United Nations in September. Will August be the month of surprises, or will September be the month of confrontation and frustration? The United Nations is watching and waiting, with a mixed sense of defiance and vigilance.
