Many ask about Egypt's state after the revolution, as they see a security breakdown still afflicting the country's streets, neighborhoods, cities and institutions; special interest protests obstructing people's businesses and industry coming to a halt; major figures of the regime remaining in place, a regime with its head toppled and its body collapsed while its cells refuse to leave their positions; procrastination in taking necessary decisions, which, if they are issued, are issued too late, after the train has left them and moved to the next station; and a Prime Minister who reached his seat as a result of the revolution and from the heart of its protest square, without achieving the ambitions of those who carried him on their shoulders and considered him to be one of them. People watch a controversial state media balancing between rejecting the revolution from its very basis, hinting without being sincere about it, and trying to ride its wave – from the same people who had accused the revolutionaries of being foreign agents, intruders and instruments of foreign forces. Some of those who started the revolution and sacrificed for it, alongside other Egyptians and friends of Egypt abroad, were upset by the absence of a program for the revolution, one that would determine the type of rule in the next phase. This has resulted in political fluidity that has made any person or any party or group that wants to do something, whatever it is, able to do it without anything to tie them down or keep them in check, even if they have nothing to do with politics or are downright odd. There are also the roles played by men of religion, who now speak more of politics than of religion, and discuss government more than the principles of Islam or Christianity, thus reaching the forefront of a political scene devoid of politicians, and in the absence of vision among other forces in society, forces that have turned to clerics or priests in order to gain a fatwa or a statement to the benefit of this or that party. Many continue to be upset, including from phenomena considered to have been produced by the revolution: the appearance of Salafists and their presence in the street and in the media after they had been present in mosques and dark corners, turning from lying in wait to seeking to play a political role under the umbrella of Islam, or impose virtue by force and prevent vice through violence. People also wonder about the Muslim Brotherhood, which has gained legitimacy after having been banned for years, about their plans for the future, their dominant presence on the political scene, their influence in the street, and the extent to which they might be tolerant of others. Some detect conflicting scenes: supporters of a club storming the stadium before the end of a game to assault, destroy and act like “baltagiya” (thugs) for no reason aside from spreading chaos and fear; state television programs that continue to promote fear, reminisce about the past and hint to the “blessing” of bygone stability; numerous baltagiya appearing at every assembly and place to ruin someone's joy or thwart someone's achievement; an attack against Doctor Mohamed El-Baradei during the referendum; the disruption of Amr Moussa's seminar in El-Sawy Culturewheel; and a brawl at a celebration at the press union! They wonder: are these the results of the revolution… or of any revolution? Or is this the counterrevolution? What is certain is that the crime of withdrawing security forces on January 28 gave rise to dangerous repercussions and caused many of the negative effects which Egyptian citizens have experienced and continue to experience after the revolution. Had this crime not been committed and had the revolution triumphed with the police present and security forces still in place on the background of keeping the country completely secure and protecting its fate, from regulating traffic in the streets to guarding its public institutions, acts of baltagiya would not have proliferated or spread, and the police would not have now seemed unable to restore its standing or to confront every crisis. What is also certain is that the formerly ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) spread like cancer throughout the country and connected the interests of large numbers of Egyptians to its remaining in power. And when the NDP fell, those interests were lost or threatened, and those who held them had no choice but to resist all reform and oppose all stability. Equally certain is the fact that the situation calming down and the wheel of industry returning to turn will enable state authorities of every branch to pursue all those who have corrupted and to arrest all those who seek to abort the revolution. Also certain is the fact that the army protected the revolution, supported it and refused to stifle it. But the army was not prepared to govern or to get involved in politics. Its tanks and armored vehicles were prepared to go to war in the desert, not to drive over asphalt and to remain in streets and squares, which explains what some have considered to be slowness or delay. And certainly the Muslim Brotherhood's political discourse is reassuring, just as their movement on the political scene is focused on participation, not exclusion. Moreover, the Brotherhood has paid the price in advance and over many long years. And when freedom became available to all, the Salafists appeared and so did the mistakes committed by some of them. The remnants of the regime used them to terrorize people and to portray them as the sole outcome of the revolution… And finally what is certain is that the sands of time do not flow backwards, that Egypt is headed towards a future brighter than its recent past, and that Egyptians have changed the face of history and have sacrificed during the revolution… and after it too.
