The common denominator between Algeria, Libya (with its Jamahiriya), Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Mauritania is that they all have adopted a presidential system and all suffer acute crises. This reached the point where the Arab presidential system has become synonym with predicament, while violence has become a way out from it as it is confirmed by the experiences of the aforementioned countries, without any exception. The predicament in these countries lies exactly where the presidential system ought to present a solution to any political crisis, i.e. to provide the opportunity to change the adopted policies through free and pluralistic elections and the transition of power. This is the only safety valve of the presidential systems, and the only possible reference to exit the sphere of crises and violence. But in our Arab countries, the title has nothing to do with the content. Indeed, except for the Lebanese case - which enjoys its own specificity - these republics emerged following military partisan coups and set the foundation for a permanent rule. As for the constitutions, they were drawn up to justify this durability, thus rendering tyranny the reference of these presidential systems. Consequently, communication was severed between the calls of those controlling these regimes for the respect of the constitution, and the calls of those protesting on the street and demanding the change of the regime. At this level, the respect of the constitution means the continued adoption of the reference of tyranny, while the calls to change the regime denote the adoption of another reference allowing a peaceful transition of power. Hence, the protesting demonstrators kept taking to the streets in greater numbers whenever the ruler announced a measure in form, considering that neither the announcement of the abolition of the presidency for life (Tunisia), nor the non-candidacy for a new term (Egypt) or the introduction of change via the constitution (Yemen and Syria) meant to the protesters that the regime will change its reference. The ruler thus announces that he is meeting demands and making concessions as called for by the protesters. But the latter are not convinced by what he is offering – or so he thinks – which is why he turns the protesters into saboteurs. Had they not been so, they would have accepted what he offered, wished him a long life and went back to the way things were. This is where the core of the crisis lies in these Arab republics. Their tyrannical reference does not allow them to perceive any other vision or to establish a new relationship between the ruler and the citizens. The Syrian experience constitutes the archetype of this wrong method, since after three months of demonstrations, oppression and destruction, the regime saw nothing but factional demands or ones related to oil prices or the increase of wages. In the meantime, it is surprised by the people's non-welcoming of its measures. Moreover, what the ruler has so far failed to see is that the citizens, who have been living for over half a century under a regime with a tyrannical reference, want one with a democratic reference. Moreover, these people who one day accepted a partisan authority which enjoyed popularity, are now governed by apparatuses covered up by a crumbling partisan crust. They started realizing there was a constitution tailored to fit a president who can control the party's apparatuses and the state institutions indefinitely, and who enjoys prerogatives exceeding those of the latter. They also know that the president can, with a presidential decision, introduce amendments that can change the reference of the rule without resorting to any committees or dialogue. As for President Bashar al-Assad who is known for his obsession with the definition of the meanings of terms and expressions, he still believes there are legitimate livelihood demands and political disruptive demands in Syria. The adopted approach still fails to recognize that what is required is to change the regime's political reference, and not lower the prices of oil or secure the release of demonstrators.
