Whether President Ali Abdullah Saleh returns to Sanaa today as his supporters assert that he will, or remains in his Saudi hospital to continue his treatment for a few more weeks, he has proven that he was still the most powerful man in Yemen, and that he could even rule his nearly torn-apart country from his bed, after he came to know during his long reign the secret of survival, and successfully built powerful armed forces loyal to him, which were not weakened by a few defections here and there, and successfully continued to protect the regime and its governing apparatus. Let us be fair. Before the current protest movement began in mid-February, the situation in Yemen did not give the impression that it had reached the point of no return, and opposition parties with broad means of expression and publishing were not sounding the alarm about the country being on the verge of collapsing and of slipping into generalized chaos, as is happening now. Indeed, Yemen in the preceding period was facing many problems and difficulties, with disagreement between the regime and the opposition not being at their forefront. In fact, most prominent over the past few years has been the problem of Muslim extremists, who have provided safe haven to the Al-Qaeda organization, as well as that of the Houthi rebels, who have ties to Iran and are trying to carve out a microstate of their own on a sectarian basis Northwest of the country – in addition to the two chronic problems of poverty and unemployment, as well as the decline of oil revenues and the flagrant lack of water. Also to be fair, during more than thirty years in power, Ali Abdullah Saleh did not sufficiently confront the country's economic and social problems. And although the battles against secessionists in the South and in the North exhausted his treasury and his forces, he still could have done a great deal to alleviate the burden borne by his country's citizens. Like every ruler whose chief concern is to remain in power, he has taken the step of amending the constitution more than once to ensure that he could run as candidate, that he would be elected and that he would control the majority in Parliament. He did not listen to the advice that used to be given him about the necessity of completing the political reconciliation, especially with the Southerners, improving basic services provided to citizens, allowing for more freedom in the media, encouraging the role played by civil society, strengthening the rule of law, and organizing free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections. Yet the main parties to the opposition have not done much either and have not presented a unified program that would rein in Saleh's ambitions, sufficing themselves with demanding the restoration of their share of power after they felt that the President was monopolizing it and excluding them from it, despite having previously accepted the distribution of resources he was providing in reasonable proportions. Members of the opposition present in the streets today make up an incoherent mixture of political and religious movements and trends. And despite the fact that their movement and its timing were inspired by the wave of change that began in Tunisia and Egypt, vast contradictions were quickly revealed between their various groups. Indeed, the “Youths of the Revolution” protesting in public squares in the capital and in big cities, who are predominantly liberal, are demanding a modern democratic state hat would bring its people out of the Dark Ages, as well as amendments to the constitution that would prevent concentrating the powers of the three branches of governments in the hands of the President, and laws that would allow for moving towards an egalitarian civil society in which there would be no discrimination. Meanwhile, the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, for which Sheikh Abdul Majeed Al-Zindani represents the religious façade and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Al-Islah) the political and tribal one, is trying to impose its tutelage on the protest movement and to exploit it to serve its own interest and to reach power alone, after it had been part of Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime. Faced with the inability to immediately remove the President through the force of the street or through the assassination attempt, the Congregation for Reform is waging a fierce media campaign against regional and international parties which are formulating proposals for a consensual, gradual and safe transition of power, with the aim of sparing Yemen from further deterioration at the level of security and livelihood. Yet by doing this it is only making its task more complicated.
