The events witnessed in Homs since the beginning of the week leave no room for any doubts over the fact that the authority in Syria has relinquished “dialogue” and turned toward pure violence to suppress the ongoing uprising staged against it. Journalistic and diplomatic information reveal that the narrow circle surrounding President Bashar al-Assad decided to no longer offer additional “concessions” to the oppositionists, and hold on to power regardless of the cost. The consultative meeting failed to convince the Syrians – before any others – of the seriousness of the authority's attempt to put an end to the crisis through political negotiations. Moreover, the regime proved it was unable to make one step toward partnership in the decision-making process and the alleviation of the security grip, and one step away from the oppression of freedoms – as it was seen in its prohibition of the entry of Lebanese papers considered to be on its side – and the ongoing arrests and attacks targeting all those who dare demonstrate, by using the elements of its apparatuses and its supporters. Hence, the level of commotion and confusion prevailing over the regime is no longer a secret. The only clear policy in Syria today is based on two foundations. The first is the insistence on maintaining power regardless of the price paid by the citizens out of their own blood and livelihood. As for the second, it is the avoidance of any severance of the relations with the Western states, particularly the United States, as it was deduced from Minister Walid al-Muallem's press conference. There is extreme concern not to anger the Americans (if we were to put aside the attacks of the television channels and their guests who have no impact over Syria's policies). It is mainly due to the regime's realization of the fact that the West will play a major role in the upcoming settlement in Syria, whether by setting the ceiling of the Arab positions toward the uprising against the regime, or through the reactivation of the Turkish action. In other words, the United States holds the keys to the Arab, Turkish and European positions, and Damascus does not wish to engage in an open conflict with Washington before the latter adopts a decisive position against President Bashar al-Assad, a thing which has not yet been seen. In parallel to the slow and difficult accumulation witnessed by the Syrian revolutionary powers in producing their rhetoric and leaders and in spreading out to new areas, the regime went back to repeating its same practices, i.e. the raiding of homes and towns, the terrorization of the citizens by shooting at them and their houses, and the arrest of all those who are suspected of participating in the demonstration. However, since the first day of the crisis and the arrest of the children in Daraa, this method proved its failure and even its fueling of the opposition by providing it with the necessary evidence to consecrate its demands and turn them from mere temporary and local objections to a revolution aiming at changing the regime, and not just at toppling its head. In any case, the opposition cannot be blamed for using the regime's massive mistakes, since this is the primary and simplest role of political action. But on the other hand, one cannot disregard the sectarian dimension which the regime is trying to attribute to the uprising, and the slide of some who consider themselves to be oppositionists down that path. It would not be unfair to the Syrian opposition if we were to say that change should either be toward a state that treats all its citizens equally and rejects sectarianism, denominationalism and all their offshoots or should not be. This is true despite the realization in advance of the fact that the wheel of change has started turning, which is increasing the urgent character and necessity of the alertness.
