Lebanon should not remain captive of Rafik Hariri's blood. Indeed, if it stays hanging on the rope of this terrible crime, this would perhaps achieve the will of his assassins. The country's fate is more important than the fate of any individual. I say this, and I consider Hariri to be an exceptional figure in the history of independent Lebanon. This man could have represented the backbone of a Lebanese settlement that would restore the republic's spirit, just like Kamal Jumblatt, Rene Moawad, and others – while taking into account the difference among the men and the stages. Hariri was a great player who sometimes missed the target and at others hit it. He represented the country's strategic reserve not only because of his Arab and international relations, but also because he became part of the major poles club without a single drop of blood on his hands – and this is a rare occurrence in Lebanon. Lebanon should not remain captive of Rafik Hariri's blood. The issue is not only about his blood, but also about those whose blood was shed during the river of assassinations that flowed after 14 February 2005. Indeed, Lebanon must not remain captive of their blood. The fate of peoples is to abandon painful shrines and build the future; to use the sacrifices of martyrs and entrench the republic of the living. It is impossible to exit the republic of all the shrines and all the martyrs with a factional mind and to yield to the others unless they die, whether they belong to this or that camp. A few days ago, I visited with my colleague Mohammad Choucair Prime Minister Najib Mikati to ask about the indictment, and we understood from his constantly reserved speech that it was imminent. I felt like asking our host, who is also an old friend, “Why did you throw yourself in the fire?” But I didn't say this, as I felt there is no use for dejected and belated words. When the indictment was issued and the identity of the four accused became known, I felt that the indictment was too huge for the country's tolerance threshold, just like the crime that was behind its issuance. I also felt that the indictment extends the fiery years that Lebanon went through since the terrible assassination. It also aggravates the process of sliding towards an appalling clash between Hezbollah's martyrs on the one hand, and the Cedar Revolution's martyrs on the other. Moreover, PM Mikati's government is not the best option to contain the dangers that emerge at a deeply worrisome moment both domestically and regionally. Also, forcefully removing Lebanon from the STL does not imply its exit from Hariri's blood, and has perhaps led to the opposite. My feeling about the danger of the indictment's content led me to imagine various scenarios. I said that the Lebanese will not lose the opportunity to curb the momentum towards the abyss. I believed that all the political forces will act according to national responsibility, leaping over all previous calculations and what came with them. Lebanon was supposed to welcome the indictment with a government of poles, headed by Saad Hariri. The reasons are simple: the initial delegation by the voters before the forceful recruitment process. Also, he is the son of the man whose blood it is requested to exit, and he has legitimacy in making demands and compromises. He is the most widely represented in his sect, with the acknowledgment of his opponents. Further, he had expressed a readiness to exit the blood of martyrs – provided this exit is made to the benefit of the state, based on reconciliation, pardon, and the revival of institutions. This is not to mention that his presence is a guarantee to thwart the sectarian conflict and avoid international isolation. Had he been at the head of a government of pardon and reconciliation, Saad Hariri would've had to drink the poison of some compromises and put them at the service of the compromise to the state. His presence was beneficial to his opponents more than to his allies. He would've exempted Hezbollah from saying later that his refusal to surrender the four accused men led to economic deterioration and isolation both at the Arab and international levels. Hariri's presence was better for the resistance and its image in the Arab and Islamic world, even if it paid the price of its existence in the form of a compromise to the benefit of the state. Hariri's presence would've exempted PM Mikati from hearing later that the blood of the most important Sunni figure in this part of the world was lost during his government's mandate. It would've exempted Walid Jumblatt from hearing that he contributed in making the country pay for the establishment of the STL then contributed in making it pay for its moving away from the STL. Also, it would've exempted General Michel Aoun from hearing in his milieu that he lost the blood of Gibran Tueni, Pierre Gemayel, and Antoine Ghanem, “for a handful of ministries”, and I like General Aoun and do not want him to be the object of such an accusation. Saad Hariri's presence at the head of a government of poles that would welcome the indictment and assimilate it in an atmosphere of pardon and reconciliation would have been in the state's interest, and in the interest of Syria amidst the difficult circumstances it is going through. I am not sure that Hariri's presence at the head of such a government would have been in his interest. However, it is fine for Hariri to lose a little or a lot of his credit in order to save the country and prevent strife. I have a feeling that he would've accepted the risk of leading Lebanon from a time of shrines to a time of the state. The decision to remove Hariri was not levelheaded. It gave him the opportunity to move away from the poison cup, and his image of a threatened man who is unjustly treated will increase his popularity. Those who encouraged Mikati to sit in Hariri's seat did not arm him with the necessary weapons. Staying in the Grand Serail in such circumstances resembles being on a fault line.
