Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and those close to him are fortifying themselves in Tripoli, out of which are issued orders to the forces loyal to him to attack this or that position controlled by the rebels. And despite their use of heavy machinery of death and destruction, all movement by Gaddafi forces has remained in a kind of attack and retreat mode, with no impact on the fate of the armed confrontation, even if it is spreading death and destruction and increasing the extent of losses. Gaddafi has now become completely isolated diplomatically and politically, and yet he is still wagering on receiving a fame-seeking lawyer here or a celebrity there, trying to reap the Colonel's last remaining fruits. He is also wagering on receiving the envoys of major countries, especially Russia and China. And in all such exchanges, Gaddafi has failed to put forward any kind of credible offer that could be built upon to begin the phase of reaching a solution. Gaddafi cannot impose the solution that he imagines, and he cannot offer what could be an acceptable solution. He is in a total predicament. On the other hand, the National Transitional Council, which speaks for the majority of those opposed to Gaddafi's rule, is fortifying itself in Benghazi. It sends units of its fighters to this or that position held by Gaddafi forces, repeating the latter's strategy of attack and retreat, without managing to achieve substantial progress that would settle the confrontation on the field. In parallel to Gaddafi's growing diplomatic isolation, the Transitional Council is gaining increasing international recognition, and has become the main body speaking in the name of the Libyan people. Yet such diplomatic success, and perhaps because it has been so successful, has not allowed the Council to attract Libyans still loyal to Gaddafi, for tribal, geographical or even political reasons. In other words, the Council's foreign success has found no real translation that would reverse the internal balance of power. And just as stagnation has become the distinguishing feature of the military confrontation on the field, the Transitional Council's political efforts at the domestic level have also been stagnating. This is in view of its lack of a comprehensive vision, whether in terms of the process of reaching a settlement with Gaddafi or in terms of the process of drafting a future without the Colonel. At the same time, North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) forces are moving forward with their air raids on positions held by Gaddafi, and with them death and destruction continue to spread, without these raids affecting, except within narrow limits, the nature of the military balance of power. On the background of these bombings, the International Libyan Communication Group (ILCG) is holding meetings which, even if they aim at financially supporting the Transitional Council, have achieved no serious breakthrough in affecting the stances of the two major powers (China and Russia) that object to how the UN Resolution on imposing a no-fly zone and protecting civilians is being interpreted. And this means that NATO's military mission is marking time with the tactic of air raids without managing to impose a solution on Gaddafi, who could still escape with his life, which is perhaps being targeted by those raids. Furthermore, NATO forces participating in the campaign against Gaddafi have come to suffer from a lack of capabilities and funding, as some members have announced their withdrawal from military operations over Libya, and with the complications represented by Republicans in the US Congress for the Barack Obama Administration's strategy in Libya. As for the Arabs who were enthusiastic about the decision for the international community to intervene against Gaddafi, they seem to have opted to remain silent, after situations have arisen elsewhere in the Arab World which are similar to that of Libya and in which they do not wish to interfere. The Arabs have suspended Libya/Gaddafi's membership in their League, and “spared the faithful the evils of battle”… They did not develop such a decision in a direction that would be of service to a political settlement, not just because they are insignificant for Gaddafi, but also because of their own inability to interfere. It thus seems that all sides of the Libyan crisis are faced with a predicament and a dead-end road in terms of reaching a viable political settlement. And unless an unexpected event were to take place, such as Gaddafi loyalists revolting against him in Tripoli or the Colonel being killed in an air raid, it seems that the predicament is likely to persist for a long time – time during which the Libyan people will continue to pay an exorbitant price in lives and property.
